This article widens the theoretical debate on congruence in voting by including the municipal level on top of the consolidated national-regional comparisons. The concept of multi-level congruence (MLC) is introduced and an original dataset is computed in order to investigate two distinct territoriallevel comparisons in Italy and Spain: the national-municipal and the regionalmunicipal. By building on several strands of literature, the article tests different predictors of congruence. Our findings show that local elections are more likely to be impacted by national (and, to a smaller extent regional) politics in central, large municipalities; while local politics is more likely to prevail in peripheric, small municipalities. Moreover, municipal elections are second-order with respect to the national-level at least when election timing is taken into account. Furthermore, historical voting patterns also play a role in explaining the incongruence between local and national elections. Finally, national party-system reshuffle (slightly) affects congruence only for the regional-municipal comparison – and surprisingly not for the national-municipal one.
Assessing Multi-Level Congruence in Voting in Comparative Perspective. Introducing the municipal level
Grimaldi S;
2021-01-01
Abstract
This article widens the theoretical debate on congruence in voting by including the municipal level on top of the consolidated national-regional comparisons. The concept of multi-level congruence (MLC) is introduced and an original dataset is computed in order to investigate two distinct territoriallevel comparisons in Italy and Spain: the national-municipal and the regionalmunicipal. By building on several strands of literature, the article tests different predictors of congruence. Our findings show that local elections are more likely to be impacted by national (and, to a smaller extent regional) politics in central, large municipalities; while local politics is more likely to prevail in peripheric, small municipalities. Moreover, municipal elections are second-order with respect to the national-level at least when election timing is taken into account. Furthermore, historical voting patterns also play a role in explaining the incongruence between local and national elections. Finally, national party-system reshuffle (slightly) affects congruence only for the regional-municipal comparison – and surprisingly not for the national-municipal one.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
2020_Grimaldi_Bolgherini_Paparo_LGS.pdf
solo utenti autorizzati
Tipologia:
Documento in post-print (versione successiva alla peer review e accettata per la pubblicazione)
Licenza:
DRM non definito
Dimensione
932.46 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
932.46 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri Richiedi una copia |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.