Attualismo, pluralismo ontologico e meinonghismo

In this paper, I shall consider the advantages and the problems connected with the acceptance of J. Turner’s and K. McDaniel’s ontological pluralism, i.e., of the thesis that there are different ways of being (or of existing) that are more fundamental than being (or existence) in general. In the first section, I shall examine two problems for actualists, i.e., for those philosophers who claim that there are no entities that do not exist. In the second section, I shall evaluate the advantages of actualist ontological pluralism in dealing with such problems. Nevertheless, in the third section, I shall introduce several problems that affect in turn ontological pluralism. Finally, in the fourth section, I shall defend the idea that non-actualist (i.e., Meinongian) ontological pluralists can deal with some (but not all) these problems in a more perspicuous way. My conclusion will be that, if one aims at defending ontological pluralism, s/he should try to argue for it from a non-actualist perspective.