Bill, Bowl and Ball. A Tale of Disjunctive Properties

The existence of disjunctive properties has been put in question by many philosophers. In this article, I shall offer an argument for the existence of such properties. I shall show that they are required in order to ground certain objective and unique resemblances between things. In Section 1, I develop the argument by presenting a toy example involving three entities: a red fish (Bill), a glass and round fish bowl (Bowl), and a red ball (Ball). In Section 2, I deal with two strategies to rebut my argument. Such strategies respectively consist in denying that there is any objective and unique similarity between Bill, Bowl and Ball, and in holding that such a similarity is based on non-disjunctive properties. In Section 3, I examine and reject two further strategies, that consist in holding that grounding objective and unique similarities is not enough in order for something to exist as a property and in pointing to some more general concerns about disjunctive properties.