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IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

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Heralding the New Enlightenment

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

THEME

ANNA-Teresa TYMIEIECKA / Heralding the New Enlightenment 3

INAUGURAL LECTURE

ANNA-Teresa TYMIEIECKA / The New Enlightenment 7

SECTION I

DANIELA VERDUCCI / The Development of the Living Seed of Intentionality. From E. Husserl and E. Fink to A.-T. Tymieniecka’s Ontogenesis of Life 19

RONALD BRUZINA / Phenomenology in a New Century: What Still Needs to be Done 39

KATHLEEN HANEY / Tymieniecka’s First Philosophy 77

ANGÈLE KREMER-MARIETTI / Jean Wahl and the Renewal of Metaphysics 97

SECTION II

JAN SZMYD / Post-Modernism and the Ethics of Conscience: Various “Interpretations” of the Morality of the Post-Modern World. Role of A. T. Tymieniecka’s Phenomenology of Life 111

CARMEN COZMA / On the Meaningfulness of Man’s Existence: from the Existentialist Thinking to Phenomenology of Life 123

PETER ABUMHENRE EGBE / Creative Imagination in Harmony as Full Maturity of Phenomenological Inquiry 131
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOL NEELY / Hermeneutics and the Vocative Structure of the Divine:</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toward a Dramatic, Redemptive Phenomenology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANÍBAL FORNARI / Arriving in the World-of-Life</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECTION III</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMEN ANDERSEN ØYEN / Intersubjectivity – an Existentialistic,</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phenomenological and Discourse Ethical Approach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHOR KARIVETS / Is the Phenomenon of Non-Intention “Self-Other” Relation Possible?</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAWEL MALATA / Two Dimensions of Human Being in Karl Jaspers'</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy – Existence and Hermeneutics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RONNY MIRON / The Guilt Which we are: An Ontological Approach to Jaspers' Idea of Guilt</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECTION IV</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGIL H. OLSVIK / Freud, Husserl and “Loss of Reality”: Classical</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychoanalysis, Transcendental Phenomenology and Explication of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychosis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVA SYŘIŠTOVÁ / A Contribution to Phenomenology of the Human Normality in the Modern Time</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTONIO DE LUCA / Toward a Phenomenological and Existential Psychology</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAVID DOYLE / Paradoxes of Intention: Logotherapy, Phenomenology and Existentialism</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECTION V</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUDMILA MOLODKINA / Phenomenology of Utilitarian-Aesthetic Dynamics of Nature</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SECTION VI</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENEDETTA GIOVANOLA / Human Flourishing Beyond Economic Well-Being:</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Contribution of Phenomenology Towards a “Richer” Idea of Personhood</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUNE FAUGSTAD AARØ / Phenomenological Perspectives on Philosophical Didactics</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIMMA KURENKOVA AND LARISA VYSOTSKAYA / Phenomenology of Education:</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary Dialogue of Philosophy and Pedagogics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONCLUDING</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARIA-CHIARA TELONI / The Phenomenological Way: A Philosophical View on the Vitality of Being</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAME INDEX</strong></td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LIVING SEED OF INTENTIONALITY. FROM E. HUSSERL AND E. FINK TO A.-T. TYMIEŃIECKA’S ONTOPOIESIS OF LIFE

ABSTRACT

Husserlian phenomenology maintains a surprising vitality even in its posthumous condition. Habermas observes, in fact, that unlike structuralism and Marxism, phenomenology has not in the least passed into a post-phase, but is still permeated with lively existentiality. In his philosophical testament, Husserl himself epistemologically engages this condition of phenomenology, seeking its foundation through the essential description of the dynamic of philosophizing and its tradition. Even though Husserl and Fink thus manifest the lived experience of iteration of finality with which the “I” of the individual philosopher, in intrinsic and living intersubjective correlation with all the other philosophers, creatively enriches natural life, they failed to devote attention to the newness this offers to the intuition.

