The main goal of the present work is to analyze the evolution of non-compliant ﬁrms in public procurement. The dynamic setting is formalized by an evolutionary adaptation process which describes whether honest or dishonest behavior prevails in society at any given time. Firms will either behave in an honest or dishonest way depending on the payoﬀs and the type of ﬁrms they meet, through a word-of-mouth process. The honesty propensity assumption is introduced. By making use of both analytical tools and numerical techniques, we show that monomorphic conﬁgurations may represent stable or unstable equilibria, while coexistence of both groups in the steady state is possible and its asymptotic stability is sensitive to parameter modiﬁcations. Moreover, a rich variety of integrated dynamic behavior can be observed due to diﬀerent kinds of bifurcations, smooth or border collision. A social planner can evaluate social and/or ﬁscal policies to manipulate preferences for honest behavior.
|Titolo:||Evolutionary eﬀects of non-compliant behavior in public procurement|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2019|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01.01 Articolo in Rivista|
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