Platonism about properties holds that there are uninstantiated properties. For properties do not depend on their instances, whereas their instances depend on them. In this paper, I shall discuss two ‘heterodox’ versions of Platonism about properties: Meinongian Essentialist Platonism about Properties and Mutualist Essentialist Platonism about Properties. In Section 1 I shall introduce what I label ‘Orthodox Platonism about Properties’, its virtues and problems. In Section 2 I shall present a weaker form of Platonism, i.e., Essentialist Platonism about Properties (EPP), which only takes into account the essential dependence relations between Platonic properties and their instances. In line with this view, in Section 3 and Section 4 two versions of EPP will be presented: Meinongian EPP and Mutualist EPP. The former roughly consists in claiming that Platonic properties do not have the sort of existence that is typical of substances, though they are endowed with essences. The latter roughly consists in claiming that Platonic properties existentially depend on their instances but their instances essentially depend upon them. In Section 5 and in Section 6 I shall reconsider the problems that affect Platonism about properties and show how Meinogian EPP and Mutualist EPP can successfully cope with them.

Platonism in Better Shape

Paolini Paoletti, Michele
2026-01-01

Abstract

Platonism about properties holds that there are uninstantiated properties. For properties do not depend on their instances, whereas their instances depend on them. In this paper, I shall discuss two ‘heterodox’ versions of Platonism about properties: Meinongian Essentialist Platonism about Properties and Mutualist Essentialist Platonism about Properties. In Section 1 I shall introduce what I label ‘Orthodox Platonism about Properties’, its virtues and problems. In Section 2 I shall present a weaker form of Platonism, i.e., Essentialist Platonism about Properties (EPP), which only takes into account the essential dependence relations between Platonic properties and their instances. In line with this view, in Section 3 and Section 4 two versions of EPP will be presented: Meinongian EPP and Mutualist EPP. The former roughly consists in claiming that Platonic properties do not have the sort of existence that is typical of substances, though they are endowed with essences. The latter roughly consists in claiming that Platonic properties existentially depend on their instances but their instances essentially depend upon them. In Section 5 and in Section 6 I shall reconsider the problems that affect Platonism about properties and show how Meinogian EPP and Mutualist EPP can successfully cope with them.
2026
Springer
Internazionale
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-026-00687-1
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11393/375170
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