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, in contrast, grasps and draws forth the phenomenon of the ontopoiesis of life that flowers from Husserlian phenomenological intentionality and its developments in Fink, describing it in her phenomenology of life. In the quality of “producer of being” of human creative acts, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka identifies, as unexplored foundational terrain of phenomenology itself, the “point of contact” with the fountain/source from which the unique and originary poetic flow gushes, which leads being and thinking, nature and consciousness to existence. In this way, pushing the investigation beyond the realm of pure ideas in which Husserl and Fink remained imprisoned, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka carried out the intuitive resowing through which her individual phenomenological initiative was grafted into the very stream of flowing life, bringing to fruit the quality of spontaneous autoproduction of life. A new “Archimedean point” has thus been conquered and upon it each thing can now find its proper place.
THE POSTUMOUS LIFE OF HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

History's gaze has also fallen upon the thought of Edmund Husserl, after his death. Father Van Breda's 1939 foundation of the Husserl Archive and the transfer of all the philosopher's manuscripts there marked the beginning of Husserl's vita postuma, one to which he had devoted his energies since as early as the 1920s, if one is to judge by the sheer volume of the manuscripts he was accumulating without managing to dedicate the necessary energy to bring them to publication. It may actually be said that Husserl's vita postuma is quite lively: the ever-growing number of manuscripts published in Kluwer/Springer's «Husserliana» series gives rise to natural correlates in the form of discoveries, re-discoveries, reprisals, in-depth analyses, and hermeneutical turning points of phenomenology, which confer upon the Husserlian post-mortem story an authentic vitality.

Notwithstanding the impressive volume of his productive dynamism, though, all this might merely reach us as the effect of an irrevocably terminated history from which we might at best draw inspiration were it not for the fact, – which Heidegger had observed as early as 1929 – that the Phänomenologieiseren that Husserl inaugurated, created a completely new space for philosophical inquiry, casting upon the "hidden forces" of the great tradition of Western philosophy a "gaze" that summoned all to participate in the infinite task, both in method and development, of bringing these forces to their "concrete realization"; a gaze that solicits acceptance of Husserl's legacy itself not just as a completed opus to be historically interpreted, but as a trail blazed in history and still open, leading us ever more deeply into history's living depths. «Wege nicht Werke» (= "Paths, not works!") therefore, for Husserl as well, according to Heidegger's motto for his Gesamtausgabe, one which also describes the vicissitudes of Husserl's thought after his death, "through a kind of retroactive genealogy".

I. Habermas would be wrong, then, if he failed to acknowledge phenomenology's particular character as a living theoreticis, giving into his suspicion prompted by «the fact that phenomenologists have not yet arrived at their own “post-ism”», unlike the post-analytics, the post-structuralists, or the post-Marxists. One could certainly expect that phenomenology, too – which found its own "historians", its own "standard portraits", its own "founding documents" long ago – would be destined for a Hegelian "shape of spirit" (Gestalt of Geistes) which, «as soon as [it] is recognized in its uniqueness and is named, [...] is placed at a distance and condemned to decline». One could even hold, that «phenomenology [...] seems to be breaking up», «after a final productive impetus» given it in France by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, "unraveling" into superficial anthropologization and profound ontologization. However, it is difficult not to note, as Habermas rightly does, that phenomenology has not yet been reduced to the mere "history of its effects" (Wirkungsgeschichte) at all; indeed, it is still «permeated with existential topicality». In fact, as Habermas observes, while «an ontologically oriented phenomenology» discovers that "transcendental consciousness concretizes itself in the practices of the lifeworld and takes on flesh and blood in historical embodiments», «an anthropologically oriented phenomenology locates further media of embodiment in action, language and the body», having by now acquired evidence «for the rootedness of our cognitive accomplishments in pre-scientific practice and in our intercourse with things and persons».

It is truly quite singular that Habermas should be the one to show us "life" as the cipher of phenomenological theoricis and the motive for its post-metaphysical survival! In fact, he comes from the same circles of critical thought that in the 1950s, with György Lukács, had stigmatized the irrationality of Husserlian phenomenology as an occult philosophy of life. Later, his philosophical journey led Habermas to adopt the post-modern critique of logocentrism from the positive perspective of identification and enhancement of the "effective" universal suppositions of communication and discourse that permit the attainment of understanding and consensus among subjects capable of speaking and acting. In such a set up of universal pragmatism which, connecting language and socialization, returns the theoretical self-referentiality of the logos to a basis in performance, Habermas ran into the "lifeworld" as indispensable "semantic potential" or "horizon of sense" for the constitution of society, culture and personality and the constructive exchange among them. Even more, the «individual life histories and intersubjectively shared forms of life», which «are joined together in the structures of the lifeworld and have a part in its totalization», now represent for Habermas, as happened to Husserl and Fink, «the almost naturalike wellspring for problematizations of this familiar background to the world as a whole», to which the «basic philosophical questions draw the relation they have to the whole, their integrating and conclusive characters».

