

Timing and Temporality  
in Islamic Philosophy  
and Phenomenology of Life

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## THE TIMING OF THE ONTOPOIESIS OF LIFE

## 1. TIME AS PHILOSOPHICAL ENIGMA

That time plays a fundamental role in ontology is the intuition that supports the work, *Sein und Zeit* by M. Heidegger, whose ponderous inquiry, however, was not able to remove the enigmatic character that since antiquity has accompanied the relationship between being and time. Rather, he accentuates it, exhibiting the incapacity to investigate its conversion into *Zeit und Sein* presaged in the work's outline.<sup>1</sup> Thus even after Heidegger, we lack an adequate philosophy for understanding time, and we still find ourselves in the condition described by Augustine of Hippo, who, even while he had awareness of time, no longer knew the answer to what time was, if asked about it.<sup>2</sup>

According to Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, the being-inside and being-outside of time in comparison with being of traditional ontology, is emblematic of the current dissatisfaction of philosophical aspiration, which since now has been incapable of drawing upon that context of totality and entirety<sup>3</sup> that, "if this be at all possible", reposing in itself and not calling for further justification or explanation, would allow philosophy to advance without delay in its own work of conferring meaning on all the entities that appear bit by bit on the stage of history. In addition, a context of totality and entirety would enable philosophy to avoid always having to delay in devising strategems for researching reasons-of-being, that the restricted and closed horizon of meaning, at the moment available, does not allow it to find.

It is true that speculative thought to produce systematic totalities of meaning is now viewed with diffidence: since from the end of the XIX century to our days, a critical attitude has prevailed against general theories and systems of philosophy seeking to project an all-encompassing context for every philosophical inquiry, because of the fact that illegitimate connections are made between and among various facets of questions. However, even using the hermeneutic methodology in vogue today, it lasts that to find the meaning of a single piece of the "text", it is always necessary to draw upon "deeper" layers of meaning and to enact "a regression through the entire development

of culture"<sup>4</sup>. Thus not even the methodological updates of the XX century provide philosophy with an adequate context for its progressive development in time: in both speculation and hermeneutics, it remains entangled in the recessive processes of justification or explanation and cannot succeed in unfolding as life would ask it to. The problem of time remains still crucial and unanswered for philosophy, which, not even in its phenomenological inflection with E. Husserl<sup>5</sup> or P. Ricoeur<sup>6</sup>, seems able to transform the inscrutability of the relationship between time and being from an objection to ontological inquiry, to the occasion for its in-depth analysis and expansion.

## 2. A NEW CRITIQUE OF REASON

And yet, it is intrinsic to philosophical intentionality, inaugurated by Taletes in the VII century BC, to constantly measure itself against time: the search for the principle of all things, in fact, continually re-establishes itself because experience constantly presents anew not-yet-known. Philosophy is born with a duplicity built into its structure, by which the stillness, connected with the contact with ontological apexes, lives alongside the dynamism implicated by the processuality of inquiry, which the interrogative pressure from the renewal of experience keeps active and striving to respond to the question: "How must the foundation and the first cause of the totality of the world be constituted so that such a thing, such an essential structure, may be possible?"<sup>7</sup>

In addition, as Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka observes, "the various modes of existence (e.g., reality, ideality, fictive existence, absolute existence)" are fundamentally distinguished from each other on the basis of their relationship with time. In fact, their ontological structure either necessarily requires the reference to time, as in the case of real existence, which is subject to change and action, or they reject it as incompatible with their own nature, as it happens for ideal existence, which does not entail the possibility of change.<sup>8</sup>

But, on the other side, in practical philosophy and religious philosophy, which reflect on cultural-social life and the specifically human vocation of searching for a personal transcendent destiny, what comes to sight first is not so much time, as life.<sup>9</sup>

Along with Nietzsche and with Scheler<sup>10</sup>, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka holds that it is the traditional philosophy of being which represents an inadequate context for understanding time, and that the moment has come to set out upon "a new critique of reason"<sup>11</sup>, given that

no longer can the notion of being function as a principle of the principle which sustain what-there-is. The principle, rather, is "beingness", which is what individualizes something and through which, as through a vehicle, life expands.<sup>12</sup>

Also in the sphere of the phenomenological exploration of the 1970s, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka issued calls to search for a new ontological-metaphysical horizon, able to meet the demands of the changed epistemological and social context after Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, Ingarden, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty; but, above all, for an inquiry that would penetrate further deeply than these thinkers had. It meant achieving the Husserlian aspiration of a phenomenology as *philosophia prima* and at the same time to victoriously accept the challenge issued in the 1950s by Alfred Tarski. The great mathematician and convinced neopositivist, in fact, doubted that phenomenology could overcome "the pragmatic test" and demonstrate its "universal validity", taking position as the discriminating and inescapable reference on the terrain of "the issue of theory and practice". In that period, the question of the human as well as technical value of philosophy for cognition and praxis, even though it is "one that strikes at the knot of all the great philosophical questions we have inherited from two and a half millennia of tradition", arose above all in terms of the relationship between the inspirational role phenomenology has played in the human sciences and in the empirical and hard sciences, and philosophy's ability to maintain, as *philosophia prima*, the *status* of universal reference. In particular, the question was: "Is philosophy, in its new familiarity with concrete knowledge, losing his status of universal reference – of 'first philosophy'?"<sup>13</sup>

