The theory of evolution and scientific realism are closely connected in the program of Evolutionary Epistemology (EE). This paper aims to show that the very broad, naturalistic conception of cognition adopted by EE, which comprises an amoeba’s reactions as well as human symbolic thinking, usually leads to confusion between adaptation to the environment on the one hand and knowledge (as presupposing claims which can be either true or false) on the other hand. As a consequence, the sense, scope and validity of the epistemological realism espoused by the vast majority of the champions of EE are unclear. When the distinction between adaptation to the environment and human knowledge is reinstated, EE can be upheld consistently either as a philosophical interpretation of Darwin’s evolutionary theory which supports a moderate form of hypothetical realism, or as a scientific research program which investigates the neurological and biological structures involved in thinking and social life. In both cases, the human capacity to conceptualise, evaluate and change reality cannot be entirely reduced to biological concepts. Without assuming the human capacity to take a disinterested, objective standpoint, the condition of any scientific and philosophical investigation of reality – including both programs of EE – would dissolve.
The Theory of Evolution and Scientific Realism
BUZZONI, Marco
2011-01-01
Abstract
The theory of evolution and scientific realism are closely connected in the program of Evolutionary Epistemology (EE). This paper aims to show that the very broad, naturalistic conception of cognition adopted by EE, which comprises an amoeba’s reactions as well as human symbolic thinking, usually leads to confusion between adaptation to the environment on the one hand and knowledge (as presupposing claims which can be either true or false) on the other hand. As a consequence, the sense, scope and validity of the epistemological realism espoused by the vast majority of the champions of EE are unclear. When the distinction between adaptation to the environment and human knowledge is reinstated, EE can be upheld consistently either as a philosophical interpretation of Darwin’s evolutionary theory which supports a moderate form of hypothetical realism, or as a scientific research program which investigates the neurological and biological structures involved in thinking and social life. In both cases, the human capacity to conceptualise, evaluate and change reality cannot be entirely reduced to biological concepts. Without assuming the human capacity to take a disinterested, objective standpoint, the condition of any scientific and philosophical investigation of reality – including both programs of EE – would dissolve.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