Thus for Habermas, rooted in the world of individually and socially lived human life is the possibility in the post-metaphysical age that philosophical discourse may maintain ownership of its theoretical function, «to mediate interpretively between expert knowledge and an everyday practice in need of orientation», or in other words, to support «an illuminating furtherance of lifeworld processes of achieving self-understanding, processes that are related to totality». He asserts that «the lifeworld must be defended against extreme alienation at the hands of the objectivating, the moralizing and the aestheticizing interventions of expert cultures».
HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL TESTAMENT

These reflections of Habermas resonate closely with those of Husserl, as stated in his so-called "philosophical testament", Teleologie in der Philosophiegeschichte (in three chapters, the first two dated June/July 1937 and the last the end of August, 1936), in which he outlined the phenomenological meaning of philosophy as an infinite teleological movement toward reason, achieved through the cooperative effort of those who practice the craft or the profession (Beruf) of philosopher. In this way, Husserl opens a broad passage in the eidetic-egological enclosure of his transcendental phenomenology, leading it into the flow of human life, rooting foundational transcendental reflection in the praxis of human subjects operating in lively collaboration with their peers. To Husserl's retrospective glance, philosophy too, just as other crafts and professions, consists of the unitary idea of a "task" (Aufgabe) which is handed down intersubjectively through the course of history. The idea of the task of philosophy has broken into European history through an "originary foundation" (Urstiftung) laid by the first philosophers, men who first conceived of the completely new "intention" (Vorhaben) of Philosophy and whose realization they made their "primary mission" (Lebensberuf). They determined its "reproduction" (Fortpfanzung) in the social community through succeeding generations. Of course, for the new profession (Beruf) of philosopher to be handed down through history, it had to retain, unaltered in time, its "ideal aim" (Zweckidee) which has always defined it beyond the individual philosophical expressions linked to specific ages and personalities. However, for the historical transmission of the craft of philosopher, it has been equally indispensable that real individuals introject the telos "philosophy" as their "task" (Aufgabe), that is, as both a purpose of their own habitually constant will (habituell verharrende Willensziele) and a purpose for its concrete realization (Vorhaben zu einer Werk), rooting the telos "philosophy" in an "I", in which just this telos assumes its place in an effective existence, which is to say that it finds a practical, apodictic driving force that leads it to realization (Ich, in dem eben diesen Telos eine Stätte wirklichen Daseins, praktischer apodiktischer Richtkraft hat).

Husserl clarified that in the emergence of the task/telos "philosophy" with the ancient Greeks, we do not simply see the birth of a new type of craft/profession among many others, which always continuously arise through the ages. In it we find rather, an original and unheard of novelty, a true turning-point in the general history of humanity (eine Wendung in der Gemeingeschichte der Menschheit), because from the beginning, philosophy has asserted that its peculiarity (Besonderheit) was its sui generis intention to realize a "science of the universe of being as a science for each 'rational being' who thinks within that pure episteme and leads to express a definitive cognition of the world" (Wissenschaft vom Universum des Seienden als Wissenschaft für jeden, 'vernünftigen', jeden in der reinen Episteme Denkenden, zu Gebilden endgültiger Welterkenntnis führenden). If, therefore, even the history of philosophy, as the work of philosophers, who have actually followed one after the other in history, is ruled by a teleology analogous to that which is active in other crafts and if philosophy's perennial task is to reveal the "originary foundation" (Urstiftung) of every human experience, the result is an extraordinary possibility: through phenomenological "self-reflection" (Selbst-Besinnen) we may reach an awareness of the dynamics of living "reproduction" itself (Fortpfanzung) and comprehension of the logos by which the special form of the final ideas, present in the assignments of the crafts, may be transmitted intersubjectively, entering into the lives of single individuals so profoundly that they are able to determine, within the history of humanity, a new concrete historical level, produced by the praxis of their "professional humanity" (Berufs menschen) which generates its own historical concatenation (einen eigenen geschichtlichen Zusammenhang).

