Ingiustizia epistemica, intelligenze artificiali e sfide morali

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems sound to hold an epistemic advantage on individuals in nowadays mature information societies, insofar as they are capable of navigating, making sense, and inferring valuable knowledge from the datafied reality we live in, ourselves included. Such advantage spurred their pervasive use so that today AI systems co-participate and reshape the majority of epistemic tasks and decisions we form and take. While such a role and impact are recognized, whether they benefit or harm individuals epistemically ought to be investigated. This paper aims to elucidate the epistemic challenges posed by algorithmic technology to individuals in their epistemic standing, by drawing on theories on epistemic injustice developed in moral philosophy and social epistemology. By doing so, the paper aims also to clarify the moral threats entrenched with the AI-based epistemic harms outlined and to finally point out the role of moral philosophy for AI ethics to tackle them. KEYWORDS