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka responded to this demanding question, producing the "phenomenology of phenomenology" that Husserl had left incomplete, even though "other levels of rationality, towards the revelation of various perspectives of the logos" had come to light following his investigation, rooted in pure intellectual reason. However, they were underestimated, or even ignored by the first generations of phenomenologists<sup>14</sup> who for this reason failed to attain the goal of endowing phenomenology with an "absolute cognitive ground".<sup>15</sup> In this context many students and experts of phenomenology demanded it be improved, and thus arose the radical exigency, "to follow the progress of the method in order to inquire into its very logos and its yieldings".<sup>16</sup> To do so, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka subjects phenomenology itself to a "reduction", but one that goes "in another way" and represents "a different track" than "that of a 'last' transcendental reduction of transcendental constitution as such" proposed by E. Fink and approved by Husserl, in the *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*.<sup>17</sup>

In fact, this entails, on the one hand, escaping the trap in which Husserl was caught, "by [his] identifying the intentionality of consciousness with cognition"<sup>18</sup>; and on the other, revealing "the ultimate nature of rationality

in all of its modalities"<sup>19</sup> that is, "to unearth the universal logos and solve the quandry that puzzled Husserl, the impossible situation of the subject's constituting the world and being simultaneously an objective element of it"<sup>20</sup>

The new way of proceeding has a "conjectural" character, consisting in advancing step by step in the search for "what led to the Logos' being posited within the gigantic schema of dynamic reality",<sup>21</sup> dealing with the questions starting from their original way of appearing<sup>22</sup>, rather than turning to speculation, in which Hegel was masterful<sup>23</sup>, and postulating the logos as response to the multitude of questions that arise from the cosmos and from the enigmatic nature of the human being. "Conjecturing", one seeks to subject to verification precisely the intuition by which the logos would find its most suitable manifestation not so much on the level of absoluteness and of ideal, a-temporal rigor, as in the disorderly richness of contingent experience, where the process of self-building of life takes place, producing the growing differentiation of its forms.<sup>24</sup> The methodological wager is that "in the conjecture itself is contained an essential element of foothold of its surging, a logico instance, as well as anticipation of the answer point of logico destination".<sup>25</sup> In effect, the conjectural dynamic of thought, in the degree to which it espouses C. S. Peirce's indication that "we may gain access to reality only if the observation of philosopher/agent takes into account the fact of that observation"<sup>26</sup>, exalts the continuity of life and spirit, and of nature and humanity, giving logico expression to the poieticity of life self-individualizing itself and equally, allowing traditional "foundational philosophy" to accommodate the present "novel existential situation of human beingness within the network of life, nature, earth, cosmic forces that throws new light on reason".<sup>27</sup>

The intuitive-conjectural incursion conducted in this way through the "inventive powers" proper to the living human<sup>28</sup> has succeeded: A.-T. Tymieniecka has pushed as deeply as the most primitive level of being and has attained the proto-ontological position in which being itself auto-generates and regenerates, manifesting itself as a living spring of a logos that is "ontopoietical" in the degree to which it gives reasons for all things neither statically nor extrinsically, but following the intimate constructiveness of the cosmos, that is, "the constructive entanglements of life's spontaneities, dynamisms, forces in their radiating relevancies for the system of life and cosmic forces in which the logos flourishes".<sup>29</sup>

Thus a new key has been found to open the gate separating nature and culture, following the road that, as recounted by ancient mythology, human genius had already traced when it opened "the Pandora's box of natural

forces and their operational rules resulting in the inventive outburst that then upset the equilibrium of vital and existential forces". In fact, "by taking the investigation of the creative/inventive virtualities of the human being as the starting point of philosophy, rather than the cognitive act, we enter into the heart of the ontopoiesis of life in which both nature and culture are situated".<sup>30</sup>

The identification of such a logos, at once living, human and ordering, and therefore pre-ontological and proto-ontological, inasmuch as ontopoietic, is also innovative from the point of view of the enigma of time: in fact, the new logical context finally enables examination of the ancient problem of *kronos* and *kairos*<sup>31</sup>, breaking "the timeless pattern of surrender to nature" and rendering inadequate the millenary equilibrium of life between nature and human beings, and between the gifts of nature and their use by living beings.<sup>32</sup>

### 3. THE HUMAN CREATIVE CONDITION

The success of such an approach has received an absolutely essential contribution from A.-T. Tymieniecka's research beginning in the 1970s, through which she reopened access to the life for the constituting transcendental consciousness and, on the basis of the "conscious-corporeal" experience (*Leib-bewusst*), reflexively went beyond the essential "givenness" of the constitutive genesis of objectivity, in the direction of its "inner working as the locus whence eidos and fact simultaneously spring", in the conviction that "not constitutive intentionality but the constructive advance of life, which carries it, may alone reveal to us the first principles of all things".<sup>33</sup> From this new theoretical position, Tymieniecka has been able to demonstrate that the function of individualizing constructivity, which oversees the evolution of life, determining its growing specialization and complexity, finds its culminating expression in the stage of development marked by the appearance of man, the living being endowed with *Imaginatio Creatrix*.

The creative function, guided by its own telos, generates *Imaginatio Creatrix* in man, as the means, par excellence, of specific human freedom: that is, freedom to go beyond the framework of the life-world, the freedom of man to surpass himself.<sup>34</sup>

