With the judgment under consideration, the Court of Justice of the European Union has once again ruled on the compatibility with EU competition rules of a particular type of agreement used to settle patent disputes between originator and generic pharmaceutical companies, known as reverse payment patent settlements (or pay-for-delay agreements). Building on its previous case law on the matter, the Court dismissed the appeal brought by the pharmaceutical companies, thereby confirming the characterisation of the settlement agreement concluded between the parties as a restriction of competition by object in violation of Article 101 TFEU. This paper first outlines the factual and procedural background of the case as well as the issues brought before the Court of Justice. It then examines the position adopted by the Court in the relevant judgment, situating it within the line of case law to which it belongs and of which it represents the latest development. Finally, it offers some concluding remarks on the European pay-for-delay saga in light of the main points around which it has developed and been addressed.
Con la sentenza in commento, la Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea è tornata a pronunciarsi sulla compatibilità con le norme dell’Unione in materia di concorrenza di una particolare categoria di accordi di composizione amichevole delle controversie brevettuali conclusi tra imprese farmaceutiche innovatrici e produttori di medicinali generici, noti come reverse payment patent settlements (o accordi pay-for-delay). Riprendendo la propria precedente giurisprudenza in materia, la Corte ha respinto l’impugnazione proposta dalle imprese farmaceutiche, confermando la qualificazione dell’accordo transattivo concluso dalle parti come restrizione della concorrenza per oggetto in violazione dell’articolo 101 TFUE. Dopo aver ricostruito la vicenda e le questioni giuridiche sottoposte all’attenzione della Corte di giustizia, il contributo si sofferma sulla posizione assunta dalla Corte su tali questioni nella sentenza in esame, considerandola in relazione al filone giurisprudenziale in cui essa si inserisce e di cui rappresenta l’evoluzione più recente. Si propongono infine alcune riflessioni complessive sulla vicenda europea dei pay-for-delay alla luce dei principali punti attorno ai quali essa si è sviluppata ed è stata affrontata.
I reverse payment patent settlements nel settore farmaceutico come restrizioni della concorrenza per oggetto: gli sviluppi più recenti nel caso Teva/Cephalon
Campiglia, Alessandra
In corso di stampa
Abstract
With the judgment under consideration, the Court of Justice of the European Union has once again ruled on the compatibility with EU competition rules of a particular type of agreement used to settle patent disputes between originator and generic pharmaceutical companies, known as reverse payment patent settlements (or pay-for-delay agreements). Building on its previous case law on the matter, the Court dismissed the appeal brought by the pharmaceutical companies, thereby confirming the characterisation of the settlement agreement concluded between the parties as a restriction of competition by object in violation of Article 101 TFEU. This paper first outlines the factual and procedural background of the case as well as the issues brought before the Court of Justice. It then examines the position adopted by the Court in the relevant judgment, situating it within the line of case law to which it belongs and of which it represents the latest development. Finally, it offers some concluding remarks on the European pay-for-delay saga in light of the main points around which it has developed and been addressed.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


