Elisabeth Abiri & Håkan Thörn (Eds.)

Horizons

Perspectives on a Global Africa

Studentlitteratur

Migration in the Horn

Colonial and postcolonial perspectives

Uoldelul Chelati Dirar



Photo: Anders Thorén

Introduction

Starting from the 1960s, the large region known as the Horn of Africa or Northeast Africa, encompassing the present states of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan, has been a main producer of refugees and migrants on a world scale.[1] This paper will discuss patterns of migration from this area with a particular focus on Eritrea and Ethiopia, due to the particular connection existing between the two countries on virtue of their political history, which, in turn, affected significantly also neighbouring countries.

It is a common stereotype in Western perception that African people are always on the move and this image seems to evoke a sort of permanent Biblical exodus of faceless and "historyless" masses wandering through barren lands of desperation and deprivation. What I will argue through this article is that people's mobility has to be read as the result of complex regional and international developments, therefore, the vague image of Africans as permanently on the move needs to be put in a more appropriate context, taking into account time and space as crucial factors. It is in fact my strong belief that recent impressive movements of population, which cyclically tend to have the honour of the first page on Western media, to be fully understood need to be put in an adequate historical framework. This would enable analysts and public opinion to assess the relevance of those phenomena within the long durée of African history and, at the same time, would avoid the ambiguity of simplistic neo-Malthusian interpretations which, obliterating the diachronic dimension, tend to fix them into an abstract timeless fixity. The drama unfolding in the media with all its pain and suffering is just the surface, the most immediately perceivable part, of intricate processes involving the social and political history of originating countries as well as the broader network of international relations and exchanges of goods and people known also as globalization.

Precolonial migrations

Indeed, there is an element of ambiguity hidden in the very use of the concept of migration and of its derivative label of migrant in African history, as they are often employed to legitimize or delegitimize existing powers, an attitude that can be detected both in European and African historiographic discourses. For instance, according to some of the most authoritative colonial scholars, the early most significant steps of human civilization in the region should be ascribed to people originating from the Semitic area of the Middle East, a theory that was rooted in the strong and consolidated European prejudice on the congenital incapability of Africans to build strong and lasting civilizations.[2] Similar manipulations of history are frequent also in the African context, where the use of migrant identities as labels to legitimize or delegitimize claims for political hegemony is frequent. In northeast Africa, examples of the first case are the Semitic-speaking communities of the highlands of present Eritrea and Ethiopia, which have used their alleged ancestral Middle Eastern origins embedded in the myth of the Solomonic dynasty – a powerful symbolism of power constructed upon the Christian-Semitic identity – to legitimize their ambition for political and territorial hegemony.[3] At the same time, in a reversal of semiotics, the attribution of migrant identities has often been used by the same communities to deny or limit other communities' rights over land, water and, ultimately, their right to citizenship.[4] A further element which makes the issue of migrant identities more intricate is the tradition, common among Islamic communities, to trace back their ancestry to Arab roots. This is again a case of migrant identity constructed as an element of prestige, a religious and social marker utilized to connect local communities to broader cultural contexts, acknowledged as prestigious.[5]

Environment and ecological variations are other crucial factors to be taken into account, as triggers of people's mobility in northeast Africa, where drought and the often-associated famine and epidemics have ignited long cycles of political turmoil and migrations, as happened during the Great Famine of 1888 and the twin famines of 1972–74 and 1984–86.[6] Similarly, also religion has often contributed to various forms of people's mobility in the region.

This can be noticed in the praxis implicit in the social and economic model of Abyssinian Christendom – built around Christianity as ideology of the State and having plough agriculture as its dominant economic model – which has ignited processes of colonization, often through proselytism, and consequently the displacement of original inhabitants.[7] Similar developments can be noticed also in cases of *jihad,* such as the one launched by Ahmed Ibrahim nicknamed the Gragn (the left-handed) in the sixteenth century, which moving from Somali regions expanded northward to the highlands of present Eritrea.[8] Again, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the development of political systems inspired theocratic societies in which religious identity was a crucial factor to define citizenship has led to new episodes of dislocation, as in those highly intolerant models of social organization where apostasy or exodus were the only alternatives to death. Examples of this trend are on the Islamic side the rise of the Mahdi movement in Sudan, and on the Christian side the attempt made by the Emperor Yohannes IV to develop a centralized state in Ethiopia with Christian Orthodoxy as its ideological benchmark.[9] In relation to religion-motivated mobility, an important role has been played by the practice of pilgrimage to places identified as holy, either by official religious authorities or by popular faith. Both for Christians and Muslims this has been an important component of religious practices and at the same time a powerful factor to move people and put them in synergic interaction with different cultures and civilizations.[10] A curious development, related to the Islamic practice of *hajj* is the case of the Takrur people of Western Eritrea, who originate from West African pilgrims directed to Mecca.[11] Often, due to the long distance to be covered and their small financial resources, those pilgrims were forced to stop and settle down for a while to accumulate money for the remaining part of their trip, and in some cases those settlements became permanent.[12] Eventually, another element, which has led to the migration of people in the Horn, has been the quest for education. In fact, for those who wanted to upgrade the education they had received in Christian churches or Qur'anic schools it was common practice to move to regional centres of learning as well as to international ones.[13] These patterns of religious and "educated" migration also played a great role in making the outer world known to the fellow

compatriots of those travellers and at the same time in spreading information about this little known region of Africa among the people they met.

Colonial migrations

A turning point in African history has been the diplomatic agreement reached among European powers by the end of the nineteenth century for a partition of Africa, the so-called "Scramble for Africa," which in northeast Africa implied mainly Italy's encroachment in Eritrea and Somalia, though the role played by France in Djibouti and Great Britain in Sudan and Somaliland must also be considered.

Developed as a sort of proxy colonialism under the auspices of Great Britain, Italian rule left lasting traces in the history of northeast Africa, though with different intensity and depth according to the time and the nature of colonial occupation, which was more relevant in Eritrea (1869–1941) and Somalia (1898–1941) but briefer and superficial in Ethiopia (1936–1941). With regard to the issue of people's mobility, the impact of colonialism can be assessed from two different and apparently contrastive perspectives. Within the boundaries of colonial territories colonialism often acted as a facilitator of people's mobility. In fact, the unification of different territories under a common administration and the military repression of intra-communities' violence, together with an intense activity of infrastructure-building facilitated substantially the mobility of both local populations and goods within the colonial territory.[14] In contrast to this policy of increased internal mobility, colonialism implemented tough policies aimed at coercing people's trans-border mobility. In the colonial perspective, this set of restrictive policies aimed both at containing the mobility of nomadic populations – to make it more difficult for them to escape from the payment of tribute – and at reducing the possibility of contacts among anti-colonial opponents and their supporters in neighbouring countries.[15] Finally these policies of containment and repression of external mobility aimed also at erasing precolonial perceptions of

space and territory substituting them with colonial administrative frameworks and with the underlying concept of border.[16]

In this colonial context of limited mobility, migration assumed new forms and also new meanings, which are possible to conceptualize into three main patterns. A first one is the migration of elite in search of education, with the development of new additional routes heading to Europe, where few selected individuals were sent by local authorities or by European missionaries to fulfil their education overseas in Florence, Bern, London, Stockholm, Paris and other European centres.[17] A second pattern of people mobility was associated with the deployment of colonial troops (*ascari*) in Italian expansionist campaigns. The resort to indigenous troops had been a common practice among European colonial powers, due to the better adaptability of local troops to African climate and to the fact that their lives were considered cheaper than those of metropolitan soldiers.[18] However, in the Eritrean case, Italy's resort to indigenous troops was so intensive that it caused shortage of labour and imbalances in the economic sector, triggering an increase of migrant labour from Yemen, Sudan and Ethiopia – now with the blessing of colonial authorities – to fill the gaps created by the enrolment of Eritreans as *ascari*.[19] A third pattern of "migration" took the form of exile, which can be considered as a form of political protest led by individuals or communities against some aspects or the totality of colonial policies.[20] Factors leading to the choice of exile could be the political opposition to colonial domination, the protest against taxation policies or against colonial interference with local traditions.[21]

Beside these patterns of migration there are other little studied but interesting phenomena such as, for instance, seafaring communities. A case in point is the presence of communities of Somali sailors living in some of the main British port areas such as Liverpool, Cardiff and London since the early 1900s, a tradition which continued until the 1960s when the crisis in the Merchant Navy pushed those migrants towards industrial employment.[22]

Postcolonial migrations

However, some of the most impressive migratory trends in the Horn can be noticed in the postcolonial period and particularly starting from the late 1960s, and this has to be understood in the context of the peculiar transition to postcolonial order in the region. Crucial to this end has been the sudden end of Italian colonial rule over Northeast Africa in 1941 as a result of Benito Mussolini's decision to take side with the Nazi forces in the Second World War, which automatically implied the extension of belligerence to the Horn, where the British were present in Somaliland and Sudan. This overstretching of its logistic along too many fronts turned up to be a fatal decision for the Italian army, which in a few months lost Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia.[23] The vanishing of Italy ushered the region into decades of conflict and instability, since it implied that main actors in the transition to the postcolonial order became not the former colonial power and local elites but, instead, external forces – namely the Allied Forces and the United Nations – whose priorities were set by the bipolar logic of the Cold War.[24] This spread frustration and dissatisfaction through the whole region, and led to the rise of three conflicting nationalist narratives: Pan-Ethiopianism, Eritrean nationalism and Somali irredentism. Pan-Ethiopian nationalism assumed that the broader region stretching from Northern Eritrea to the Ogaden, irrespective of its linguistic and ethnic diversity, was to be considered an organic part of a political and cultural continuum, rooted in the ancient history of Aksum and embodied by the Ethiopian Monarchy.[25] On the other side, Eritrean nationalism, though not denying the existence of historical and cultural ties with neighbouring regions, emphasized the irreversible transformations set in motion by Italian colonialism, which would have determined diverging paths of socio-economic development, and on that basis it claimed the legitimate right of Eritrea to exist as a separate state within its inherited colonial boundaries.[26] Finally Somali irredentism nurtured its *raison d'etre* on the claim for the re-establishment of the Greater Somali nation, which was assumed to encompass Ogaden, Djibouti, British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland and the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya.[27]

A crucial step in this drift toward instability has been the annexation of Eritrea by the Imperial government of Ethiopia in 1962, which brought to an end the already eroded federal arrangement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, brokered by the United Nations in 1952 to break the stalemate determined by the divergent aspirations of the two countries.[28] Ethiopia's move engendered the reaction of Eritrean nationalist opposition, which had already started its activities in 1958 with the creation of the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM), followed in 1961 by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) which by 1962 had replaced the ELM in the struggle against the Ethiopian government also initiating guerrilla warfare.[29] However, it is only from 1967 that the colliding developments of those nationalist narratives started affecting the issue of migration in a significant way, when Emperor Haile Selassie opted for a policy of scorched earth to contrast growing popular support for the ELF. This campaign was aimed at frightening the civilian population and resulted in the exodus of some 20,000 civilians from the western lowlands of Eritrea to Sudan, the first of a series of waves of refugees.[30]

