There is a dispute in philosophy of language about the nature of singular reference. The descriptivist says that it is always mediated by a descriptive content and the referentialist says that sometimes it is not, in particular when we use indexicals and proper names (see, e.g., Devitt and Sterelny 1999). In these cases, according to the referentialist, the referent itself is the meaning. Thus according to descriptivism, self-reference by means of a token of “I” is mediated by a descriptive content, whereas it is not according to referentialism. There are very good reasons in favor of descriptivism. Yet, we can entertain “self-knowledge propositions,” typically appealed to in foundationalist epistemology, which suggest otherwise, or so it seems to me. Thus, if I am right, there is a dilemma. I illustrate why we face this dilemma and then I shall suggest a way out that saves descriptivism.
Self-reference and self-knowledge
ORILIA, Francesco
2007-01-01
Abstract
There is a dispute in philosophy of language about the nature of singular reference. The descriptivist says that it is always mediated by a descriptive content and the referentialist says that sometimes it is not, in particular when we use indexicals and proper names (see, e.g., Devitt and Sterelny 1999). In these cases, according to the referentialist, the referent itself is the meaning. Thus according to descriptivism, self-reference by means of a token of “I” is mediated by a descriptive content, whereas it is not according to referentialism. There are very good reasons in favor of descriptivism. Yet, we can entertain “self-knowledge propositions,” typically appealed to in foundationalist epistemology, which suggest otherwise, or so it seems to me. Thus, if I am right, there is a dilemma. I illustrate why we face this dilemma and then I shall suggest a way out that saves descriptivism.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