One might catch here echoes of the post-metaphysical utopia of Max Scheler who, following the Nietzschean anthropology of the superman and interpreting man as an ens amans constituted by the "gesture itself of transcendance", dreamed of a dynamic conception of ontological unity, open to the possibility of being itself as self-increasing, in virtue of how man and his work operate a synergy through the "interpenetration" (Durchdringung) of the subjective-ideal being and the objective-vital being. Such anthropologically borne interpenetration produces the growth of being; this can happen when through it, radically new beings come into existence, as "artificial" beings. All the products of human endeavor – be they agricultural, craftsmanship, industrial, cultural or philosophical – are "artificial" beings; they are created or produced by man, but they surprisingly result both enduring in existence and stably "rooted" in the pre-existent being.

Certainly it is not in the course of our everyday "awake life" (Wacheleben) or "life of the will" (Willensleben) that we become aware of the surprising fact that our individual action, though fully focused on particular interests and goals, obtains permanent results in the previously existing surrounding world, which we share with our fellow beings. Nor, in the course of our everyday life, do we ask ourselves about the "peculiarity of setting and fulfilling tasks"
(das Eigentümliche von Aufgabenstellungen und Erfüllung) or about the specific task of "philosophy" (das Spezifische [...] der Aufgabe [...] die den Titel "Philosophie" hat). As long as we are plunged into the everyday "life of the will" (Willensleben) of our current professions, in fact, we find ourselves in a "unique flowing current" (Einsitzzug) which leads us to a variously interwoven pursuing (Fortstreben) of ever new goals, where we are continuously aiming exclusively at these particular goals and at the most other goals that act as mediators.

It is only when we undertake the profession of philosopher that we learn to completely change our attitudes (totale Einstellungssänderung) and to perform a total thematic inversion of our focus in order to aim at our effectively operative subjectivity as such (totale thematische Umwandlung auf die leistende Subjektivität als solche). Living as philosophers, in the condition of freely achieved "self-knowledge" (Besinnung) which the phenomenological practice of epoché allows us, we can suspend the validity for us of all tested and presumably achieved tasks and of all fulfillments which have been dedicated to these (betrifft die Epoché das uns Gelen der ganzen Aufgabe und alter ihr gewidmeten, versuchten, vermeintlich erreichten Erfüllungen) and grasp what we had never seen before (in all the naïveté of everyday life) (in der alltäglichen Lebensnähe) that is, that the operative modality of subjectivity (leistende Subjektivität) with its acts of pursuing and achieving goals (als abzieendes und erzielendes) founds eo ipso for ourselves as specific Egos, «habitualities directed toward a purpose» (zielerdachte Habitualitäten) and consequently creates within ourselves «a structure of being that is persisting but transforming itself» (eine verharrende und doch sich verwandelnde Seinsstruktur). With this operative modality of subjectivity there also arises «an infinite iteration of the possible end-positions» (eine unendliche Iteration möglicher Zielstellungen) (in projects, proposals, habitual proposals; in the will as a persevering tension of the persevering "I", in the act of doing, in the effectively achieved goals as permanent result of the "I", etc.), and one arrives «at a certain act of understanding, that is, at a permanent understanding of something that lies in all of life» (zu [...] einem Verstehen bzw. Bleibendem Verständnis dessen kommt, was in allem Leben liegt).

It is precisely «in this reflection on oneself which includes iteration as such» (in der die Iteration als solche übergreifende Reflexion auf sich selbst) that one turns to oneself as "I", in other words, to his being that perseveres in the changes of his activity; in this reflection, we can glimpse our truly intimate ecologial being as the real being of that life which, in personal acts individually intentioned, grounds that which is permanent (das unser eigenliches personales Ichsein als Sein in personal intendierenden, in personalen Akten bleibendes Sein stiftendes Leben ausmacht). In other words: in reflecting on our human dynamics of infinite iteration of the possible end-positions as such, we address ourselves «as to an "I", that is, we address our being as it endures over time, even in the variations of its acts» (auf das Ich, auf sein im Wandel seiner Aktivität verharrendes Sein). Therefore we discover our "I" as «the apodictic condition of the possibility of our permanent being» (apodiktische Bedingung der Möglichkeit seines verharrenden Seins als identisch Ich ist), exactly because we can phenomenologically observe that our "I" remains identical while modifying his/her goals and aims.