In Somalia, the United Nations decided to put the country under Italian trusteeship (AFIS) for a transitional period of ten years (from 1950 to 1960), to be followed by complete independence.[31] Nevertheless, the exclusion of the Ogadeen and the NFD from this arrangement kept Somali irredentism alive, leading to a flare of rebellions and conflicts.[32] A first rebellion in the Ogadeen region was sparked in 1963 by the Ethiopian attempt to collect taxes from the nomadic people of the region.[33] This event determined unrests which were then further fomented by Ogadeeni nationalists and the Somali government and, in early 1964, escalated into a full military confrontation between the Ethiopian and Somali armies terminated with the success of the former and the flee of displaced communities to northeastern Somalia.[34]

Another crisis related to Somali irredentism flared in the Bale and Sidamo regions of southwestern Ethiopia, between 1963 and 1968, and had its roots both in colonial legacies and in the tense relations between local communities and the Ethiopian state.[35] In fact, Italian rule had reversed Ethiopian policies, re-instating indigenous chiefs and pre-Ethiopian land tenure systems, therefore, the return

of Ethiopian rule in 1941 led to renewed tensions and conflicts which were further escalated by the Ethiopian decision to play off the Borana against the Somali.[36] Consequently, ensuing clashes between ethnic Somalis and ethnic Borana saw the active involvement of the Somali government, which provided military training and weapons to the insurgents. However, again, the Ethiopian army defeated the insurgents forcing them into exile and punished the remaining with land-confiscations.

A third rebellion took place in Kenya in the NFD, where British colonial rule had left bitter legacies originated by their systematic neglect of the region, due to the absence of relevant economic interests. Moreover, the British concern to establish the NFD as a buffer area, to seal off the rest of Kenya from intra-border raids, had made ethnic Somalis living in the NFD the target of repressive and illiberal policies, confining them to a destitute periphery, disconnected from their previous commercial and political networks.[37] The persistence of those policies in the early years of Kenya's independence, contributed to alienate ethnic Somali also from the ongoing Kenyan nation building.[38] Squeezed between Ethiopian autocratic centralism and Kenyan exclusivist postcolonial nation building, Somali irredentist narrative fostered a disorganized and spontaneous rebellion in the NFD which lasted from 1963 to 1967, resulting in a further defeat of the Somalis and further social crisis, economic decline, and dislocation.[39]

However, a watershed with regard to both the issue of regional instability and migration has been the military coup of 1974 in Ethiopia which dethroned Emperor Haile Selassie and replaced him with a military junta with Marxist-Leninist orientation, better known with its Amharic denomination of Derg. The collapse of the Imperial regime marked the end of a long-established pattern of diplomatic relations in the context of the Cold War, which used to have Ethiopia aligned as a sound and reliable partner of the US and of the Western bloc. Central to this partnership had been military aid, in form of weaponry and military training.[40] Therefore, Ethiopia's shift of alliance implied also the beginning of military co-operation with the former Soviet Union and the parallel move of the US to support Somalia, until that moment a staunch ally of the Soviet Union.[41]

Cooperation with socialist countries endowed the Ethiopian government with three poisonous and effective tools: the centralizing ideology of Marxism-Leninism, the military support of the Russian and Cuban armies, and the intelligence of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). Marxism-Leninism acted as a powerful tool within the centralizing policy of the new regime.[42] Examples of this are the policies of resettlement and forced villagization, which were launched in the end of 1984 and eventually suspended in March 1990. In the regime's propaganda those policies were described as a solution to issues deriving from drought and soil exhaustion through the introduction of more rational forms of social organization, resources' utilization and access to state services in rural areas.[43] The result was the resettlement of over half a million of peasants and, among the different popular reactions they engendered, eventually, one was to flee by returning to the areas of provenance, and to migrate to the marginality of great urban centres or to join the crowd of refugees in neighbouring countries.[44]

The military support granted by the former Soviet Union and Cuba made the Ethiopian army one of the strongest in sub-Saharan Africa and enabled the country to pursue its traditional ambitions of regional hegemony. On the Somali front in 1977, Russian military support was crucial in rescuing the Ethiopian Army from a defeat at the hands of the Somali army, which had again attacked Ethiopia in the attempt to liberate the Ogaden region.[45] In spite of its initial success, the Somali army was defeated, and this paved the way to a serious political crisis within Somalia and to further massive flows of displaced people and refugees.[46] This success enabled the Derg to focus on Eritrea, pursuing a military solution to the crisis.[47] A series of devastating offensives were launched between 1978 and 1984, which, however, did not succeed in crushing the Eritrean resistance, but nevertheless levied a heavy toll among civilians that were forced into exile in Sudan. This forced Eritrean nationalist organizations to increase their efforts toward the creation of mass-organizations not only to provide ideological guidance, but also to coordinate the provision of social services to civilians living in the areas under their military control.[48] At the same time, efforts toward political agitation and the mobilization of masses were also

extended to diasporic communities, to involve them tightly in political developments at home.[49]

Finally, the intelligence support from the GDR provided the Derg with the tools to crush internal dissension, particularly among radical university students and labour unions, which had launched a strong political offensive, calling for a more consistent and effective implementation of socialist policies.[50] Threatened on its own ideological ground, the Derg reacted by unlashing a series of purges against dissidents, and particularly against urban intelligentsia which was eliminated in 1977 during a heinous campaign known as the "Red Terror."[51] That bloodshed obliterated from the Ethiopian political arena a whole generation of intellectuals and progressive militants, and forced the few survivors into hiding and exile.

Within this broad discussion of postcolonial peoples' mobility, attention should be paid also to the trial of the Falasha people or Bet Israel, as they refer to themselves. A minority mainly settled in northwestern Ethiopia, the Bet Israel claim Jewish origins and have maintained separate social and religious practices quite similar to the broader Jewish tradition, though they ignored Hebrew until the nineteenth century, when Jewish missionaries introduced them to this language.[52] After centuries of little attention from the outer world, the Bet Israel had been thrown to the foreground of international politics in 1984 when the State of Israel, within its policy of Jews' repatriation, negotiated with the Derg their transfer to Israel in exchange for weaponry. This transfer initiated in November 1984 was concluded on May 1991, on the verge of the collapse of the Derg regime.[53]

This episode introduces a second major watershed in regional politics, the end of the Cold War era, which made it possible for the joint efforts of the EPLF and the TPLF to bring an end to the Derg regime in May 1991. This interrupted the pattern of warfare, displacement and migration which had been unfolding during the 1970s and 1980s, and nurtured hope for a better future in the whole region, to the extent that international agencies started considering the return of refugees living in neighbouring countries.[54] However, this positive development did not involve the whole region, as in Somalia a deep internal crisis brought an end to the dictatorship of

Mohamed Siad Barre and sparked off a civil war which led to the implosion of the Somali.[55]

Also the hope for peace and stability fostered by both Eritrea and Ethiopia was shattered in May 1998 when a minor skirmish, allegedly over boundary issues, escalated into full-fledged war with huge losses on both sides until, in May 2000, the two parties agreed on a ceasefire, followed by a peace treaty. The resurgence of belligerence reactivated old patterns of displacements and introduced new ones, such as the deportation of civilians. Initiated by the Ethiopian government in June 1998, allegedly as a security measure to protect the country from the risk of enemy infiltrations, the deportation toward Eritrea of Eritrean nationals as well as Ethiopians of Eritrean origin has affected in a rather indiscriminate way the life of civilians of all ages and walks of life.[56] On the Eritrean side, retaliatory measures have been rejected by the government until May 2000, when, on the wake of a devastating Ethiopian military offensive and the ensuing rise of anti-Ethiopian feelings among the population, the deportation of Ethiopian citizens started also on the Eritrean side. Deportations have created a new category of displaced people as individuals, often only nominally of Eritrean or Ethiopian origin, found themselves stranded in territories where they did not entertain any significant emotional and cultural connection, forced into identities to which they did not feel they belonged. A further consequence of this conflict has been, particularly on the Eritrean side, the beginning of a juvenile exodus fostered by the distress and incertitude deriving from the tense situation, and from the perspective of endless military service and other forms of national duties requested by the state.

Parallel to this series of complex historical processes, an equally dramatic and lasting tragedy has been unfolding in Sudan where, since the late 1950s, there has been a conflict between the central government of Sudan and the opposition from the Sudanese South. Commonly represented by Western media as a clash between the Muslim-Arab North and the Christian-Animist-Black South, the conflict in Sudan has much more complex and articulate reasons, such as the issues of access to resources and the control of the state, which is at the same time the controller and the dispenser of those resources.[57] With its roots back in the period of British colonial rule

when discriminatory policies implemented by the colonial administration sowed seeds of war, the conflict had been simmering through the early years of decolonization and flared up in the 1960s. A crucial step has been the foundation in 1960 of the Sudan African Nationalist Union (SANU) better known as Anyanya, which marked the beginning of the armed struggle and a widening of territories and populations involved in it.[58] This trend continued and intensified with the creation in 1983 of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and of its powerful military wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which further radicalized the conflict and led to a substantial increase of the military capability of the armed opposition, together with the spread of the conflict to the Bedja areas in the east and to Darfur in the west.[59] Since then the conflict in Sudan has levied a heavy toll among civilians with approximately two million dead and a huge number of internally displaced people as well as refugees, a trend which, unfortunately, continues even in present days with discomforting regularity.[60]

Postcolonial patterns of migrations in the Horn

Against this composite historical background it is thus possible to sketch a map of patterns of migration and of their predominant itineraries in the postcolonial period. With regard to the early decades of the 1950s and 1960s, three main patterns of migration can be identified in the region. A first pattern, marginal from a quantitative point of view but significant for its long-term implications, was motivated by the quest for education as in those years there was a composite flow of elites sent abroad to study in Western institutes of higher education. In Ethiopia this trend was part of the modernizing policy of Emperor Haile Selassie who sent many young Ethiopians and Eritreans to Europe and the United States to study.[61] Another important flow of young in search of education can be noticed among Eritrean Muslim elites who, feeling marginalized within the Ethiopian educational system – focused on the proficiency in Amharic language and on the Christian identity – tended to continue the tradition of moving to Sudan, Egypt and the Middle East for their higher education. The developments in Somalia have been slightly different where the Trusteeship arrangement had

established privileged channels of cultural exchanges with Italy, though traditional connections with Egypt continued to exist.[62]

A second pattern of migrations noticeable from the second half of the 1950s is that of Eritrean nationalists who, due to the increased resort of the Ethiopian government to political violence and terrorism, were forced to opt for exile in Egypt, at that time a haven for African nationalists, due to the supportive leadership of general Gamal Abdel Nasser. Thus, early waves of political refugees together with the groups of Eritrean students already there for study reasons made of Cairo a vibrant centre of Eritrean nationalism and in 1961 many of these persons played a crucial role in the formation of the ELF.[63]

Finally, starting from the 1960s, a third new migratory trend, limited mainly to the Christian population of Eritrea and of the region of Tigray in Ethiopia, was that of young single women going to Italy, where they were recruited in the domestic sector as housemaids.[64] This particular development was the result of a sudden demand for domestic labour in the Italian labour market, due to the changing nature of gender roles within Italian society and the increased attitude of upper and middle-class Italian women to seek social and gender emancipation through external work.[65] Within originating societies this kind of migration, which at that stage could be defined as mainly economically motivated, played an important role in setting a pattern of migrant female workers sending substantial remittance home, which significantly marked the economic history of the region. At the same time, the presence of this female labour in Italy played a crucial role in providing early connections of Eritrean migrants to Europe, and establishing patterns of migrations for the later waves of migrants in the 1970s and 1980s.