Thus, when life reaches the level of the human creative condition, it no longer limits itself to reproducing itself, but in the acts of life of man always engages in "self-interpretation-in-existence"<sup>35</sup>, giving rise to new and previously unimaginable forms of life that are congruent with and adequate for the becoming being of life, of which only man possesses "the cipher".<sup>36</sup> For this reason, man is radically the bearer of the metaphysical

exigency: in fact, in order to orient the virtualities in his possession in the direction of positive realization, he needs to find the reasons of "beingness" and to draw upon the principle of being, through which he confers on creations the indispensable character of humanly adequate 'objective' form, that makes them graspable and usable. Of crucial importance at this point is the fact that being, so spontaneously set into play, does not limit itself to maintaining the importance of the "indispensable essential factor of all beingness", in the sense of classical metaphysics, inasmuch as it "concerns beingness in its finished, formed, established or stabilized state". Rather, to the degree in which it appears in the acts of the human living, being manifests itself as "the intrinsic factor of the constructive process of individual becoming". This means that, since "becoming is a process in its own advance, in qualification" and since the individual "remains always in the process of becoming", that is, continually proceeding toward "something that is not yet"<sup>37</sup>, being, involved in the human creative acts from which becoming proceeds, acts as intrinsic stabilizing anticipator of the acquiring and transforming of form characterizing the natural evolution of the individual life. In this sense, compared to all other givennesses, that of man within his world is not simply comparable to a "process-like nature", but expresses a specific temporal type of constructivism, which furthermore is not reduced to what is developed during life, nor does the human being operate only as "meaning-bestowing-agent", producing its life-world, as Husserl proposed. Man begins before to "create according to being" (= onto-poiesis), because:

... his [man's] very life in itself is the effect of his self-individualization-in-existence through inventive self-interpretation of his most intimate moves of life.<sup>38</sup>

A.-T. Tymieniecka has thus overturned the classic phenomenological priorities, introducing what C. S. Peirce called "the primary reality of philosophizing, its firstness: the reflective agent, who is self-organized and self-regulating".<sup>39</sup> He is independent of anything else because of his creative act with the fulgurating force of *Imaginatio creatrix*. This is presented as the Archimedean point of the human enterprise, instead of the intellectual intentionality of the objectifying constitution.<sup>40</sup> The ensuing unveiling of the Logos of Life, as the intrinsic factor of life's origination and unfolding in innumerable rationalities, opens the pristine field of life to an onto-poietic investigation. The phenomenology/onto-poiesis of life is therefore opened as the ultimate level of reason: a primordial ontology, that brings innumerable novel insights, included the possibility of a new conception of time.

#### 4. TIME AND ONTOPOIESIS

The re-integration of ontology into the original triple matrix of becoming, in which a) the human creative condition b) the self-individualization of life's being and c) the existential tentacles revealing the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive<sup>41</sup> all interact, also requires that time and temporality be torn out of their undue inscrutability and, inasmuch as they are placed back into the orbit of the being-life, the logos of which is revealed, that they be re-accepted into a structure of meaning able to comprehend them wholly. Now, time appears as "the main artery through which life's pulsating propensities flow, articulating themselves, intergenerating".<sup>42</sup> In fact, when consciousness takes on, as the Archimedean point for the beginning of research, not "the epistemic perspective", but the "creative/poietic perspective", the peculiar one to human creative condition, "the ordering of living beingness is unveiled at its core, qua the primogenital exfoliation of the logos of life". The phenomenology/onto-poiesis of life establishes itself "at the level of generation", where the becoming of living existence encounters "the constitutive epistemic-presentational manifestation".

In the arteries of becoming, these same beingnesses in their generative phases, as much of expansion as of deterioration and in the existential interchange with the vital enigmas of other beings, show themselves to be resident in the primogenital function of life: the self-individualization of beingness. This self-individualization of the living beings is sustained by the forces and dynamisms that now have become accessible, inasmuch as they are received, distributed and/or rejected by the operative nucleus of the "onto-poietic sequence", which comes on stage "with each life commencing" and acquires awareness with human life.<sup>43</sup> The conscious reflection, that is able to listen to this onto-poietic *logos* of life, can thus enter safely into the labyrinth of the living being, following the weave of self-individualization that life itself produces and that reveals, if one follows its "existential tentacles", the "unity-of-everything-there-is-alive". In such a conscious unfolding of the logos of life as onto-poiesis, the consideration of time is enormously deepened: the subjective and objective aspects of time are no longer isolated and the infinite succession and the infinite duration are no longer so distinct; time and temporality, no longer absolutized, once again find themselves located in their original and primogenital position, in that genuine unitary perspective that was lost speculatively and that now has been regained.<sup>44</sup>

"Life times itself!"<sup>45</sup>, such is the discovery that the logos of life communicates to consciousness, when the latter gains awareness that it is a living being. The secret of the "onto-poietic unfolding of life", "the ultimate generation of

beingness-in-becoming" has by now been revealed: "ontopoietic becoming times its advance at each and every one of its steps".<sup>46</sup> In this way, also "the universalizing and objectifying of movement, change and becoming that humanity has for millennia assumed in various ways as a means by which to regulate the flow of human existence amid confluence and interaction, yields a universally valid order of life's course, one accepted by all and one that assumes 'time' as 'real', whereas[...] it is just a hypothesis".<sup>47</sup>

"The grand, infinitely complex, flexible artery-in-progress of the constructive advance of life", which is time, encompasses "its relevant cosmic links" and "its reach for a portal to the transcendent aspirations of the human being". For this reason, we can now discover time

amid all the infinitely changing modalities with which the simplifying human mind categorizes the innumerable ways in which processes, events, functional units, etc. advance life (*chronos*) toward its nodal points of accomplishment (*kairoi*), as well as amid the specific circumstantial, as well as the essential, strivings (and the crowning significance of their accomplishment) at the very heart of the poiesis of life.<sup>48</sup>

With striking intuitive and conjectural capability<sup>49</sup>, A.-T. Tymieniecka attains, in her phenomenology of life and of the human condition, or in her theory of the ontopoiesis of life, just such a new and broadened perspective on philosophy and meaning<sup>50</sup>, in which "kronos" and "kairos", which elude ontological and scientific categorization, offer themselves in their originary modality.

