The timing of the ontopoiesis of life

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka as well realizes that time falls under no ontological category, and that there are some structures of being that do not admit time at all: ideal existence, for example, excludes it entirely, since in its sphere of change, which requires temporality in order to be conceptualized, there is not even the possibility. Other structures of being, in contrast, imply time necessarily as the real existence that is subject to action and change, and, in fact, the ways of existence that distinguish themselves precisely through their relationship with time. The phenomenological practice of epoché, which suspends the obvious, is decisive at this point because, without fear of losing it, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka can leave behind the terrain of metaphysics and the philosophy of the mind, where time does not emerge in its ontological pregnancy, and concentrate, instead, on practical philosophy, which thematizes real, timed existence, inclusive of the specifically human vocation of seeking a personal, transcendent destiny.Here, however, time is not the first thing to come into sight, but life: it is in the sphere of the ontopoietic ground-work of existence, in fact, that being times itself.