The dramatic intensification of warfare in the region toward the end of the 1960s led to the development of massive phenomena of dislocation through new itineraries. This process can be described as a dual and interrelated one, consisting of the development of huge concentrations of refugees in neighbouring regions – Somalis in Kenya and Djibouti, Ethiopians and Eritreans in Sudan and Kenya, Sudanese in Ethiopia and Kenya. At the same time, those

agglomerates of refugees did not always represent the final destination of displaced people as, starting from the late 1970s and increasingly during the 1980s, refugees looked at neighbouring regions only as the first step of a much longer journey which now started reaching overseas territories, namely the Middle East, Europe, and the Americas. Particularly for Eritreans and Ethiopians, at that time the most numerous communities of migrants from the Horn, a special role was played by Italy, which in spite of its unclear and not refugee-friendly policies, represented one of the preferred destination of those early migrations. As mentioned earlier, the established presence of women employed in the domestic sector acted as a facilitating factor in attracting a significant presence of displaced people, together with the presence of a small but extremely important presence of students, many of them highly politicized. In the same years, another important destination for migrants from war-torn regions of the Horn was the Middle East; Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria because of their tradition of support to Eritrean nationalism became a haven for many Eritreans refugees, particularly of Muslim origins. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia hosted a different flow of migrants, to a certain extent comparable to the one hosted by Italy in the 1960s. In fact Eritrean and Ethiopian women found a highly demanding labour market in the domestic sector among posh Saudi families.

From the early 1980s, this already articulated flow of migrants started diversifying its itineraries in a significant way, broadening its horizons. Facilitating factors in this process had been two concomitant and contrastive developments: On the one side, the deterioration of standards of life in neighbouring receiving countries as well as the unfriendly policies of some of the early European receiving countries, namely Italy.[66] On the other side, the elaboration of refugee-friendly policies by northern European states as well as by Canada, the US and Australia. A crucial development in this sense has definitely been the introduction of the American Refugee Act in 1980, which led to a sudden increase of refugees from the Horn in the US.[67] Therefore, the 1980s witnessed a complex process marked by the move of early migrants from Italy to the above-mentioned countries and then the pulling effect of those early settlements towards new waves of migrants. A similar migratory pattern can be

noticed with little differences also in the case of the massive exodus of Somali peoples after the collapse of the Siad Barre regime and the following outbreak of the civil war in 1991.

Diaspora and its conceptualizations

Having sketched broadly the main causes and patterns of migratory trends in the Horn, it is now important to address the issue of the conceptual location of those trends within the broader context of migrant discourse in contemporary days. As pointed out by James Clifford, the last two decades have been marked by an increasing attention to the migratory process as expressed also by the recent terminological mushrooming which has thrown in the intellectual debate concepts such as borders, travel, creolization, hybridity, diaspora, globalization, deterritorialization and transnationalism.[68] This semantic proliferation has also been followed by a semiotic proliferation, which attributes different meanings and values to the above-mentioned words and, ultimately, testifies the growing relevance and importance of the phenomena on a world level.

In the context of my discussion, I shall not adventure through the slippery and still opaque territory of conceptual discussion of the concept of diaspora.[69] I will rather limit myself to some broad generalizations, which can help in providing some essential hermeneutical tools. In my discussion I refer to the concept of diaspora as a crossroad of exchanges and contradictions, an intricate forest of symbols and meanings originated by people's mobility through space and time, as its Greek etymology also shows.[70] Though diasporas are not recent phenomena, what makes them different in present days is their high degree of mobility, which in turn is closely associated with the broader phenomenon known as globalization. To this regard, Armstrong defines diaspora as a concept which "applies to any ethnic collectivity which lacks territorial base within a given polity," which introduces deterritorialization as a crucial notion in defining diasporas.[71] Modern diasporas present also a further element of novelty in their not being necessarily perceived as a spurious and dangerous foreign body within a territorialized and "indigenous" polity. In fact, in the past, diasporas tended

to be perceived in negative terms, a sort of infiltrator or traitor within the receiving polity. The context of this hostile perception, in a pre-globalization world, was particularly the economic activity of migrants which were perceived as a potentially destabilizing factor for receiving societies, as the wealth produced by migrants was ultimately beneficial to other polities.[72] On the opposite side, recent literature has emphasized the increasingly fashionable perceptions of diasporas as bearers of cultural hybridism, a sort of ambivalent postmodern representation of the oldest notion of exoticism.[73] Finally, as pointed out by Robin Cohen, diasporic displacements are not seen anymore only as the result of forcible dislocation, pain, loneliness and despair as was the case in the Biblical representation of Jews' dispersal to Babylon. On the contrary, some diasporic experiences show a certain degree of voluntarism and creativity which enhance new and more challenging opportunities for individual and collective social and economic improvement.[74]

However, one of the key difficulties which scholars seem to face when trying to conceptualize diasporas' experience is the risk of generalizations, or the risk of overlooking important specificities within time and space. In other words, it is difficult to analyze diasporic experiences without taking into account the specificities generated by the *who*, *why*, *when* and *how* of each migratory experience as – paraphrasing Avtar Brah – are exactly the connections among those specificities that the concept of diaspora signifies.[75] In this perspective, it is possible to affirm that diasporas embody intricate articulations of power relations within the originating and receiving societies as well as within diasporas themselves, which in turns originates complex and always fluid processes of identity-definitions based on gender, race and class. A further methodological aspect which scholars dealing with diasporas and migration studies had to face was the initial overlap between diaspora and minority studies. In fact, though it is true that diasporas are minorities within a given polity, it is also true that the analytical tools employed for minority studies cannot be fully applied to the study of diasporas, as the latter do not have the quality of being "native" to a territory. On the contrary, diasporic discourses assume deterritorialization, being that real or represented, as a key component of

the process of identity-definition. In other words, the concept of diaspora is always associated with a "home" which is somewhere else.

This point introduces the even more intricate concept of transnationalism, which seems to have been adopted increasingly by scholars of migrant studies as a comprehensive and useful concept to analyze migrations and their multiple impact on both generating and receiving societies, as well as on migrants themselves.[76] Though definitions abound, contributing to create a sort of confusing semiotic Babel, I will tentatively adopt the definition suggested by Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch and Cristina Blanc-Szanton which defines transnationalism as

> ...the processes by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement. Immigrants who build such social fields are designed 'transmigrants'. Transmigrants develop and maintain multiple relations – familial, economic, social, organisational, religious, and political that span borders...[77]

The category of transnationalism is a crucial one, as it unravels wide and fascinating webs of relations among individuals, communities, institutions and cultures. Embedded are in fact the networks of kinship connections, which act as facilitators of migratory processes, the complex interplay of political and social loyalties of transnational citizens who are at once citizens of the receiving polity and, often, political actors in their "home."[78] Ultimately all those elements converge in the continuous process of renegotiation of identities, within and among diasporic communities on one side and the receiving society on the other, which has played a major role in the recent debate on the mutating concept of citizenship in contemporary societies.[79]

Horn of Africa's migrants as diasporas?

In light of the previous discussion, two main questions arise. The first one deals with the relevance of this intense and still on-going debate with regard to migrants from the Horn. The second one is related to the applicability of the label of diasporas to the community of migrants from the Horn. It seems to me that the main bulk

of theoretical and analytical issues discussed previously find a great deal of applicability in the case of the Horn's migratory processes. If the *why* of dislocation processes has to be taken into account, it is apparent that violence and warfare can be assessed as a major common factor for the main diasporic communities originating from the Horn. In this perspective, the spread of regional instability ignited by the interplay of unresolved nationalisms and geopolitical interests within the bipolar system of the Cold War era had influenced in a quite specific way patterns of migration from the region. In other words, the central role of politics in the crisis experienced by the region has left a heavy mark on diasporic communities originating from the Horn, which tend to present a high degree of political consciousness as for a long time politics seem to have been the main factor of aggregation and division within those communities.

In the same way the *when* of migratory processes follows quite regularly the unfolding of political crisis and outbreak of violence in the region during the last forty years.[80] The crises of the 1960s, mid-1970s, mid-1980s, early 1990s and late 1990s have been regularly followed by sudden increases of dislocation processes. This in turn brings about the issue of the *how* of those processes, as migrations from the Horn tend to have predominantly a refugees identity.[81] This appears quite clearly from the statistical data of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) which provides interesting elements for historical, sociological and anthropological considerations. In fact, the reading of UNHCR data unveils a number of interesting insights. First of all it is apparent that north-east Africa detains the unenviable primate of being one of the main producers of refugees in Africa and also on a world basis.[82] A second interesting insight is that these migrations, particularly from Eritrea and Somalia, are highly gendered, with frequent cases of female predominance as in the previously mentioned case of Italy.[83] Analyzing data on refugees from the Horn, two main strategies seem to emerge as factors determining itineraries of dislocation. A first strategy, often the most immediate, seems to be related not only to geographical closeness but also to historical traditions. This is particularly the case of Somali refugees, which, beside the obvious presence in neighbouring countries, seems to suggest the resilience

of old Swahili connections extending along the coast of East Africa all the way to Tanzania.[84] A second strategy seems to be inspired for the development of better legal provisions for refugees in some of the receiving polities, notably in northern Europe and North America.