A.-T. Tymieniecka acknowledges that Aristotle was the one who located the physical body and the notion of time "in the same time-motion and space-soul context": he saw time immersed in the physical processes, and generating itself with them<sup>51</sup>, but could not detach it from the soul.<sup>52</sup> In fact, time consists of "now moments" that, involving a "before" and an "after", while they number the movement, require that there be "someone" to measure or count the space of time<sup>53</sup>, and the soul represents such an "indispensable synthesizing principle for the measurement of time".<sup>54</sup> So indispensable that later Leibniz, even though he was a good Aristotelian and forcefully proposed both the monad as the crucial factor of life in the world, and the *vis viva* as the motor of intra-mundane nature, did not see fit to name it in the spatial-temporal matrix of every-possible-world.<sup>55</sup>

In the perspective of the phenomenology of life, the entire Aristotelian reflection on time is assumed and reinterpreted. In fact, on the one hand, the physical world here is inserted with full rights into that of life, while on the other hand, the ontopoietic horizon representing the most recent achievement of the *logos* of life<sup>56</sup>, "reposes in itself, without turning to further points of reference".<sup>57</sup> In the revision of the meaning of time within the new vital

context, A.-T. Tymieniecka draws from a neutral and universal concept of motion, which, however, already in Aristotle is seen very soon as oriented toward constructive movements in the cosmos and toward movements of life that are constructive and goal-oriented.<sup>58</sup> Already in the consideration of physical movement, "time and motion remain in reciprocal relation to each other when it comes to measurement"<sup>59</sup>, conforming to the Aristotelian indication in *Physics*, 220b 14–22: "we measure not only motion by time but also time by motion, because they determine each other mutually: because time determines motion of which is the number and movement determines time". In the interpenetration of time and movement, there emerges a reference to the measurer; if it is the soul that measures, then there emerges the question of the criterion with which it operates. Does the soul create the measure? Or does it simply bring to completion the operation of measuring and counting? Perhaps the soul itself is time that creates its numbering? The question is not resolved by the idea of the soul "as an intellectual observer"; rather, it requires interpreting the soul as the "integral factor of all that moves, that is, of living beings and the life-processes in which they are entangled" and explaining its role in the "processes and progress of life, of 'coming to be and passing away'"<sup>60</sup>.

At this point, A.-T. Tymieniecka's conception of life as self-individualizing-in-existence plays a fundamental role: in fact, according to this perspective, "it is through a crucial specific existential/ontological device that differentiates all life from non-life, that is, through the inward/outward oriented central 'agency' of the individualizing beingness, that life's ontopoietic processes are carried out"; therefore, it turns out phenomenologically that we are not dealing with a "universal or universalised" generic motion, but with the specific movement of the *Bios*, which numbers time. This confirms the Aristotelian vision that assigned to each living being a soul, like "a system of articulation with a glimmering of consciousness". Leibniz also observed that even from the simplest forms of life, the soul shows that it possesses a capacity for synchronization.

However, in the ontopoietic context of life, it emerges that the soul does not only play "a counting role": it does not merely observe the temporal succession; rather, exercising "a living function" of organizing, articulating and dynamically operating, the soul introduces distinct phases into the temporal process and acts as "an articulator of motions into their successive, concurrent and telic knots, a configurator of phases and culminating-points of accomplishment".<sup>61</sup> In the degree to which we can avail ourselves of the meaning horizon of the ontopoiesis of life, we can proceed beyond Aristotle and Leibniz and grasp the soul, that gathers all the life-processing



functions and through them articulates the constructive progress of life, as the concrete principle of life itself, as promoting through life's functioning the movement through which time is numbered. The soul, which Tymieniecka has conceived of as

a stretching over the entire territory of the self-individualizing processes of life, comprises then all the being's circuits of energy and forces, all stirrings, moves, operations, and processes, from the simplest vital ones, through those psychic and gregarious ones orchestrated by the entelechial principle of vital significance, up to the emergent Human Condition, which with its creative orchestration ushers in freedom and the specifically human significance of life.<sup>62</sup>

Correspondingly, in the degree to which the soul is identified as the concrete principal of life itself, it also turns out that

time, being originally and primordially coeval and congenital with the constructive deployment of life, and hence to be distinguished among the relevancies, both those cosmic and those abstractly rational, participates in two lines of a combined strategy of life, and hence has one twofold modality, that of *kronos* and *kairos*.<sup>63</sup>

#### 5. KRONOS AND KAIROS

However, if time and movement are functions of a progress that constructs life and if time appears in the crystallization of the motility proper to the vital functioning, then we can no longer identify temporality principally with succession, as has happened till now. In the constructive phases in which life crystallizes itself, in fact, that is, in the phases of generation, of growth, of fruition, of decline, and of extinction, in measuring the interval of time it is not enough to identify "a direct cause-effect nexus in which the lapse of time is to be apprehended as a sequence in which each occurrence or event would have a clearly traceable cause and be in turn the cause of the next occurrence, change, transformation". "The vital process of *bios* do not proceed through we can only abstractly distil from the entanglements of the functions which carry them on"! On the contrary,

the ontopoietic course of life proceeds through the **confluence** of numerous operations, processes, moves, stimuli and it is this confluence to perform the transformative or sensoro-motor operations. This confluence itself crystallizes in a multiple *motio*. Hence it crystallizes in time, which lends it a "moment" of fulfillment, the measure of the step onward in the process of growth or decline.<sup>64</sup>

In order to measure the interval of time in the ontopoietic course of life, it is therefore necessary to use the modality of "**confluence**". In fact,

each constructive advance of individualizing life (e.g., the opening of the petals of a flower, the rise of the sap of a tree in early spring, the cross pollination of flowering plum trees effected

by insects...) is a result of a bundle of results – of numerous operations and processes, **each of them crystallizing segments of time that flow together to work a change**, a transformation, a moment of constructive progress.