Then, Husserl added: «something much more important is implicit for we human beings through the aims of the will» (in dieser Weise impliziert ist aber für uns Menschen durch die Willensziele noch sehr viel mehr)! In fact, it is true that «all our natural life refers to our surrounding world, unceasingly pre-given to us» (all unser natürliches Leben bezieht sich auf unsere uns ständig vorgegebene Umwelt), as «universal and fundamental terrain of all our aspirations and their effective attainment» (Sie ist das allgemeine Grundfeld aller unserer Abziehungen und Erzielenungen); it is equally true that for any decision we make, its content must be known to us in the form of "apperceptions" (Apperzeptionen), which – generated by individual experiencing and living in the for-us-effectively-valid world – flow within the concrete current of living experiences and move our will, entering as intentions of meaning. However, it is equally indubitably that, in regard to these apperceptions and to anything which comes to us from tradition or has become habitual, it is up to us both to shape the attitude of a «passive tendency to the assumption» (passive Tendenz zu Übernahme) and to place ourselves in active skepses that, by questioning the «original meaning and essence» (ursprüngliche und eigentliche Sinn) of every experience or thing, leads us to a new awareness. Here, in this intentional iteration, in those who gain self-awareness, the construction of a new, higher goal of distinction and clarity takes place and then imposes itself on the ingenuous setting of objectives and then living to attain them, inasmuch as it is a freely chosen goal that can be reiterated by will (so baut sich über dem naiv tätigen Leben, dem naiv Sich-Ziele-Stellen und dann den Zielen leben gegenüber als ein neues Ziel, ein Ziel höherer Stufe, das der Deutlichkeit und Klarheit, als ein freies, wiederholbares Willensziele). In such new attainment of awareness that is no longer philosophical or of second level, but phenomenological or of third level, the reflective man acquires awareness of his subjectivity, in experiencing a double freedom, on one hand, «in refusing to automatically appreciate any passivity and, on the other hand, assuming the responsibility of continuously questioning and clarifying problems (worin liegt, dass das Subjekt iterative keine Passivität gelten lassen will, die nicht im Vermögen,
The dimensions of infinity and responsibility of an I that lives freely with those discovered “infinites” of goals and aims (ist offenbar [...] dass hier neue Dimension von Problemen – eben die der Unendlichkeit und der Verantwortung des in die entdeckten Unendlichkeiten frei lebenden Ich und Wir-erwachsen) is especially evident in the profession of the philosopher, whose cognitive task is not only the opposite of any other special form of knowledge within the pre- and extra-scientific life, being purely theoretical, but also attests, within its plural history, to the judgment of the «impossibility, in early naivety, of succeeding in achieving the fulfillment of the inherited task» (Ummöglichkeit, in der alten [...] Naivität der Methode je zu einer Erfüllung der vererbten Aufgaben gelangen zu können). Husserl himself remembered having experimented with the unsettling role of the philosopher in which, precisely when «expressing oneself completely within one’s own system, one resorts to a personal – and unfortunately only individualistic – conviction of having taken philosophy down the road of a definitive realizations» (Ein jeder, in seiner System sich auslebend, erringt eine personale – leider nur persönliche – Überzeugung, die Philosophie auf die Bahn endgültiger Verwirklichung gebracht zu haben, und unser exemplarisch Philosoph [=Husserl selbst] mochte ebenso schon sich in dieser Weise personal vollendet), exactly in that instant one is unfaithfully «taken in by the skepticism which derives both from the complex view of history and from the inductive certainty of exactly what the general fate of philosophy is» (als sich seiner jener Skepsis aus dem Gesamtbücherschau über die geschichte und der induktiven Gewissheit eben jenes allgemeine Schicksal der Philosophien bemächtigen will). But it is precisely at this point, when no new objective seems possible, that Husserl points out that “self-reflection” (mich besinnen) in itself is the much sought-after new beginning (das ist schon ein neuer Anfang); it shows itself to me as what “I” can do without abandoning the “philosophical” objective. In fact, «self-reflection, in this situation, is the primary “opportunity” to question philosophy and study according to its conditions» (sich in dieser Situation besinnen ist die prinzipielle “Möglichkeit”, die Philosophie in Frage zu stellen und nach ihren Bedingungen zu fragen).
coming to-itself for transcendental subjectivity», because it gives way to a place for the transcendental spectator that thematizes the constituting transcendental life. Here we have the oxymoronic concept of the “onlooker who acts” (Phänomenologisierender Zuschauer), which, as Natalie Deprez notes in the Schwarzwald Manuscript at the Fink Archive in Freiburg i. Br., cited and annotated by Bruzina, shows to what degree Fink was philosophically intolerant of the descriptive seriousness used by Husserl who, seeking to keep to the methodological rigor of the sciences, held intuitive evidence as the only criterion for truth.