Home and the myth of return

The *how* of the Horn of Africa migratory processes is also an extremely important factor in determining perceptions and representations of the staying in receiving societies, an aspect which, in turn, is also influenced by the nature of receiving policies implemented within those societies. Having defined the identity of the Horn's diasporas as predominantly associated with the refugee experience, it is, therefore, likely that the perception and representation of sojourn in refugees camps in neighbouring countries tend to be marked by the idea of temporality and transition. A major reason which makes refugees' status an unenviable one in the regional context is the fact that the majority of the receiving polities are themselves struggling with scanty and poorly organized resources and services for their own citizens and, therefore, lack the material resources and juridical framework necessary for the implementation of refugee-friendly policies.[85] As pointed out by Gaim Kibreab, what he defines as "inauspicious policy environment" plays a major role in structuring refugees' manifestations of identity, pushing toward a policy of invisibility, to avoid discrimination or violence, and nurturing the perception of exile as a temporary experience vis-à-vis the representation of "home" as the key component of one's identity.[86] In this unfriendly setting the experience of exile is perceived as transitional, and to return home is a dramatically urgent issue, felt with much more urgency than in other countries. However, instability and the fluid political set-up of the region have made return a long delayed dream for many refugees. The most striking case, perhaps, has been the case of the more than half a million of Eritrean refugees living in Sudan – many of them since the 1960s – which were expected to return home quickly after Eritrea achieved its independence.[87] Unfortunately, the return of those refugees has been seriously delayed by the odd entropy caused by inadequate financial and political support from international agen-

cies on the one side and, on the other side, concerns of the Eritrean government about the potentially destabilizing consequences of the sudden returns of those refugees.[88] In fact, the return of refugees from Sudan raised two major issues, the first one being their need for land and in general for occupational opportunities within an already deprived and destitute country.[89] The second one, suggested by some foreign NGOs but denied by the Eritrean government, would be due to the fact that refugee-camps in Sudan have been a basin of recruitment for opposition movements, including some radical Islamic fundamentalist movements developed since 1988 from splinter groups of the Eritrean Liberation Front. As a result, the great majority of Eritrean refugees in Sudan have yet to return home.[90] Similarly, to return home has become an impossible dream for many Somali refugees, who have seen their state implode not to be replaced by anything but indiscriminate warfare, violence and unlawfulness.

However, it is much more intriguing to assess the issue of perception and representation of exile within refugee-friendly societies, where clearer and more favourable legal and institutional frameworks for the reception and integration of refugees have propitiated the development of a more articulate dialectic between originating regions, receiving polities and the broader web of diasporic identities. In this context, the case of the Eritrean diaspora again is particularly enlightening as its originating from a would-be nation very much affected the perception and experience of exile among Eritreans, strengthening the emotional link with the remote home and nurturing the myth of a quick return to this home.[91] This has significantly marked the Eritrean diaspora, which has developed a high degree of internal cohesion under the banner of a militant nationalism.[92] The quest for the nation to be freed and built has therefore absorbed the main part of the Eritrean diaspora's human and material sources, engendering an extremely active involvement in politics at home which has earned them the denomination of "transnational *tegadelti*" (fighters).[93] Paradoxically, this can be noticed in the relatively scarce economic visibility of Eritreans abroad. Apart from a few restaurants and a few notable cases of business developments, it can be said that Eritreans – in spite of their long experience of exile – have invested much less in the

improvement of their material life than other diasporas in their receiving countries. The great part of the wealth produced by Eritrean diasporas has, therefore, returned to the distant home in form of remittances to relatives and friends and, also in a equally regular way, in form of direct financial support to nationalist movements struggling at home.[94]

However, it is interesting to notice that once Eritrea eventually achieved its long awaited independence in 1991, the return of the Eritrean diaspora has not materialized. Contrarily to worldwide expectation, the majority of the Eritrean diaspora has remained in its receiving countries and return has therefore entered the dimension of myth. In fact, after the deep and sustained emotional tension toward the materialization of the state and, therefore, of the real home, has faded away, diasporic communities have started facing the little known reality of cultural and material alienation from "home," which had been slowly but recklessly built by the very diasporic experience. Some of the actors affecting the feasibility of the long awaited "return home" have been the difficult integration of children born or grown up "abroad" as well as the emergence of political division and dissatisfaction with Eritrean politics.[95]

A different and equally interesting case is the one offered by the Somali diaspora. The *raison d'etre* of the Somali diaspora being, mainly, the sudden and traumatic disappearing of the Somali state and its replacement by a fluid institutional vacuum, tentatively filled by more fragmented identities, it seems that the issue of loyalties for Somali diasporas tends to be articulated along a more fragmented and elusive framework based on local, clan- and family-based, relations.[96] In this context, diasporic dislocation configures as the space for the re-negotiation of new fragmented identities and the selective rediscovery (or invention) of new, and allegedly more "authentic" identities.[97]

The issue of identities

All those elements concur to determine the very nature of diasporic communities from the Horn, strengthening processes of identity-definition in relation to originating causes and also to the policies

of the receiving polity. For instance, the Eritrean diaspora bears great evidence of the strong political imprinting of its origin and this has followed its development through the long thirty years of Eritrean liberation struggle. In other words, Eritrean diasporic identity has been built around an image and a practice of militant nationalism, which has led to a high degree of internal cohesion, rooted in the prioritization of the needs of the motherland vis-à-vis the needs of the diaspora itself. Diasporic aggregations have, therefore, been the place for the construction of radical nationalism to a certain extent even more radical then at home, and in this perspective regional or religious identities seem to have been ignored or put aside on behalf of the broader national identity. Thus, dislocation has been transformed into a sort of laboratory to experiment the differences of Eritrean social, religious and ethnic make-up in a much easier way than would have been possible at home. It is then possible to state that diaspora in the Eritrean case has been a crucial part of the complex process toward statehood and nation building.[98]

However, diasporic dislocation has not only been the place to strengthen nationalist identities, but has also offered the opportunity to define other, often parallel, identities. For instance, a common phenomenon, particularly among second-generation diasporas, has been the discovery of their "blackness." This is a process of particular importance within a Horn of Africa context where, at least for a consistent part of people from Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, the race's self-representation tends to be based not on blackness but rather on more intricate and complex references. As mentioned earlier, among Christians from Eritrea and Ethiopia the prevailing perception and representation of identities is based on a supposed otherness – vis-à-vis "Africaness" – rooted in alleged Semitic origins. Similarly, for Muslim populations remote ancestry is commonly traced back to Arab roots. Therefore, for northeast African migrants the discovery of blackness and the appropriation of black identity represents a substantial identity-shift embedded in traumatic diasporic experiences encompassing dislocation, alienation, diversity, and exploitation, of which the adoption of "blackness" becomes a metaphor.[99] Black identity and particularly black music and behavioural patterns associated with rap culture provide

young immigrants from the Horn with a broader, and more marketable, transnational identity, which can accommodate their internal differences and fragmentation.[100] Thus, diversity is blurred within a broader shared black-diaspora identity, which ultimately also has currency in the market of globalized mass-culture.[101] However, it is important to be aware of the fluidity and negotiability of those identities, a point summarized in Avtar Brah's analysis of communities in the United Kingdom. To this regard the scholar points out that

> ...the usage of 'black', 'Indian' or 'Asian' is determined not so much by the nature of its referent as by its semiotic function within different discourses. These various meanings signal different sets of cultural and political identities, and set limits to where the boundaries of a 'community' are established...[102]

Citizens with divided loyalties

All those issues are crucial components of a much more complex and controversial theme in contemporary societies, namely the issue of citizenship and its changing definition. It is in fact apparent that the increasing number of migrants that for different reasons leave their countries to settle in other polities raise an intricate series of issues to be dealt with, which involves migrants, their originating countries and their receiving ones. In this context one of the key themes is the re-definition of citizenship. Rooted in a Romantic-inherited notion of being "native" – within a relation of "flesh and blood" – to a territory, the traditional notion of citizenship discovers all its inadequacy in front of continuously increasing numbers of permanent residents not "native" to the receiving polity, but organically part of it in virtue of their being economically productive, paying taxes, enjoying services, begetting offspring.[103] What is at stake is the very concept of the nation-state and its ethnically and territorially defined borders. The intensity of this epistemological and also political crisis can be noticed particularly through the debate which has been going on, particularly among western countries, on the issue of migrants, refugees and their rights.[104]

It seems to me that one possible way to look at the issue of citizenship is to consider it as tangential to two strictly interrelated issues:

the issue of duty and the issue of loyalty. Two issues which do not involve only receiving polities but also the originating ones. In fact, to be a citizen does not involve only the wide range of aspects related with rights (vote, political representation, possibility to produce wealth, religious freedom, right to have a family, access to services such as health, education, safety, mobility etc), it includes also legal and social duties which, in turn also embody the notion of loyalty.

What is probably most original, and to a certain extent controversial, in the contemporary debate on citizenship is that modern migrants and the diasporic communities they constitute are not just settling within a polity which they adopt and from which they want to be adopted after a no-return experience of dislocation and displacement. On the contrary, an original feature of most modern diasporas – and in this regard the Horn of Africa is not an exception – is their close connection and interaction with "home." In this case home is not only a space of memory and emotions where to root one's identity, but it is also a territory where to play an active economic, political and even cultural role. What receiving polities have to deal with now is the new category of transnational citizen, a citizen with divided loyalties, both to its originating and to its receiving countries.[105] This is a quite interesting and new development which raises a number of substantial issues concerning the nature of the receiving polity and in certain cases even its internal security. In fact, diasporic cultural specificities, which often in contemporary multiethnic societies tend to be welcomed within a sort of fashionable exoticism, can also be a source of tension and concern for receiving countries when those specificities enter into a path of collision with local interests and national priorities. For instance, a growing object of debate has been the contradictions which diasporas can create in the domain of the foreign policy of a state. The most cited case is that of the United States, where scholars debate about whether lobbying activities of diasporic communities are actually prioritizing US national interests or rather the interests of diasporas' countries of origin.[106] Similarly, the philosophy of the state and of the nature of the relations between state and citizen can sometimes become elements of a debate which does not affect only the relations between diasporas and receiving polities

but also the broader foreign policy of those polities. A case in point is the ongoing debate in France on the issue of the acceptability of the Islamic scarf in French schools. This debate, which in a normal context would belong to the sphere of the relations between State and religion, within the present tense international conjuncture tends to be perceived as an issue which can affect also the nature of the relations between France and the Islamic world. Moreover, in certain cases divided loyalties can also be source of concern for receiving polities and determine ambiguous situations in terms of political identities. This is the case of organizations which, at "home" are considered to be legitimate nationalist political organizations but that in the receiving polity are labelled as terrorist organizations, such as, for instance, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka, and many radical Palestinian organizations.[107]

In the case of the Horn the contradictions associated with the presence of diasporas with divided loyalties seem to have emerged particularly during the Eritreo-Ethiopian war of 1998-2000. The unexpected conflict that flared up between the two countries has expanded also to their respective diasporas which have engaged in a variety of supportive activities. The first and most effective domain of engagement has been what I would define "diasporic diplomacy," consisting of a mixture of lobbying activity among governmental and non-governmental institutions of the receiving polity. This activity has been particularly intense in the United States which was identified as a main international arbiter and therefore the object of special attention. Another field of activity of Eritrean and Ethiopian diasporas has been cyberspace, transformed into a battlefield where a full-fledged war without prisoners has been fought. This activity which has been defined as a diasporas' proxy-war has unlashed an unprecedented level of hatred and conflict within the involved diasporas, far beyond the already high tunes of state-propaganda, opening deep divisions in the name of nationalism.[108] Similarly, the Somali diaspora has also played a determinant role in the political life of Somalia through its involvement in web-politics. This extremely active involvement has fulfilled a dual and contradictory mandate by fostering feelings of belonging and at the same time exacerbating the fragmentation of

the Somali society which has brought in exile obsessions and ghosts of the distant home.[109]

