In basic ontology philosophers dispute inter alia about the nature of properties and events. Two main rival views can be identified in the current debate. According to universalism, properties are universals and events are structured entities involving as constituents (in a typical case) a particular, a property qua universal and a time. In contrast, according to tropism, properties are tropes, abstract particulars that can also be viewed as events. This paper analyzes the resources that these two doctrines can offer in an attempt to construct a nonreductive physicalist account of the mental that accommodates multiple realizability without falling prey to epiphenomenalism (in short, NENRP). The tropist resources allow for success by means of a strategy leading to a non-unitarian doctrine. This rules out the unitarian idea, according to which creatures with important physical differences can still have the very same experiences. This tropist strategy can be “simulated” in a version of universalism, with the same non-unitarian consequences. However, from the perspective of another, possibly more natural, version of universalism, one can perhaps find another avenue for NENRP, which brings with it a unitarian point of view. The resulting approach strongly suggests, in contrast to one based on tropism, the possibility of something like self-acquaintance as understood by philosophers such as Russell or Chisholm. In sum, the paper shows ways in which basic ontology matters in philosophy of mind.
Basic Ontology, Multiple Realizability and Mental Causation
ORILIA, Francesco
2008-01-01
Abstract
In basic ontology philosophers dispute inter alia about the nature of properties and events. Two main rival views can be identified in the current debate. According to universalism, properties are universals and events are structured entities involving as constituents (in a typical case) a particular, a property qua universal and a time. In contrast, according to tropism, properties are tropes, abstract particulars that can also be viewed as events. This paper analyzes the resources that these two doctrines can offer in an attempt to construct a nonreductive physicalist account of the mental that accommodates multiple realizability without falling prey to epiphenomenalism (in short, NENRP). The tropist resources allow for success by means of a strategy leading to a non-unitarian doctrine. This rules out the unitarian idea, according to which creatures with important physical differences can still have the very same experiences. This tropist strategy can be “simulated” in a version of universalism, with the same non-unitarian consequences. However, from the perspective of another, possibly more natural, version of universalism, one can perhaps find another avenue for NENRP, which brings with it a unitarian point of view. The resulting approach strongly suggests, in contrast to one based on tropism, the possibility of something like self-acquaintance as understood by philosophers such as Russell or Chisholm. In sum, the paper shows ways in which basic ontology matters in philosophy of mind.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