Consequently, whether or not consciousness registers it, "life-bios-is timing itself. It measures itself, and thus its temporal spread by its natural constructive advance in the cyclic cosmic order".<sup>65</sup> It is not time that orders; time is not added to the construction factors from outside. The movements of the vital operations that begin in the latent organic forces, emerging from other apparently not organic forces, or movements of a virus that enters in a cell to reproduce itself, all these temporally regulate themselves from within and their advance marks and measures the temporal process itself. In this way, the measure of movement—of organic/sensorial/psychic movement and that of time that crystallizes in it—springs from the movements within the sentient and living soul of the living being.

On the other hand, this crystallization, universally constructive/destructive of time, takes place in virtue of the more radical self-constructive tendency of life, that expresses itself in a self-individualizing progress, supported by an "entelechial principle of life", from which emanates an "entelechial framework" that, like a pre-existent model in the germinal state, presides over the constructive advancement of life toward self-realization. In this ontopoietic unfolding, every juncture of development and every step forward participates in a broader construction, in an interwoven and interconnected network that flows from different functional sectors but in which all the parts cooperate with each other. Each operative confluence, which constitutes a segment of the constructive advance, is constructive because, even while it is not taken for granted, it appears oriented by a final principle, toward a successive stage that has been prepared as a task to bring to completion with respect to the previous stages of the process.<sup>66</sup> This positive and constructive deployment of the operative moments to the point of confluence is what determines in temporality the arrival of the "propitious moment"<sup>67</sup> that is to be understood as "the confluent moment of the constructive mode".

In conclusion, if we identify "the long winding operations and processes of timing" with the notion of "kronos", we subject them to the simplifying effect of the impartial observation of human intelligence, which reduces time to succession or continuity of happenings and events. In order to grasp "instances of 'kairos'", we must focus on "the multifaceted timing of the constructive achievements that punctuate life's progress". Thus if kronos indicates the order and the sequence of life, moments of kairos are "life-constructive fulfilments marking ontopoietic progress, and their occurrence within the play of favourable and contrary conditions". Starting from these

experiences of living temporalization, we also deal with the complicated problem of cosmic time and mechanical temporality.<sup>68</sup> Since we have no evidence of "movement timing itself" in the cosmos, we approach these moves and processes as "stripped-down versions of the timing of life" and so posit for it an abstract line of succession, seeing only lifeless mechanical motion. In this way, we reach both cosmic time and the time of mechanical movement, and equally, the uniform abstraction "of all of time's qualitative life-coordinates" in the measurement of time with the hourglass, the clock, and the metronome. "We empty the prototype of living time of all its genetic content, leaving a mere skeleton".<sup>69</sup>

#### 6. HUMAN HISTORY

The reign of *Bios* is coextensive with temporalization itself, placed as it is between the two extremes of the need for the constructive entelechial principle and of the chance of the external conditions of the unfolding of the principle. *Kronos* and *kairos* are the arteries of life and take form in this oscillation.

A gradual change intervenes in this situation in the moment in which the animal species emerge, in the course of evolution, in the complexity of their forms and their growing "flexibility", in adhering to the internal request and the external offerings to oppose adversities and seize opportunities. This flexibility reaches its culmination in the emergence of a new category of life, that of human freedom. In fact, it is between freedom and arbitrariness that human self-individualization oscillates. The timing of life's self-unfolding, its self-interpretative course, here undergoes several transformations, with time as *kairos* coming into its own. *Kairos* here assumes original, uniquely significant roles with respect to the specifically human significance of life, its projecting of new avenues, history, and the personal quest for transcendence.

In effect, it is in the crystallization of the human creative condition that the entelechial decodification, up to this point relatively rigid, of the law of life in the progressive unfolding of the species in evolution, attains the flexible, inventive, incessantly transformable progress of the "free will" or of the imagination of the human being. In this way, *kronos* and *kairos* take on new modalities and new roles. Temporalization itself passes through the innumerable interrogatives concerning the entire sphere of human life in its universality: freedom, coercion, arbitrariness, order and disorder, monotony and revolt, peace and crisis in personal and social life. On the one hand, there are still the regular and daily activities and gestures, while on the other, there is the incessant flow of aware and personal psychic life, made up of stimuli, sensations, emotions, motivations, and conscious acts, all variably

linked together. The process of human self-individualization defines itself by striving for accomplishment: tasks, goals, and ideals, projected inventively by the human creator emerge, in fact, as the fruit of the creative human re-orientation in the surrounding world and thus pose themselves in contrast to the organic and vital sensorial movements constructive of life that were previously given.<sup>70</sup> Thus, even though due credit should be given to the progress of the evolution of the species from the entelechial flexibility to the exercise of freedom, at the point in which the creative orchestration of the specifically human emerging function establishes itself, the crystallization of the creative function in the human condition remains the principle example of the emergence of the unique temporalization that is the *kairos*.<sup>71</sup> Within the new creative functional orchestration, in which human will seems to rise on the wings of the *Imaginatio Creatrix* above all natural urges, we see introduced "the primordial moves of the human spirit", "the thrust toward the other", "the will to undertake" and lastly "the deliberative inventive quest". These functions activate themselves in the sphere of the evaluative framework, that installs the human creative condition in the esthetic, moral and intellectual perspective and open to the specifically human evaluation of life. In addition, these factors of the human dynamic operate in the limits that the world of life projects in structures and rules: thus the human being, while striving to always go beyond, because of the creative push, maintains his creative and inventive drive in the open but not absolutely unlimited confines of the human, following a direction that it fundamentally finds within the confines of the system of life itself.<sup>72</sup>

With the advent of the human condition, we witness the emergence of an extraordinary sphere of expansion of the work of self-individualization and self-interpretation toward the interior and toward the exterior of the living being. However, interior life, the life of experience and consciousness, manifests a temporalization of its own, because *kronos* and *kairos* become more acutely defined in our sensations, feelings, thoughts, and judgements and in their concatenations. In particular, temporalization of the interior aware self-interpretative course inserts itself in the model of *kronos*, inasmuch as the acts not only succeed each other, but in the proceeding, form new modalities of experience that can also be seen as monotonous. But, "when animated by hidden inner stirrings toward ventures, projects and aspirations that are to be actualised in the external realm of life, inward acts acquire the "exciting" rhythms of kairic striving for accomplishment".