In some cases the tense relationship between diasporic loyalties and security concerns of receiving polities seem to have led to the return of old perceptions of diasporas as a threat to national stability, though in new "post-modern" forms. I am referring here to the increasing concerns of receiving polities with regard to informal channels utilized by diasporas to send their remittances back home. In an apparent contradiction with the predominant celebration of free market and deregulation as supreme economic values, many receiving polities have started checking the way the wealth produced by diasporas is channelled. For instance, after the dramatic events of September 11, the United States have been taking serious sanctions against the Somali holding al-Barakat, which has been accused of being a disguised line of supply for terrorist activities associated with the al-Qaeda network. Therefore, following the United Nations Security Council resolutions 1267/1999, 1333/2000, the assets of the holding have been frozen and many of its managers arrested, which has represented a serious setback for Somali migrants as the money-transfer branch of the al–Barakat holding has been one of the most efficient and reliable instruments to send remittance back home.[110]

However, divided loyalties do not represent a problem only for receiving polities. There are in fact a number of issues which are of concern also for originating countries. The wide range of issues related to the uneasy relationship between diasporas and their originating states arises from the economic power of diasporic communities. The crucial and regular flow of remittances welcomed by originating polities as a vital lifeline of hard currency, which in some cases is the main source of revenues for particularly weak economies, in the long run configures itself as a double-blazed sword.[111] In fact, the substantial economic flow of remittances is not eternal and blank checks which diasporas deliver to their homes disinteresteded, out of nationalism and family ties. The consciousness of the broad impact of remittances upon the distant home brings about, inevitably, the quest for political visibility and the possibility to have a say on the various processes of social and economic development which are to a great extent fed by remit-

tances themselves. Therefore, from expressions of devote nationalism, remittance can rapidly turn out to be a heavy and powerful instrument of blackmailing which could enable diasporas to influence from outside the direction of internal affairs. It is therefore apparent that vocal diaspora increasingly tend to pretend more political space to express their opinion on substantial and sensitive issues such as economic development, democracy, human rights, religious policies etc. With regard to the Horn this process seems not to have taken a clear and open shape and Cyberspace, again, remains the privileged observatory to scrutinize the complex dynamics of those processes. It is in fact through the variety of proliferating websites that it is possible to get a glimpse of some of the main feelings and themes of the debate circulating among diasporic communities.

It is apparent that, in light of the above-mentioned reasons, diasporic communities confront their originating polities with a variety of sensitive issues which call for urgent answers. It is therefore interesting to see how those issues have been accommodated. An interesting point of observation to assess the reactions of the State to those new challenges is, again, the issue of citizenship, checking how citizenship is defined and practiced in originating countries.

Eritrea is perhaps the case where the issue of diasporic communities is more sensitive because of both their economic and political weight in the life of the country. In fact, in the Eritrean case diaspora has been crucial not only as an external economic supporter of kinship networks but also in being instrumental in bringing about the state through the multifaceted forms of support in which it has been involved through the thirty years of liberation struggle. It is therefore interesting to see how this special role of diaspora has been tentatively accommodated within the broader process of nation building. The right to citizenship as enshrined in the Eritrean constitution seems to be drafted in order to accommodate the dispersion of Eritreans. According to the constitution, any Eritrean citizen who has at least one Eritrean parent or a foreigner who has resided in Eritrea for at least five years consecutively is entitled to Eritrean citizenship. At the same time, dual citizenship, though not officially recognized by the constitution or by the Eri-

trean Nationality Proclamation N 22/1992, is de facto accepted and accommodated in Eritrea's immigration policies. From the constitutional text it is apparent that citizenship is not anymore rooted in territoriality, but on the contrary is rather defined on a transnational basis. This in turn paves the way to other original and, to my knowledge, unique developments in modern relations between the State and its citizens. In fact, though the right to citizenship is defined in the very accommodative forms which I have just elucidated, the real enjoyment of citizenship rights is conditional to the fulfilment of two basic duties: the payment of taxes and the participation in both military and national service. It seems to me that through those provisions Eritrean legislators have consciously attempted to revivify previous guerrilla forms of transnational social administration in the new administrative framework of the State. However, a major conceptual change seems to have been overlooked, as during the liberation struggle the involvement in activities of support to the struggle were expressions of a free and individual choice and remained within a non-institutional framework. On the contrary, after the accession of Eritrea to statehood what was the expression of a political and ideological choice has become a duty through which the Eritrean state seeks to discipline and control its transnational citizens. Particularly the payment of taxes, which for diasporic citizens is expected to correspond to the 2 percent of the total income, seems to be both the institutionalization of what has become a crucial lifeline for Eritrean economy and the monetary cooptation of the diaspora in the process of nation building. At the same time the disciplining part of Eritrean citizenship policies are compensated by the parallel attempt to give political visibility to the diaspora together with some privileges. Political visibility is granted through the potential right of members of the diaspora to run for parliamentary elections and therefore be actively involved in the political life at home though being resident abroad.[112] At the same time, through the creation of a Commission for Diaspora attempts have been made to create an institutional forum where to discuss the various issues related with diaspora and frame adequate state policies.

The Somali case represents probably a quite different case, as Somalis configure the unprecedented case of a diaspora originated from

the implosion of a state but which continues to have a nation where in the absence of both the state and other forms of foreign military or political control, life keeps going on through the channels of informality. It is therefore a completely new scenario where diasporic communities in virtue of both the predominant deregulation of the society and their economic power have the possibility to play a major role in local politics, notwithstanding the persistence of a very volatile and unsafe environment.

Conclusions

Through this article I have argued that recent migratory phenomena from Africa and the diasporas they originated need to be analyzed against the broader picture of African history. Accordingly, I have argued that time and space are two fundamental elements to be included in the study of modern diasporas in order to enable a deeper comprehension of their roots and of the modalities of their dislocation. To this regard, the Horn of Africa represents the ideal scenario in virtue of its complex and rich history which has given rise to some of the most complex and articulated cases of modern migration. The second part of my paper has tried to show how modern diaspora from the Horn interact with their new social status and how the complex dialectic which leads to the definition of identities has determined unprecedented and challenging spaces of hybridity and transnationalism, which are a source of enrichment but also of concern for both receiving and originating polities.

Notes

1 Assefaw Bariagaber, referring to 1995, gives the figure of 1,355,900 refugees from the Horn, amounting to 26 percent of refugees from Africa. See Assefaw 1999, p. 597–619.

2 Recent literature tends to suggest a different interpretation of the past, marked by a more favourable assessment of local contribution to the development of past civilizations in the region. Curtis & Yosef 1999, Wenig 1997, Munro-Hay 1991, p. 44–48. Crucial in this sense has been the role played by linguistics, see particularly Ehret 1979, 1986, 1995. On the views of the colonial scholars see for instance Conti Rossini 1928, p. 99–111. A similar standing can be found also in later publications such as Ullendorff (1960).

3 For a detailed reconstruction of those developments, see Taddese 1972. On specific aspects of religion and symbolism of power see Levine 1988, Kaplan 1988.
4 Object of this kind of discourse have been, for instance, Agaw, Oromo and Somali. See Taddese 1988, Turton 1975.
5 This is common, for instance, among the Afar and the Somali people. See Trimingham 1952, p. 153, Mukhtar 1995, Lewis 1962.
6 Markakis even suggests reading the recent political history of the Horn in terms of a struggle among communities for access to resources. See Markakis 1987, p. 4–8, Markakis 1998. A good attempt to write an ecological history of the region is Johnson & Anderson 1988. It is important to note that the relation between the environment and migration should not be taken in mechanistic terms as pointed out in McCann 1999.
7 Part of this pattern can also be considered the practice of sending military garrisons to forcibly ensure the loyalty of the remote marches of the territories over which Abyssinian power tried to exert its authority. In 1935, the Italian scholar Alberto Pollera identified the existence of 66 villages in Eritrea whose origin was attributed to those military settlements (Pollera 1935, p. 120). On the proselytism aspects see Kaplan 1984, McCann 1995.
8 Trimingham 1952, p. 85–88.
9 One of the best reconstructions of the events in Sudan is still Holt 1970. On the Ethiopian case see Caulk 1972.
10 Jerusalem, Cyprus, Armenia, and Rome attracted Christian Abyssinian pilgrims through centuries. See Cerulli 1943–1947, Lefevre 1941, 1964, 1967–68, Khoury 1983. Beside the prestigious pilgrimage to Mecca (*hajj*) other important centres of religious cult and pilgrimage were the tombs of pious men to whom popular tradition attributed special powers. Trimingham 1952, p. 152–159, Lewis 1998, p. 96.
11 Al-Naqar 1969.
12 Ellero 1947.
13 On the Christian churches' education see Girma 1967. On the Qur'anic schools see Mohammed 1979–1980. Regional centres were Gondar for Christians, Kassala and Harar for Muslims, then for higher education the University al-Azhar in Cairo for Muslims, Jerusalem and Rome for Christians. See Leonessa 1929, p. 185.
14 Pankhurst 1964, Taddia 1985, Yemane 2003, Hess 1966, p. 22. To avoid misunderstandings it has to be recalled that Italy's terrific efforts in the field of infrastructure were primarily aimed at making its colonies safer from a military perspective and viable for Italian settlers, who were expected to populate the region. The amplitude and complexity of this activity, with regard to railways is discussed in Maggi 1996.
15 The payment of tribute, at least during the earlier years of colonial rule, registered the hostility of local populations. Lenci (1999) mentions those episodes.
16 Those policies affected particularly socio-economic exchanges among people living along the newly invented colonial borders, especially nomadic populations, for whom colonial boundaries represented a threat to their livelihood, which assumed permanent mobility as its basic prerequisite. There is a detailed discussion of the Eritrean-Ethiopian case in Guazzini 1998.
17 The relevance of this phenomenon within the Ethiopian society is discussed extensively in Bahru 2002. On the migration to the cities mentioned see Leonessa 1929, p. 200, Arén 1978, p. 345–346, Ollén 1919.
18 This theme has been discussed extensively in Curtin 1998. See also Echenberg 1980.
19 The shortage of labour led to a sheer increase of wages, see Tekeste 1987, p. 50. See also Pankhurst 1971.
20 This particular form of dislocation has been discussed with regard to Eritrea in Guazzini 2002.
21 A quite frequent cause of exodus was punishment for what colonial sources defined as barbaric forms of violence, such as the so-called price of the blood as well as customary punishment for crimes. See Alexander 2002.
22 See Summerfield 1993, p. 89.
23 Henderson 1943, Dower 1944.
24 Taddia 1990.
25 Ruth 1993.
26 See for instance Osman 1974, chap. 3 and 4. See also Ruth 1995, p. 29–30. Paradoxically, a few years later this principle of the inviolability of colonial boundaries was also to become an ideological foundation of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OUA) which made this the founding principle for African political stability.
27 On the early stage of this process a good reconstruction is still Touval 1963, p. 109–154.
28 There is a detailed analysis of this process in Yohannes 1991, p. 177–209, and in Tekeste 1997.
29 A third, more radical organization, the Eritrean People Liberation Front (EPLF), flanked the ELF by the early 1970s and finally took over in 1984 after a bloody internecine war.
30 Markakis 1987, p. 122. As one of the ironies of history the first conference on African refugees was held in Addis Ababa in the same year, under the auspices of the OAU. See Adepoju 1982.
31 Lewis 1980, p. 180.
32 Also Djibouti was excluded from the arrangement, but the strong and firm French presence in this territory acted as an effective persuader against Somali irredentist claims.
33 Markakis 1987, p. 177.
34 Markakis 1987, p. 170.
35 Tareke 1991, p. 200.
36 Osman 1982–1983.
37 Touval 1966, Lewis 1963.
38 Turton 1972.
39 To a certain extent, the collapse of the Somali democratic government and the rise of the dictatorship of Mahammad Siyaad Barre after a coup in November 1969 can be read in relation to this crisis. See Laitin & Samatar 1987, p. 200.
40 Henze 1984, p. 637–56. A broader discussion in Lefebvre 1991.
41 Yodfat 1980, Laitin 1979, Ottaway 1982.
42 Ottaway 1976.
43 Implicitly, this set of policies was assumed to be instrumental in moulding the ideal socialist society. See Pankhurst 1997.
44 Taddese 2002, Pankhurst 1992, p. 52 and p. 220–222.
45 Lewis 1980, p. 236.
46 For a critical assessment of this conflict see the recent study of Gebru Tareke, in Tareke 2000. See also Laitin 1979b. As happens often in these cases also with regard to the Ogaden conflict of 1977–78 there has been a war of figures on the exact assessment of the conflict in terms of refugees. The Somali government claimed the presence of 2 million refugees in its camps when international relief agencies drastically reduced the figure to 650,000. See Laitin & Samatar 1987, p. 146.
47 Whitten 1978, Valdés 1980.

