This paper deals with the relationship between regulatory compliance, bureaucratic corruption, lobbying and the industrial structure of a country. We show that lobbying and bureaucratic corruption can coexist at the macro level when we allow for heterogeneity in firm size. Countries with similar level of development are often characterized by very different industrial structures: we show the implications this has for the level of compliance, corruption and lobbying in that country. Welfare implications of our model point toward encouraging policies that support the small business sector of an economy and toward flexible regulatory policies meant to suppress regulation for small enough firms.

Bribes, Lobbying and Industrial Structure

Cerqueti, R;Coppier, R;
2021

Abstract

This paper deals with the relationship between regulatory compliance, bureaucratic corruption, lobbying and the industrial structure of a country. We show that lobbying and bureaucratic corruption can coexist at the macro level when we allow for heterogeneity in firm size. Countries with similar level of development are often characterized by very different industrial structures: we show the implications this has for the level of compliance, corruption and lobbying in that country. Welfare implications of our model point toward encouraging policies that support the small business sector of an economy and toward flexible regulatory policies meant to suppress regulation for small enough firms.
Springer
Internazionale
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
ITEJ_Cerqueti2021_Article_BribesLobbyingAndIndustrialStr.pdf

solo utenti autorizzati

Tipologia: Documento in post-print (versione successiva alla peer review e accettata per la pubblicazione)
Licenza: DRM non definito
Dimensione 416.16 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
416.16 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11393/287089
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 1
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 0
social impact