It is thus that the experience of human life in its interiority and in its external activity are transported by two connected arteries: in fact, they are marked by *kronos*, "the everyday tacit carrying on of repetitive assignments for life's

maintenance" and by the "kairic rhythms of urgency, promise, expectation, ecstatic hope, and final attainment of goals". These achievements require the right proportions, the right measures, the right occasions, and advance in the creative and constructive progress of peoples, social groups, cultures, and nations.<sup>73</sup> Also on the level of the history of human society there is therefore an advance of both *kronos* and *kairos*: it proceeds through the succession of daily affairs, regular tasks, and goals, while indispensable daily progress is marked by the realizations of *kairos*.<sup>74</sup> In the sphere of such a socially lived human temporality, there arises "fabulation", "the response of imagination that is triggered by the urge to understand, a response that goes further than the factual timing of reality". It is launched "narrating" real events and continues "telling stories, myths, and sagas" that transmit "ancestral wisdom".<sup>75</sup> This fabulation, or imaginative temporalization of life by human beings, finds place for the profundity of the personal being of each, and from here emerge "the communicative networks of sharing-in-life".<sup>76</sup>

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#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Cf.: M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, § 8, in: *Gesamtausgabe*, hrsg. V. F. W. Herrmann, Bd. II, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1977. English transl. by J. Stambaugh, *Being and Time*, State University of New York Press, Albany 1996. P. Chiodi, in the Introduction to the Italian edition of *Sein und Zeit* (*Essere e tempo*, Longanesi, Milano 1970, pp. iii–iv), also underlines the doubly incomplete character of the work, which not only lacks the second, historical part, converging in any case in other Heideggerian inquiries (for instance: M. Heidegger, *Der Begriff der Zeit. Vortrag vor der Marburger Theologenschaft—Juli 1924*, hrsg. von H. Tietjen, Niemeyer, Tübingen 1989), but above all lacks the third section of the first part, in which he should have discussed the problem of the meaning of being in general, conclusive in terms of the issues of "the problem of the being of Dasein" and of "the problem of the meaning of the being of Dasein", dealt with in the first two sections. To pursue this topic further, see: A. Fabris, *Essere e tempo di Heidegger. Introduzione alla lettura*, (*Being and Time of Heidegger. Reader's Introduction*) Carocci, Roma 2000.

<sup>2</sup> Cf.: A. Augustinus, *Confessiones*, in *Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina XXVII*, ed. L. Verheijen, Turnhout 1981, I, XI, 14: "Quid est ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio". In this regard: J. Quinn o.s.a., *The concept of time*, Augustinianum, Roma, 1965. L. Ruggiu (ed. by), *Filosofia del tempo*, (*Philosophy and Time*) Mondadori, Milano 1998. L. Ruggiu, *Tempo e anima in S. Agostino*, (*Time and the Soul in S. Augustine*) in: L. Perissinotto (ed. by), *Agostino e il destino dell'Occidente*, (*Augustine and the Destiny of the West*) Carocci, Roma 2000, p. 79–118.

<sup>3</sup> The theme of the whole is of Hegelian origin. Cf.: G. F. W. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, in *Gesammelte Werke*, hrsg. v. W. Bonsepien und R. Heede, Bd. XI, Meiner, Hamburg, 1980. Tr. by J. B. Baillie, *Phenomenology of Mind*, Harper & Row, New York, 1967, *Preface*,

§ 20: "The truth is the whole". Recently the paradigm of philosophy as type of entire and integral knowing has been set back into play in Italy in the ambit of the philosophical school that through G. Bontadini descends to V. Melchiorre and his students, including F. Totaro. Cf.: F. Totaro, *La tensione all'intero e le ragioni del filosofare*, (*The Tension of the Whole and the Reasons for Philosophizing*) in AA. VV., *Lo statuto epistemologico della filosofia*, (*The Epistemological Statute of Philosophy*) Morcelliana, Brescia 1989, pp. 182–188. Id., *Integralità dell'essere, prospettiva e misura della prassi*, (*The Wholeness of Being, Perspective and Measure of Praxis*) in G. Nicolaci – P. Polizzi, *Radici metafisiche della filosofia. Scritti per Nunzio Incardona*, (*Metaphysical Roots of Philosophy. Writings for Nunzio Incardona*) Tilgher, Genova, 2002, pp. 161–168. Id., *Per una metafisica dell'inattuale. Riflessioni di un discepolo della prima ora*, (*For a Metaphysics of the Non-Current. Reflections of a First Generation Disciple*) in: F. Botturi, F. Totaro, C. Vigna (ed. by), *La persona e i nomi dell'essere. Scritti di filosofia in onore di Virgilio Melchiorre*, (*The Person and the Names of Being. Writings of Philosophy in Honor of Virgilio Melchiorre*) Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2002, vol. I, pp. 205–219. Id., *Etica dell'essere persona e nuova cittadinanza*, (*Ethics of Being a Person and New Citizenship*) in: F. Botturi (ed. by), *Le ragioni dell'etica. Natura del bene e problema fondativo*, (*The Reasons of Ethics. The Nature of the Good and the Problem of Foundation*) Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2005, pp. 41–64.

<sup>4</sup> Cf.: A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Life's primogenital timing. Time projected by the dynamic articulation of the ontogenesis*, in: "Analecta Husserliana", L (1997), p. 3. Even in the sciences, the regressive temptation is always lying in ambush, even though camouflaged in progressivism. Cfr.: J. Barbour, *The end of time. The next revolution in physics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000.

