Gli elementi dell'esperienza. Note su Kant e il problema dell'individuazione

The Elements of Experience. Remarks on Kant and the Problem of Individuation · The problem of individuation is certainly not a main question in Kantian philosophy. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it immediately concerns the basic distinction between intuitions and concepts, it lies on the cornerstone of the system. Reading transcendental philosophy from this point of view allows us not only to focus on some of its marginal areas (on infancy for example, or on the activity of ‘noticing’ and on the nature of marks, notae, Merkmale, which are the objects of this noticing, or still on the distinction between intuitive and conceptual marks), but also to clarify some of its key concepts. My point in this article is that the Kantian solution to the problem of individuation is not a real one: given that the individuation of one single thing is entirely referred to some factors (space, time and the immediacy of intuition) which are extrinsic to the thing itself, it follows that a thing can be said ‘one and the same’ only by reference to the relationship it has with our experience of it.