This paper examines the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the euro crisis through the lens of a robust political economy. Based on the history of monetary unions, monetary union is unlikely to survive without a fiscal union or strong constitutional constraints. The EMU has neither, and its institutional structure makes it unsustainable. Since the euro was (and is) fundamentally a political – rather than economic – project, we argue that policymakers will not allow the EMU to fail. Rather, continued movement towards greater EU-level fiscal, and ultimately a fiscal union, are likely
Monetary Union without fiscal union? The Euro crisis and the move towards European fiscal union
SPIGARELLI, Francesca;
2015-01-01
Abstract
This paper examines the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the euro crisis through the lens of a robust political economy. Based on the history of monetary unions, monetary union is unlikely to survive without a fiscal union or strong constitutional constraints. The EMU has neither, and its institutional structure makes it unsustainable. Since the euro was (and is) fundamentally a political – rather than economic – project, we argue that policymakers will not allow the EMU to fail. Rather, continued movement towards greater EU-level fiscal, and ultimately a fiscal union, are likelyFile in questo prodotto:
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