48 This strategy was adopted also by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) which started its political activity in the Northern Ethiopian region of Tigray later on in 1975. See Young 1997, p. 172–174, Hammond 2002, p. 90–115. See also Pool 2002, p. 102–112.
49 Pool 2002, p. 129.
50 Ottaway 1978.
51 Baissa 1979, Markakis & Ayele 1978, p. 166–167.
52 According to their own tradition, they would descend from Jews who accompanied Menelik, the son of King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, during his trip from Jerusalem to Ethiopia. On the different theories about the origins of the Beta Israel see Kaplan 1992, Quirin 1992. See also Trevisan-Semi 1987.
53 Between November 1984 and January 1985 a first exodus transferred to Israel through Sudan an estimated 8,000 Bet Israel, followed by a second smaller one (800 people) in 1985 and a third bigger one (14,324) in May 1991. See Karadawi 1991, Teshome 1991.
54 This enthusiasm and hope is apparent in many of the publications that appeared in those years, such as Henze 1991, Doornbos et al. 1992, Tekle 1994.
55 New, more impressive waves of refugees were one of the main results of this crisis. The human and material devastation of this development is captured in Farah 2000.
56 A detailed report based on fieldwork in Asmarom 1998. For a legal discussion of the issue of deportees, see Klein 1999.
57 In this regard it is not a coincidence that the discovery of oil in the southern regions toward the end of the 1970s together with disputes over the control of the abundant water resources corresponded with the end of a truce brokered in Addis Ababa in 1972 (Addis Ababa Agreement) and led to a resurgence of belligerence. See Johnson 2003, p. 47.
58 Johnson 2003, p. 31.
59 Scott 1985.
60 Johnson 2003, p. 87–90.
61 Ironically, in the long term this practice fostered political tensions between the autocratic and conservative nature of the Ethiopian political and social system and the claim for visibility and reform of the new modernizing elite, which ultimately led to the collapse of the Emperor. See Keller 1988, p. 187.
62 It has to be stressed that, particularly for the former British Somaliland, the channel of exchanges with the United Kingdom remained in place. See Summerfield 1993, p. 89. See also Lewis 1980, p. 141.
63 Markakis 1987, p. 109–110.
64 On this specific aspect of Eritrean migration the most detailed and documented analyses are in Andall 2000.
65 Andall 2000b, p. 145–172.
66 It has to be recollected that until the early 1990s, Italy had implemented a very restrictive legislation with regard to refugees. This legislation, reflecting the Cold War bipolar logic, acknowledged the status of refugees only to applicants from countries of the former Warsaw Pact and, in rare cases, to applicants from Chile. This legislation has been modified only in 1990 with the so-called *Legge Martelli*.
67 Black, Al Ali & Koser 2001.
68 Clifford 1994.
69 For a comprehensive discussion of the issue I would recommend Brah 1996.
70 In its Greek etymology Diaspora is the result of the prefix ___ (dia), which means through, and the verb _πει___ (speirein) which means to scatter.
71 Armstrong 1976.

72 Armstrong 1976.
73 A provocative review of the development of perceptions of diasporas as bearers of cultural hybridism can be found in Friedman 1997. Nevertheless, as will emerge through my discussion, the fashionable representation of diasporic identities should not be overemphasized and rather described as selective. In fact, often diasporic identities are sources of violent clashes and rejection as in the case of the adoption of the scarf by Muslim women or the very controversial issue of female genital mutilation. An example of this problem in a Swedish context is Johnsdotter 2003.
74 Cohen 1995.
75 Brah 1996, p. 183.
76 Recent literature tends to question the broad applicability of the category of transnationalism, pointing out its limits. See for instance Kivisto 2001.
77 Glick Schiller, Basch & Szanton Blanc 1992.
78 Choldin 1973, Boyd 1989, p. 638–670.
79 Brah 1996, p. 186.
80 There is an extensive discussion of this process in Mekuria (1988) which is also particularly interesting as it devotes a great deal of attention to the issue of the economic integration of refugees from the Horn. A similar approach can be found also in Kibreab 1987.
81 For an introduction to the early stages of this phenomenon, see Richard 1979.
82 According to UNHCR annual report updated in 2001, Somalia would account for 475,383 refugees, Eritrea 376,506, Sudan 493,868, and Ethiopia 66,347 in UNHCR/Population data Unit, *Government*, Geneva, 2002. Those figures do not include those migrants who, though sharing the same set of reasons for their displacements, exploited channels other than UNHCR or similar international agencies.
83 For insights on gendered migration from the Horn, see Moussa 1993, Summerfield 1993.
84 On the interplay of coastal regions and Swahili Civilisation, see Laitin & Samatar 1987, p. 7–21.
85 Dramatic evidence of this crisis can be seen in the detailed analysis of De Waal 1989 and Kuhlman 1994. Nevertheless, attention should be paid to avoid uncritical and stereotypic representations of refugees' experience; a crucial contribution in this direction is Kibreab (1993) who criticizes the common representation of refugees as permanently dependent.
86 Kibreab 1999.
87 Elias 1992, Kibreab 1996.
88 For a first tentative reconstruction of this process see McSpadden 2000.
89 Connell (2001) discusses some of the odds and contradictions faced by returnees once at home.
90 According to UNHCR sources, only around 103,000 refugees have returned home since 2001, and still another 300,000, would be hosted in Sudanese camps, many of whom have been there since the 1960s. Of course the assessment of that data is quite difficult as often receiving countries inflate figures in order to benefit from the flow of humanitarian help given by UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies.
91 For an interesting comparative review of some of the main cases of diasporic "myths" see Safran 1991.
92 Tekle 1988.
93 Redeker Hepner 2001.
94 Pool 2002, p. 103.
95 Conrad 2001, Koser 2003.

96 Cassanelli 2002.
97 Griffith 2002, p. 95.
98 Tekle 1991.
99 For an interesting discussion of those themes with reference to the Italian case, see Andall 2002.
100 There is a brilliant discussion of the relation between music and black diaspora identity in Gilroy 1991. See also Griffith 2002, p. 119.
101 Friedman 1997, p. 83.
102 Brah 1996, p. 190.
103 Habermas 1998.
104 An interesting synthesis of the scholarly aspect of this is debate can be found in Appadurai 1991.
105 Skinner 1993.
106 Shain 1995.
107 Started in the United States with the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, the practice of drafting "Blacklists" of terrorist organizations has dramatically escalated after the events of September 11, and has led to the inclusion in those lists of organizations that until that moment had legally acknowledged status in the US as well as in the European Union. The Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FPLP), and the Palestinian Jihad Front (PJF) are among the many Palestinian nationalist organizations included on the blacklists of the United States and the European Union. On the Sri Lankan case see Fuglerud 2001.
108 Abbink 2003, Guazzini 2001.
109 Griffith 2002, p. 97. According to Abdissalam Issa-Salwe, more than 300 Somali websites were active in 2003, reflecting the many political, social and geographical differences of the Somali society. See Issa-Salwe 2003.
110 After the tragic events of September 11 2001, the holding al-Barakat has been included on a blacklist of Specially Designed Global Terrorists maintained by the US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control.
111 Though detailed and official figures are not available, according to IMF data, Diaspora's remittances amount to 200 million US dollars in front of 900 million US dollars of Eritrea's GDP.
112 A right which, however, remains only potential, as parliamentary elections in Eritrea after independence have still to be held.

References

Abbink, J. (2003): "Ethiopia-Eritrea: Proxy Wars and Prospects of Peace in the Horn of Africa," in *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3, p. 407–426.

Adepoju, A. (1982): "The Dimension of the Refugees Problem in Africa," in *African Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 322, p. 21–35.

Alemayehu, L. (1989): *Villagization and Agricultural Production in Ethiopia*. Addis Ababa: Institute of Development Research, Research Report no. 37.

Alexander, N. (2002): "Memories of the Kunama of Eritrea towards Italian Colonialism," in *Africa*, Vol. 4, No. 56, p. 573–590.

Al-Naqar, U. (1969): "Takrur, the History of a Name," in *Journal of African History*, Vol. 10, No. 3, p. 365–374.

Armstrong, J.A. (1976): "Mobilized and Proletarian Diaspora," in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 70, No. 2, p. 393–408.

Andall, J.M. (2000a): *Gender, Migration and Domestic Services. The Politics of Black Women in Italy*. London: Ashgate.

