I explain the notions of propositions and states of affairs as they are understood in the current ontological debate and I briefly relate them to similar notions in Aristotle and some Medieval authors. In contrast with the point of view of some philosophers (e.g., the early Russell, Castañeda and Gaskin) who identify propositions and states of affairs, I argue that they need to be sharply distinguished. I then move on to a problem for propositions and, above all, states of affairs, known as Bradley's regress, and hint at discussions of this or analogous puzzles in the philosophical tradition before Bradley. Finally, I present my own approach to this issue, Fact Infinitism, focusing on why it would have been hardly acceptable before ontology came to have the Cantorian conception of the infinite at its disposal.
Tradition and Innovation in Ontology: The Case of Propositions and States of Affairs
ORILIA, Francesco
2012-01-01
Abstract
I explain the notions of propositions and states of affairs as they are understood in the current ontological debate and I briefly relate them to similar notions in Aristotle and some Medieval authors. In contrast with the point of view of some philosophers (e.g., the early Russell, Castañeda and Gaskin) who identify propositions and states of affairs, I argue that they need to be sharply distinguished. I then move on to a problem for propositions and, above all, states of affairs, known as Bradley's regress, and hint at discussions of this or analogous puzzles in the philosophical tradition before Bradley. Finally, I present my own approach to this issue, Fact Infinitism, focusing on why it would have been hardly acceptable before ontology came to have the Cantorian conception of the infinite at its disposal.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
