It seems to be a desideratum for any theory of thought experiments in the natural sciences that they connect real (REs) and thought experiments (TEs) in a way that might account both for their unity and their distinction. However, the main current interpretations of TEs (championed by Brown and Norton) ultimately lead either to a conflation or to an unacceptably radical separation of REs and TEs. This paper shows that this relation can be best explained by bringing together the transcendental point of view of the Kantian tradition and the ‘operational’ point of view of American pragmatism.
Thought Experiments from a Kantian Point of View
BUZZONI, Marco
2013-01-01
Abstract
It seems to be a desideratum for any theory of thought experiments in the natural sciences that they connect real (REs) and thought experiments (TEs) in a way that might account both for their unity and their distinction. However, the main current interpretations of TEs (championed by Brown and Norton) ultimately lead either to a conflation or to an unacceptably radical separation of REs and TEs. This paper shows that this relation can be best explained by bringing together the transcendental point of view of the Kantian tradition and the ‘operational’ point of view of American pragmatism.File in questo prodotto:
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