Andall, J.M. (2000b): "Organising Domestic Workers. The challenge of Gender, Class and Ethnicity," in Anthias, F. & Lazaridis, G. (eds): *Gender and Migration in Southern Europe*. Oxford: Berg, p. 145–172.

Andall, J.M. (2002): "Second Generation Attitude? African-Italians in Milan," in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 3, p. 389–407.

Appadurai, A. (1991): "Global Ethnoscapes: Notes and Queries for a Transnational Anthropology," in Fox, R.G. (ed.): *Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the present*. Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, p. 191–210.

Arén, G. (1978): *Evangelical Pioneers in Ethiopia: Origin of the Evangelical Church Mekane Jesus*. Uppsala: EFS förlaget.

Asmarom, L. (1998): *The Uprooted: Case Material on Ethnic Eritrean Deportees from Ethiopia Concerning Human Rights Violations*. Asmara: Citizens for Peace in Eritrea.

Assefaw, B. (1999): "States, International Organisations and Refugees: Reflections on the Complexity of Managing the Refugees Crisis in the Horn of Africa," in *The Journal of Modern African studies*, Vol. 37, No.4, p. 597–619.

Bahru, Z. (2002): *Pioneers of Change in Ethiopia*. Oxford: James Currey.

Baissa, M.H. (1979): "Civil-Military Elite Interaction in the Ethiopian Revolution: The Role of Students," in Hess, R.L. (ed.): Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Ethiopian Studies. Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, p. 771–82.

Black, R., Al Ali, N. & Koser, K. (2001): "Refugees and Transnationalism: The experience of Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe," in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 4, p. 615–634.

Boyd, M. (1989): "Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent Developments and New Agendas", in *The International Migration Review*, Vol. 23, No. 3, p. 638–670.
Brah, A. (1996): *Cartographies of Diasporas. Contesting Identities*. London: Routledge.
Cassanelli, L. (2002): "Emigrants and Homeland Development: The Somali Case in Comparative Perspective." Paper presented at the International conference *Il Corno d'Africa fra storia, diritto e politica*, Rome, December 13–14, 2002.
Caulk, R. (1972): "Religion and the State in Nineteenth Century Ethiopia," in *Journal of Ethiopian Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 23–41.
Cerulli, E. (1943–1947): *Etiopi in Palestina*. 2 voll. Roma: Libreria dello Stato.
Choldin, H.M. (1973): "Kinship Networks in the Migration Process," in *The International Migration Review*, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 163–175.
Clifford, J. (1994): "Diasporas," in *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. 9, No.3, p. 302–338.
Cohen, R. (1995): "Rethinking 'Babylon': Iconoclastic Conceptions of the Diasporic Experience," in *New community*, Vol. 21, No. 1, p. 5–18.
Cohen, R. (1997): *Global Diasporas. An introduction*. London: University of Central London Press.
Connell, D. (2001): *Getting Home is Only Half the Challenge: Refugee Reintegration in War-Ravaged Eritrea*. Washington: US Committee for Refugees.
Conrad, B. (2001): "The Best of Both Worlds? Young Eritreans in Germany and their Relations to Eritrea." Paper presented at *Independent Eritrea: Lessons and Prospects*, First International Conference of Eritrean Studies, Asmara, July 22–26, 2001.
Conti Rossini, C. (1928): *Storia d'Etiopia*. Bergamo: Istituto Italiano di Arti Grafiche.
Curtin, P.D. (1998): *Disease and Empire. The Health of European Troops in the Conquest of Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Curtis, M.C. & Yosef, L. (1999): "Archaeological Survey in the Adi Qeyeh Area," in *Nyame Akuma*, Vol. 51, p. 25–35.
De Waal, A. (1989): *Famine That Kills*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Doornbos, M.M., Cliffe, L., Ahmed, A., Ghaffar, M., & Markakis, J. (eds) (1992): *Beyond Conflict in the Horn. Prospects for Peace, Recovery and Development in Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and the Sudan*. London: James Currey.
Dower, K.C. (1944): The First to be Freed: A Record of the Campaign and British Military Administration in Eritrea and Somalia, 1941–1943. London: HMSO.
Echenberg, M. (1980): "Les migration militaires en Afrique Occidentale Française, 1900–1945", in *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 3, p. 429–450.
Ehret, C. (1979): "On the Antiquity of Agriculture in Ethiopia," in *Journal of African History*, Vol. 20, No. 2, p. 161–77.
Ehret, C. (1986): "Linguistic Clues to Social History in the Northern Horn, 500 B.C. to 500 A. D.," in Beyene, T. (ed.): *Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference of Ethiopian studies*. Vol 1. Addis Ababa: Institute of Ethiopian studies.
Ehret, C. (1995): "The Eastern Horn of Africa, 1000 B.C. to 1400 A.D.," in Ahmed, A.J. (ed.): *The Invention of Somalia*. Lawrenceville NJ: Red Sea Press, p. 233–256.
Elias, H.-S. (1992): "Eritrean Refugees in the Sudan: A Preliminary Analysis of Voluntary Repatriation" in Doornbos, M., Cliffe, L., Ahmed, A., Ghaffar, M. & Markakis, J. (eds.): *Beyond Conflict in the Horn. Prospects for Peace, Recovery and Development in Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan*. London: James Currey, p. 23–32.
Ellero, G. (1947): "I Tacruri in Eritrea," in *Rassegna di studi etiopici*, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 189–199.
Farah, N. (2000): *Yesterday, Tomorrow. Voices from the Somali Diaspora*. London: Cassel.
Friedman, J. (1997): "Global Crises, the Struggle for Cultural Identity and Intellectual Porkbarrelling: Cosmopolitan versus Locals, Ethnic and Nationals in an Era of De-Hegemonisation," in Werbner, P. & Modood, T. (eds.): *Cultural Hybridity: Multi-Cultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism*. London: Zed Press, p. 70–89.
Fuglerud, Ø. (2001): "Time and Space in the Sri Lanka Tamil Diaspora," in *Nation and Nationalism*, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 195–213.
Gilroy, P. (1991): "'It Ain't Where You're From It's Where You're At.' The Dialectics of Diasporic Identification," in *Third Text*, Vol. 13, p. 3–16.
Girma, A. (1967): "Aims and Purposes of Church Education in Ethiopia," in *Ethiopian Journal of Education*, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 1–11.

Glick Schiller, N., Basch, L., & Szanton Blanc, C. (1992): "Transnationalism: A new Analytical Framework for Understanding Migration," in N. Glick Schiller, L. Basch and C. Blanc-Szanton (eds.): *Toward a Trans-National Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nation Reconsidered*. New York: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, p. 1–24.

Griffith, D.J. (2002): *Somali and Kurdish Refugees in London. New Identities in the Diaspora*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Guazzini, F. (1998): *Le ragioni di un confine coloniale*. Torino: l'Harmattan Italia.

Guazzini, F. (2002): "Note per una ricerca sull'esodo come protesta anti-coloniale," in *Studi Piacentini*, Vol. 31–32, p 165–192; p. 155–182.

Guazzini, F. (2001): "Riflessioni sulle identità di guerra nel cyberspazio: il caso eritreo-etiopico", in *Africa*, Vol. 4, No. 56, p. 532–572.

Habermas, J. (1998): "The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship," in *Public Culture*, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 397–416.

Hammond, J. (2002): "Garrison Towns and the Control of Space in Revolutionary Tigray," in Donham, D.L., James, W., Kurimoto, E., Triulzi, A. (eds): *Remapping Ethiopia. Socialism and After*. Oxford: James Currey, p. 90–115.

Henderson, K.D.D. (1943): "The Sudan and the Abyssinian Campaign," in *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 42, No. 166, p. 12–20.

Henze, P.B. (1984): "Arming the Horn, 1960–1980: Military Expenditures, Arms Imports, and Military Aid in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan with Statistics on Economic Growth and Government," in Rubenson, S. (ed.): *Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Ethiopian Studies*. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, p. 637–56.

Henze, P.B. (1991): *The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Hess, R.L. (1966): *Italian Colonialism in Somalia*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Holt, P.M. (1970): *The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881–1898*. Nairobi: Oxford University Press.

Issa-Salwe, A.M. (2003): "Electronic communication and oral culture. Somali Web Site Case Study." Paper presented at the workshop *Language, Power and Society*. London, School of Oriental and African Studies, July 11–18, 2003.

Johnsdotter, S. (2003): "Somali Women in Western Exile: Reassessing Female Circumcision in the Light of Islamic Teaching," in *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 33, No. 2, p. 261–274.

Johnson, D.H. (2003): *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*. Oxford: James Currey.

Johnson, D.H. & Anderson, D.M. (eds.) (1988): *The Ecology of Survival. Case Studies from Northeast African History*. London: Lester Crook.

Kaplan, S. (1984): *The Monastic Holy Man and the Christianization of Early Solomonic Ethiopia*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.

Kaplan, S. (1988): "Christianity and the Early State in Ethiopia," in Eisenstadt, S.N., Abitbol, M. & Chazan, N. (eds.): *The Early State in African Perspective: Culture Power and Division of Labor*. Leiden: Brill, p. 148–167.

Kaplan, S. (1992): *The Beta Israel (Falasha) in Ethiopia: From Earliest Times to the Twentieth Century*. New York: New York University Press.

Karadawi, A. (1991): "The Smuggling of the Ethiopian Falasha to Israel Through Sudan," in *African Affairs*, Vol. 90, No. 358, p. 23–49.

Keller, E. (1988): *Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People's Republic*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Khoury, G.S. (1983): *The History of the Ethiopian Community in the Holy Land from the Time of Emperor Tewodros II to 1974*. (Edited by K Pedersen.) Jerusalem: The Ecumenical Institute for Theological Research Tantur.

Kibreab, G. (1987): *Refugees and Development in Africa. The Case of Eritrea*. Trenton NJ: Red Sea Press.

Kibreab, G. (1993): "The Myth of Dependency Among Camp Refugees," in *Journal of Refugees Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 4, p. 321–349.

Kibreab, G. (1996): "Left in Limbo," in Allen, T. (ed.): *In Search of a Cool Ground. War, Flight & Homecoming in Northeast Africa*. London: James Currey, p. 53–65.

Kibreab, G. (1999): "Revisiting the Debate on People, Place, Identity and Displacement," in *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 4, p. 384–410.

Kivisto, P. (2001): "Theorizing Transnational Immigration: A Critical Review of Current Efforts," in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 549–577.

Klein, N.S. (1999): *Mass Expulsion from Ethiopia: Report on the Deportation of Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin from Ethiopia, June-August, 1998*. Connecticut: Yale School of Law.

Koser, K. (2003): "Une diaspora divisée? Transferts et transformations au sein de la diaspora Erythréenne," in *Politique Africaine*, Vol. 85, p. 64–75.

Kuhlman, T. (1994): *Asylum or Aid? The Economic Integration of Ethiopian and Eritrean Refugees in the Sudan*. Leiden: African Studies Centre.