On the other hand, Husserl himself dealt not only with objects and elementary acts of giverness, but also with formal acts of symbolic giverness and with phenomena, such as the existential events and situations of birth and death, or certain social interactions that set into motion a complex structure located beyond the power an individual can have over them. In §62 of the V Cartesian Meditation, Husserl identified these as boundary-problems that neither static nor genetic phenomenology, limited to the individual, can deal with, and which therefore call for a specific descriptive method that must take into account the latest phenomenological “discoveries” by means of which, on the one hand, being constitutes a practical idea, that of the infiniteness of a work of theoretical determination and on the other hand the transcendental sphere of being is presented as a monadic intersubjectivity. It was precisely this new methodological need, we believe, that led Husserl to entrust to the exercise of lively phenomenological intentionality of another, Eugen Fink, the progress of the «phenomenological system itself as architectonic of transcendental philosophy», given that, as Fink also recognized, it «cannot be drawn up ahead of time, but is only to be obtained from the “matters themselves” by passing through concrete phenomenological work».

Notwithstanding the transcendental excavations and intersubjective stratagems put into play, however, the fact remains that phenomenological research never produced the systematic method, open to the metaphysical and religious-ethical dimension, that Husserl had envisioned in the 1930s. In the Finkian text as well, in fact, the progress of phenomenology is still judged to be limited to the draft phase: «What we have done first is to sketch out the Idea of constitutive clarification as the Idea of the analytical inquiry that moves back from the “phenomenology of the world” (from the acceptedness-construct [Geltungsgebilde] in reductively disclosed transcendental life) into the construction of the acceptedness, into the process of world-actualization». But this «predelineation» does not itself go «beyond a quite preliminary and general characterization». Husserl and Fink thus seemed to agree that even using the synergy of their joint research, they had made no progress beyond the stage of “a working philosophy” or, Kantianly, that they had only developed a prolegomena for a science still to be constructed, rather than explanation of an already existent science.

However, it is not convincing that this state of affairs in Husserlian phenomenology should exclusively depend, as Fink claims, on the fact that «there can be no adequate characterization of phenomenological cognitive actions before concrete analyses are carried out; the method and system of phenomenological cognitive actions cannot be anticipated nor can the essentially new kind of thing which in phenomenological cognition transcends the style of knowing found in worldly knowledge, be comprehended on the basis of “philosophical” tradition of world-bound philosophizing and cogitations».

Rather, one has the impression that something fundamental had been overlooked, neglecting the consideration of what in effect was already present in intuitive giverness; it would seem that this error promoted instead the speculative/idealistic drift that «breaks the anchorage to the immediate phenomenal».

THE ONTOPOIESIS OF LIFE

In contrast, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka focuses her attention on the «late breakthrough to the plane of nature-life» that characterizes the final phase of Husserl’s journey of reflection; from here, she has applied her work to reactivating Phänomenologisieren, which had apparently run dry, in order to bring to light once again «the seminal virtualities engendered by [Husserlian] thought», which philosophically link the historical body of phenomenological learning and the horizons for future programs. Moving from the reflective unease, triggered by the dualistic result that had accompanied the attempt of the classic phenomenologists to discover, in the flow of experience, an adequate principle of intending grasp that leads all living experiences to consciousness, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka pursues more deeply the intuition of the logos, intrinsic to phenomenological inquiry, and realizes a phenomenology of the ontopoietic logos of life. As early as the 1960s, she had intuited that there is a more original talent/disposition of consciousness (Uranlage des Bewusstseins), beyond the absoluteness of the constituting transcendental dimension. The experience of the «conscious-corporeal» (das “Leiblich-bewusste”) shows that consciousness effectively is based in the “natural corporeal” and that an organic nexus unites consciousness with the entire contexture of nature, which remains nonetheless autonomous, as documented by the lived experiences of succession, intertwining, and motivation of the psychic processes in general. The essential “giverness” of the constitutive genesis of objectivity is rooted in an
simultaneously an objective element of it». In her opinion, what is needed, rather, is

«to learn, from the strengths and the weaknesses of the specifically phenomenological rationalities, the nature of the universal rationality that is involved in the emergence and ran of our reality that subdends its genesis—the logos reaching beyond it and yet essentially engaged in the constitution of ourselves within our lifeworld and its horizons».

