We should distinguish two versions of Bradley's regress and correspondingly two accounts of the unity of states of affairs. One account is Bergmann's (and Strawson's) nexus internalism, as we may call it. The other is an approach closely related to something that Meinong seems to have in mind in his analysis of relations and which I call fact infinitism. This paper defends the latter approach.
Bradley’s Regress: Meinong vs. Bergmann
ORILIA, Francesco
2007-01-01
Abstract
We should distinguish two versions of Bradley's regress and correspondingly two accounts of the unity of states of affairs. One account is Bergmann's (and Strawson's) nexus internalism, as we may call it. The other is an approach closely related to something that Meinong seems to have in mind in his analysis of relations and which I call fact infinitism. This paper defends the latter approach.File in questo prodotto:
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