Laitin, D. (1979): "Somalia's Military Government and Scientific Socialism," in Rosberg, C.G. & Callaghy, T.M. (eds.): *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies University of California Press, p. 174–206.

Laitin, D. (1979b): "The War in the Ogaden: Implications for Siyaad's Role in Somali History," in *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1, p. 95–115.

Laitin, D. & Samatar, S.S. (1987): *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Lefebvre J.A. (1991): *Arms for the Horn. U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953–1991*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Lefevre, R. (1941): "Roma e la Comunità etiopica di Cipro nei secoli XV e XVI," in *Rassegna di Studi Etiopici*, Vol. 1, p. 71–86.

Lefevre, R. (1964): "Note su alcuni pellegrini etiopi in Roma al tempo di Leone X," in *Rassegna di Studi Etiopici*, Vol. 21, p. 16–26.

Lefevre, R. (1967–1968): "Presenze etiopi in Italia prima del Concilio di Firenze del 1439," in *Rassegna di Studi Etiopici*, Vol. 23, p. 5–26.

Lenci, M. (1999): "Gli Habab d'Eritrea e il Governatorato di Ferdinando Martini dalla defezione alla sottomissione," in *Africa*, Vol. 54, No. 3, p. 349–378.

da Leonessa, M. (1929): *S. Stefano Maggiore degli abissini e le relazioni romano-etiopiche*. Città del Vaticano: Tipografia Poliglotta Vaticana.

Levine, D. (1988): "Menilek and Oedipus: Further Observations on the Ethiopian National Epic," in Marcus, H. (ed.): *Proceedings of the First United States Conference on Ethiopian Studies*. East Lansing: Center for African Studies, p. 11–23.

Lewis, I.M. (1962): "Historical Aspects of Genealogies in Northern Somali Society," in *Journal of African History*, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 35–48.

Lewis, I.M. (1963): "The Problem of the Northern Frontier District of Kenya," in *Race*, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 48–60.

Lewis, I.M. (1980): *A Modern History of Somalia*. London: Longman.

Lewis, I.M. (1998): *Saint and Somalis*. London: Haan.

Maggi, S. (1996): *Colonialismo e Comunicazioni. Le Strade Ferrate nell'Africa Italiana. 1887–1943*. Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane.

Markakis, J. (1987): *National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Markakis, J. (1998): *Resource Conflict in the Horn of Africa*. Oslo: Peace Research Institute.

Markakis, J. & Ayele, N. (1978): Class and Revolution in Ethiopia. Nottingham: Spokesman Books.

McCann, J. (1995): *People of the Plow: an Agricultural History of Ethiopia (1800–1990)*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

McCann, J. (1999): "Climate and Causation in African History," in *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 2/3, No. 32, p. 261–279.

McSpadden, L.A. (2000): *Negotiating Return. Conflict and Control in the Repatriation of Eritrean Refugees*. Uppsala: Life & Peace Institute.

Mekuria, B. (1988): *Flight and Integration. Causes of Mass Exodus from Ethiopia and Problems of Integration in the Sudan*. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.

Mohammed, A.Y. (1979–1980): "Early Muslim Education and its Role in Northeast Africa," in *Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affaires*, Vol. 1–2. No. 2–1, p. 125–131.

Moussa. H. (1993): *Storm and Sanctuary. The Journey of Ethiopian and Eritrean Women Refugees*. Dundas: Artemis.

Mukhtar, M.H. (1995): "Islam in Somali History: Fact and Fiction," in Ahmed, A.J. (ed): *The invention of Somalia*. Lawrenceville NJ: Red Sea Press, p. 1–28.

Munro-Hay, S. (1991): *Aksum: an African Civilisation of Late Antiquity*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Ollén, J.M. (1919): *Svenska missionsbragder. Skildringar ur Svenskt missionsliv i Afrika och Asien*. Vol. I (Ostafrika och Kongo), Stockholm: Svenska Missionförbundets Förlag.

Osman, M. (1982–1983): "Somalia: From Irredentism to Insurgency," in *Horn of Africa*, Vol. 5, No. 4, p. 26–31.

Osman Saleh, S. (1974): *The History of Eritrea*. Beirut: Dar al-Masirah.

Ottaway, M. (1976): "Social Classes and Corporate Interests in the Ethiopian Revolution," in *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 3, p. 469–86.

Ottaway, M. (1978): "Democracy and New Democracy: The Ideological Debate in the Ethiopian Revolution," in *African Studies Review*, Vol. 21, No. 1, p. 19–31.

Ottaway, M. (1982): *Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa*. New York: Praeger.

Pankhurst, A. (1992): *Resettlement and Famine in Ethiopia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Pankhurst, A. (1997): "When the center relocates the periphery: resettlement during the Derg," in Fukui, K., Kurimoto, E. & Shigeta, M. (eds.): *Ethiopia in Broader Perspective: Papers of the 13th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*. Kyoto: Shokado Book Sellers.

Pankhurst, R. (1964): "The Trade of Northern Ethiopia in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," in *Journal of Ethiopian Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 47–159.

Pankhurst, A. (1971): "Italian and 'Native' Labour during the Italian Fascist occupation of Ethiopia, 1935–1941." Paper presented at the Conference on *Innovation in African Economic History*, University of Ghana, Legon, December 14 – 20, 1971.

Parfitt, T. (1985): *Operation Moses: The Untold Story of the Exodus of the Falasha Jews from Ethiopia*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.

Pollera, A. (1935): *Le popolazioni indigene dell'Eritrea*. Bologna: Cappelli.

Pool, D. (2002): *From Guerrillas to Government. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front*. Oxford: James Currey.

Quirin, J.A. (1992): *The evolution of the Ethiopian Jews: A History of the Beta Israel (Falasha) to 1920*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Redeker Hepner, T. (2001): "Backward Glances and American Chances. Eritrean Communities, Transnational Activism, and Political Identity in the US." Paper presented at *Independent Eritrea: Lessons and Prospects*, First International Conference of Eritrean Studies, Asmara, July 22 – 26, 2001.

Richard, R. (1979): "An Historical Introduction to Refugee Problems in the Horn," in *Horn of Africa*, Vol. 2, No. 4, p. 14–26.

Ruth, I. (1993): "Regional Hegemony: Domination and Resistance in the Horn of Africa," in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 2, p. 257–276.

Ruth, I. (1995): *The Eritrean Struggle for Independence. Domination, Resistance, Nationalism (1941–1993)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Safran. W. (1991): "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return," in *Diaspora*, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 83–99.

Scott, P. (1985): "The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Liberation Army (SPLA)," in *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 33, p. 69–82.

Shain, Y. (1995): "Multicultural Foreign Policy", in *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 100, p. 67–87.

Skinner, E.P. (1993): "The Dialectic between Diasporas and Homelands," in Harris, J.E. (ed.): *Global Dimensions of the African Diaspora*. Washington DC: Howard University Press, p. 11–40.

Summerfield, H. (1993): "Patterns of Adaptation: Somali and Bangladeshi Women in Britain," in Buijs, G. (ed.): *Migrant Women: Crossing Boundaries and Changing Identities*. Providence: Berg.

Taddese, B. (2002): "Modernist Dreams & Human Suffering: Villagization among the Guji Oromo," in Donham, D.L., James, W., Kurimoto, E. & Triulzi, A. (eds): *Remapping Ethiopia*. Oxford: James Currey, p. 116–132.

Taddese, T. (1972): *Church and State in Ethiopia: 1270–1527*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Taddese, T. (1988): "Processes of Ethnic Interaction and Integration in Ethiopian History: the case of the Agaw," in *Journal of African History*, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 5–18.
Taddia, I. (1985): "Intervento Pubblico e Capitale Privato nella Colonia Eritrea," in *Rivista di Storia Contemporanea*, Vol. 2, No. 14, p. 207–242.
Taddia, I. (1990): "At the Origin of the State/Nation Dilemma: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Ogaden in 1941," in *Northeast African Studies*, Vol. 2–3, No. 12, p. 157–170.
Tareke, G. (1991): *Ethiopia: Power and Protest. Peasant Revolts in the Twentieth Century.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tareke, G. (2000): "The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 revisited," in *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3, p. 635–667.
Tekeste, N. (1987): *Italian Colonialism in Eritrea (1882–1941): Policies, Praxis and Impact.* Uppsala: University of Uppsala.
Tekeste, N. (1997): *Ethiopia and Eritrea: the Federal Experience.* Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.
Tekle, A. (ed.) (1994): *Eritrea and Ethiopia: From Conflict to Cooperation.* Lawrenceville NJ: Red Sea Press.
Tekle, W. (1988): "Eritrean and Ethiopian Refugees in the United States," in *Eritrean Studies Review*, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 89–111.
Tekle, W. (1991): "Political Mobilization and Nationalist Movements: The Case of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front," in *Africa Today*, Vol. 38, No. 2, p. 31–42.
Teshome, W. (1991): "The International Political Ramifications of Falasha Emigration," in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 4, p. 557–581.
Touval, S. (1963): *Somali Nationalism.* Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Touval, S. (1966): "A Third View: The Shifta Warfare," in *East Africa Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 7–10.
Trevisan-Semi, E. (1987): *Allo specchio dei falascià. Ebrei ed etnologi durante il colonialismo fascista.* Firenze: Giuntina.
Trimingham, J.S. (1952): *Islam in Ethiopia.* London: Frank Cass.
Turton, E.R. (1972): "Somali Resistance to Colonial Rule and the Development of Somali Political Activity in Kenya, 1893–1960," in *Journal of African History*, Vol. 13, No. 1, p. 119–43.

Turton, E.R. (1975): "Bantu, Galla, and Somali Migrations in the Horn of Africa: A Reassessment of the Juba-Tana Area," in *Journal of African History*, Vol. 16, No. 4, p. 519–37.
Ullendorff, E. (1960): *The Ethiopians.* London: Oxford University Press.
UNHCR (2002): *Population data Unit. Government.* Geneva: UNHCR.
Valdés, N.P. (1980): "Cuba's Involvement in the Horn of Africa: The Ethiopian-Somali War and the Eritrean Conflict," in *Cuban Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 49–80.
Young, J. (1997): *Peasant revolution in Ethiopia: the Tigray People's Liberation Front, 1975–1991.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wenig, S. (1997): "German fieldwork in Eritrea", in *Nyame Akuma*, Vol. 48, p. 20–21.
Whitten, L. (1978): "The Soviet-Cuban Presence in the Horn of Africa," in *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 3, p. 39–45.
Yemane, Mesghenna. (2003): "Economic boom on the Eritrean labor market," in *Africa*, Vol. 1, No. 58, p. 89–114.
Yodfat, A.Y. (1980): "The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa," in *Northeast African Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 65–75.
Yohannes, O. (1991): *Eritrea: A Pawn in World Politics.* Gainesville: University of Florida Press.