The «Husserlian proposal of a self-critique of phenomenology upon its very transcendental/subjective assumptions» is thus understood in an enlarged and evolving sense, so to speak, following the tendency present in the late Husserl to break with «the early theoretic-methodological restrictions that his focus on intentionality [had] imposed on him». 69

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka can now follow «the progress» implicit in the Husserlian method, which emerges by studying the «integral Husserl», 70 where «each stage of his thought seems to have been for him a springboard for inquiry in a more profound direction», even while proposing no speculative claim «to unify his various insights». Husserl, in fact, simply «follows an analysis to an obvious end and then takes up deeper questions», tracing an evolving sequence which only in appearance seems to lack nexuses among its phases, given that in it «Husserl adjusted his assumptions as he went without dismissing any set of them». In effect, Tymieniecka continues, Husserl

«might call the regional ontologies 'naive' as they stand alone, but he never disclaimed the eidetic insight through which we distinguish objects. He tacitly included it in the ascending ontic steps in the process of originating and forming the ideal structures of beings as they are constitutated in the subjective transcendental processes of the intellect. And then he immersed the singular mind with its set of constitutive procedures within the intersubjective lifeworld. The concatenation of the lifeworld opens yet another field of investigation, but the nature of the constitutive process in the singular individual mind remains valid, however much apprehension of the reality of the lifeworld modifies the appreciation of it». 71

Notwithstanding the contradictory appearances and Husserl’s own awareness of them, therefore, the Husserlian phenomenological research seen from the new position set forth by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, proves neither rapsodic nor preliminary. Advancing his project «beyond a fixation on inner subjectivity», one may still trace there a constructive logos of iron-clad necessity, the same that presides over «the planes of the human reality», in which each effective carrying out of descriptive study, as phenomenology certainly is, involves that we finally find ourselves at the edge of the area that has just been investigated and from which we can lean out to grasp new dimensions now within reach. The remarkable euristic-poietic validity of such spontaneous human cognitive behavior, indeed, has guided the progress of scientific knowledge in
the twentieth century. A similar evolving logos, human and phenomenological, preserves not only the validity of each phase of phenomenology, but also «the promise each offers». The future opportunities for investment, in fact, rest in the living, concrete, natural subjectivity of the philosopher at work: the ontopoietic acts of such an individual can bring new being to existence and construction, increasing being itself, as noted even by Husserl in his philosophical testament. As Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka comments:

«Therefore, the elementary condition of man—the same one through which Husserl and Ingarden attempted in vain to open a breach, extending the expansion of its intentional nexuses and at the same time turning to ante-reduction scientific data—appears to be constituted by the blind element of nature, and yet at the same time this element shows itself to have virtualities for individualization on the vital level and, what is more important, for a specifically human individualization. The latter virtualities we could call "subliminal spontaneities".»