<sup>5</sup> E. Husserl dedicated numerous studies to the theme of time, some still unpublished. Cfr.: E. Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917)*, ed. by R. Boehm, in: "Husserliana" 10, Nijhoff, Den Haag 1966. Id., *Texte zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917)*, ed. by R. Bernet, "Philosophische Bibliothek", LXVII, Meiner, Hamburg 1985. Id., *Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein, 1917/1918*, ed. by R. Bernet and D. Lohmar, Dordrecht, Kluwer 2001. In addition: G. Brand, *Welt, Ich und Zeit. Nach unveröffentlichten Manuskripten E. Husserls*, Nijhoff, Den Haag 1965. M. C. Franz, *Fenomenologia e tempo (Phenomenology and Time)*, Edizioni dell'Ateneo, Roma 1982.

<sup>6</sup> Cf.: P. Ricoeur, 1: *L' intrigue et le récit historique* / 2: *La configuration dans la récit de fiction* / 3. *Le temps raconté*, Editions du Seuil, Paris 1991.

<sup>7</sup> M. Scheler, *Erkenntnis und Arbeit*, in: *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. by M. Scheler and M. Frings, Francke, Bern-Munich 1960, VIII, "Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft", p. 208. Cfr. also: D. Verducci, *Il segmento mancante. Percorsi di filosofia del lavoro*, (*The Missing Segment. Itineraries of the Philosophy of Work*) Carocci, Roma 2003, p. 51.

<sup>8</sup> Tymieniecka, *Life's primogenital timing*, cit., p. 3. –

<sup>9</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>10</sup> We refer to the convergence of Nietzsche and Scheler on the idea of a "God in becoming" that substitutes the static God of traditional theism. Cf.: G. Cusinato, *Katharsis. La morte dell'ego e il divino come apertura al mondo in Max Scheler*, (*Catharsis. The Death of the Ego and the Divine as Openness to the World in Max Scheler*) ESI, Napoli, 1999; Id., *Scheler. Il dio in divenire*, (*Scheler. The God in Becoming*) Messaggero, Padova 2002. Such progress in the theological conception also entails advancement in the comprehension of time. Nietzsche proposes the expression "God in becoming" in § 238 of *Human, All Too Human*, treating it as a hypothesis to verify. Cf.: F. Nietzsche, *Menschliches Allzumenschliches I*, in: *Nietzsche Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, ed. by G. Colli and M. Montinari, IV<sub>2</sub> 1963. Tr. by R. J. Hollingdale: *Human*,

*All Too Human*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1986. Scheler, in part IV of *Idealismus-Realismus* (in: *Gesammelte Werke*, cit., IX, "Späte Schriften", 1975, pp. 245–253), commenting on *Sein und Zeit* of Heidegger, demonstrates that he has attained the notion of dynamic eternity set within becoming, hence on the level of absolute or ethical time and in contrast to physical, quantifiable time. Cf.: M. Scheler, *Schriften aus dem Nachlass. Band II: Erkenntnislehre und Metaphysik*, in: *Gesammelte Werke*, cit., XI, 1979, pp. 207, 208, 213–214.

<sup>11</sup> This is the intent with which A.-T. Tymieniecka begins the publication of the 3 volumes of the series *Logos and Life*. They are: Id., *Logos and Life. Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason*, Book 1, "Analecta Husserliana", XXIV (1988); Id., *Logos and Life. The Three Movements of the Soul*, Book 2, "Analecta Husserliana", XXV (1988); Id., *Logos and Life. The Passions of the Soul and the Elements in the Onto-poiesis of Culture*, Book 3, "Analecta Husserliana", XXVIII (1990). Cf. in addition: Id., *The Creative Experience and the New Critique of Reason, in Japanese Philosophy*, "Analecta Husserliana", VIII (1979), pp. 205–229.

<sup>12</sup> Tymieniecka, *Logos and Life. The Passions of the Soul...*, cit., p. 9.

<sup>13</sup> A.-T. Tymieniecka, *The pragmatic test of the onto-poiesis of life*, in: "Analecta Husserliana" LXXXIV (2005), p. xiii.

<sup>14</sup> A.-T. Tymieniecka, *The logos of phenomenology and the phenomenology of logos*, in: "Analecta Husserliana" LXXXVIII (2005), p. xiii.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xiv.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xv.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xiv. Cfr.: E. Fink, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation: The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of Method*, tr. R. Bruzina, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995. R. Holmes observes that "the work was written as a continuation of Husserl's five *Cartesian Meditations*: the *Sixth Cartesian Meditation* was drafted by Eugene Fink and then worked on and critiqued by Husserl. It is subtitled *A Transcendental Theory of Method* and was intended—as R. Bruzina, *Introduction to Fink, Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, cit., pp. xlviii–xlix notes—to show that the methodological question in phenomenology, in the 'radical self-reflection' that phenomenology puts into practice, the question of the nature of the move back to the *beginning* beyond which questioning cannot go, is ultimately going to involve the central substantive difficulty of the nature of the difference and identity between human and transcendental subjectivity, between the subjectivity that lives and subsists with the world and the subjectivity that constitutes the world and all in it. This is a question of how a phenomenologist can explicate a subjectivity that both belongs in the world and yet constitutes objectivity and its world. Fink's answer is to the effect that to explicate the sense of world and subjectivity within it (again from the translators introduction) "requires a dimension of reflective analysis in phenomenology that works beyond the strict limits of the intuitional giving of something in its very self [*Selbstgebung*]" (*Ibid.*, p. lviii). That is, it seems to require we violate the fundamental principle of phenomenology to not accept "any judgment as scientific that I have not derived from evidence, from 'experiences' in which the affairs and affair-complexes in question are present to me as they themselves" (E. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, tr. D. Cairns, Dordrecht: Nijhoff Publishers, 1977, p. 13)", R. Holmes, *The sixth Meditation*, in: R. Feist and W. Sweet eds., *Husserl and Stein*, Washington D. C., RVP, 2004, Chapter 3. Cfr. G. van Kerckhoven, *Mundanisierung und Individuation bei Edmund Husserl und Eugen Fink: die sechste cartesianische Meditation und ihr Einsatz*, Würzburg, Königshausen & Neumann, 2003.