From the vitality of this natural subjectivity, so rich as to sustain the entire phenomenological journey of interrogation and reduction, there rises, according to Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, the Husserlian twofold philosophical approach, «with an intuitive grasp of the given paralleling a cognitive constitutive scrutiny of the cognitive procedure, one that is meant to validate and legitimate them». In such a «unique» approach, «the system of consciousness that Husserl, in accord with the nature of subjective acts, calls "intentional" and "transcendental"» is rooted together with «the primordial givenness of the objective correlates of our intuitions». For this reason, while proceeding «in the exfoliation of the levels of authentic reality» by the successive stages of the reductive procedures, these reductions not only are performed «in the very depths of the progress of interrogative investigation, but concurrently in their consecutive phases they make up the body of phenomenological doctrines». Here, in fact, we find delineated the successive rational intuitive "platforms" of the very life of conscious being, as Tymieniecka calls them. The intentional platform, the multisphere platform of the lifeworld, the platform of the genetic perspective with the correlated sphere of the creative experience: each constitutes a step on the experiential ladder which effectively leads from one intentional intuitive step to the next, new ontopoietic platform, which in turn leads to a further and still unknown level of phenomenalization. These platforms may now be understood as arising from «two channels of self-generating forces — objective and subjective — [that] roll forward, one proceeding from the concatenation of constitution on the objective side and the other proceeding from the nature of the subjective intentionality at work in that constitution». Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka emphasizes the sui generis nature of these dynamisms, for while they are proper to the life of consciousness, they also represent, to the extent that they realize something in being, «the specific dynamism of the constructive logos of the real as it deploys itself». In this natural onward flow of consciousness, in fact, the constructive acts of consciousness bring forth their very own inner dynamisms and forces in such a way that reason/logos is not a mere structuring line of construction, but simultaneously its prompting force. Husserl and Fink certainly were culpable of a grave oversight in underestimating to such an extent their own work, in which, instead, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka recognized the logos of life in action, as the sole and the original poietic flow that leads being and thinking, nature and consciousness, to existence and that therefore is the source/font or the grounding terrain of phenomenology. With such an evolutive source, still little known but certain in its effects, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka sought to re-establish conscious contact: she set in motion a new phenomenological “self-knowledge” (Selbstbesinnung) that, pushing the investigation beyond the realm of pure ideas, carried out the intuitive re-sowing through which her individual phenomenological initiative was grafted into the very stream of flowing life, bringing to fruit the quality of spontaneous autoproduction of life, which, in the 1970s, neurophysicists Maturana and Varela had discovered and defined as “autoepoiesis”. Armed with only the Husserlian “principle of all principles” that recognizes «every originally offering intuition (Intuition)» as legitimate source of knowledge, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka dove into the sea of phenomenological experience searching for its sense and vital continuity, beyond the safe but asphyxiating limits set by the constituting consciousness and its givenness. Her endeavor was completely successful, not only because she attained the revitalization of consciousness without giving up its constituent function, producing a new line of inquiry in the phenomenology of life, but above all because in proceeding this way, for philosophy itself and for all the human sciences, including economics, she surprisingly opened wide a new horizon of sense and a new symbolic system calibrated on the vitality of being, discovered at the roots of constituting consciousness and contiguous with it.

The nature and meaning of every development, including that of phenomenology, can thus be enclosed in this new philosophical platform of the ontopoiesis of life. Such a theoretical situation of solidarity between spirit and life had never been seen before on the contemporary philosophical scene. It emerged as a new horizon of sense when A-T. Tymieniecka decided to follow her intuition in practicing a «radical overturn of the phenomenological perspective» to gain a new “Archimedes's point” on the basis of which «each thing finds its proper place».
Notes

7. Ibid., p. 4.
8. Ibid., p. 7.
9. Cf.: G. Lukács, Die Zerstorung der Vernunft, Aulbaum Verlag, Berlin 1953; transl. by P. R. Palmer, Destruction of Reason, Merlin Press, London 1980. Lukács is concerned with Husserl only indirectly because the irrationalistic tendencies, present from the start in Husserlian philosophical method, will become truly explicit only in the works of Scheler and particularly Heidegger.
11. Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
17. Ibid., p. 364.
18. Ibid., p. 411.
19. Ibid., pp. 303-364.
20. Ibid., p. 405.
most often and continually recurring in Fink’s personal notes during the period of his labors with Husserl, Bruzina, Translator’s Introduction, op. cit., pp. iv–lvi.


57. Ibid., p. 101.


60. Fink, Sixth Cartesian Meditation, op. cit., §1, p. 4. German text: p. 3.


62. Fink, Sixth Cartesian Meditation, op. cit., §1, p. 4. German text: p. 4.

63. Depraz, Il metodo pradossale di Fink, op. cit., p. 102.


69. Tymieniecka, A Note on Edmund Husserl’s late Breakthrough, op. cit., p. 686.

70. A.-T. Tymieniecka, “Phenomenology as the inspirational force of our times”, in: Tymieniecka (ed. by), Phenomenology world-wide, op. cit., p. 2b.

71. Ibid., p. 3a.

72. Ibid., p. 2a.

73. Ibid., p. 3a.

74. Tymieniecka, Logos and Life: Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason, op. cit., p. 28.

75. Tymieniecka, The Logos of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Logos, op. cit., p. xvii.

76. Tymieniecka, Phenomenology as the inspirational force of our times, op. cit., p. 3b.

77. Tymieniecka, The Logos of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Logos, op. cit., p. xvii.

78. Tymieniecka, Phenomenology as the inspirational force of our times, op. cit., p. 4a.

79. Ibid., p. 4a.