<sup>18</sup> Tymieniecka, *The logos of phenomenology...*, cit., p. xxxv.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xv.

<sup>21</sup> A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Impetus and Equipose in the Life Strategies of Reason*, "Logos and Life", Book IV, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000/ "Analecta Husserliana", LXX (2000), p. xxxiv.

<sup>22</sup> Tymieniecka, *Life's primogenital timing*, cit., p. 4.

<sup>23</sup> Cf.: G. Rametta, *Il concetto di tempo: eternità e Darstellung speculativa nel pensiero di Hegel (The concept of time: Eternity and Speculative Darstellung in Hegel's Thought)*, F. Angeli, Milano 1989.

<sup>24</sup> Tymieniecka, *Impetus and Equipose*, cit., p. 98.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xxxiv.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14. The reference is to C. S. Peirce, *Evolutionary Love*, in: M. R. Cohen (ed. by), *Chance, Love and Logic. Philosophical Papers by the late Charles S. Peirce*, New York, Harcourt: Brace & Co., 1923.

<sup>27</sup> Tymieniecka, *Impetus and Equipose*, cit., p. 99.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xxxiv.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 102.

<sup>31</sup> Tymieniecka, *Life's primogenital timing*, cit., p. 4.

<sup>32</sup> Tymieniecka, *Impetus and Equipose*, cit., p. 99.

<sup>33</sup> A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Tractatus Brevis. First Principles of the Metaphysics of Life Charting the Human Condition: Man's Creative Act and the Origin of Rationalities*, "Analecta Husserliana" XXI (1986), p. 3.

<sup>34</sup> A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Logos and Life. Creative Experience...*, cit., pp. 25–26.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>36</sup> Tymieniecka, *Impetus and Equipose*, cit., pp. 13–22: "The CIPHERING of the Inner Working of Life and the Full Manifestation of the Logos of Life"; "The Primal CIPHERING of the Logos of Life"; "The Creative Vision and CIPHERING".

<sup>37</sup> M. Kronegger-A.-T. Tymieniecka (ed. by), *Life. The human quest for an ideal*, in: "Analecta Husserliana", XLIX (1996), p. 15.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.

<sup>39</sup> Tymieniecka, *Impetus and Equipose*, cit., p. 14.

<sup>40</sup> A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Die phänomenologische Selbstbesinnung (I)*, in: "Analecta Husserliana", I (1971), pp. 2–7. In this regard: D. Verducci, *Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. La trama vivente dell'essere. (Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. The Living Weave of Being)*, in: A. Ales Bello e F. Brezzi (ed. by), *Il filo(sofar) di Arianna. Percorsi del pensiero femminile nel Novecento, (The Philo(sophizing) of Arianna. Itineraries of Feminine Thought in the Twentieth Century)* Mimesis, Milano 2001, pp. 66–68. Cfr. anche: D. Verducci, *The Human Creative Condition Between Autopoiesis and Ontopoiesis in the Thought of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka*, in: "Analecta Husserliana", LXXXIX (2004), pp. 4–5.

<sup>41</sup> Tymieniecka, *Life's primogenital timing*, cit., p. 5.

<sup>42</sup> Ivi, p. 4.

<sup>43</sup> Tymieniecka, *The pragmatic test of the onto-poiesis of life*, cit., p. xxiii.

<sup>44</sup> Tymieniecka, *Life's primogenital timing*, cit., p. 5.

<sup>45</sup> Tymieniecka, *Logos' timing of Life – Fabulating history*, in: "Analecta Husserliana" XC (2005), p. xiii.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>48</sup> Tymieniecka, *Life's primogenital timing*, cit., p. 4.

<sup>49</sup> Cf.: D. Verducci, *To reason as living men. Conjecture as the inferential supporting framework of the human condition according to the meta-ontopoiesis of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka*, in: *Phenomenological Inquiry*, 27 (2003), pp. 63–76.

<sup>50</sup> Cf.: A.-T. Tymieniecka, *The first principles of the Metaphysics of Life*, in: "Analecta Husserliana", XXI (1986).

<sup>51</sup> Aristotle, *Physics* III, 201.

<sup>52</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1071b 7.

<sup>53</sup> Aristotle, *Physics* IV, 223a 27. See also: E. Cavagnaro, *Aristotele e il tempo. Analisi di Physica*, 4, 10–14 (*Aristotle and the time. Analyse on Physics*, 4, 10–14), Bologna, Il Mulino 2002.

<sup>54</sup> Tymieniecka, *Life's primogenital timing*, cit., p. 5.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>56</sup> Cf.: A.-T. Tymieniecka, *The Ontopoiesis of Life as a New Philosophical Paradigm*, in: "Phenomenological Inquiry" 22 (1998), pp. 12–59.

<sup>57</sup> Tymieniecka, *Life's primogenital timing*, cit., p. 4.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6–7.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>68</sup> See also: S. Toulmin-J. Goodfield, *The discovery of time*, Harmondsworth, Penguin 1965.

<sup>69</sup> Tymieniecka, *Life's primogenital timing*, cit., p. 12.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 13–14.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>75</sup> Tymieniecka, *Logos' Timing of Life...*, cit., p. xvii.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xviii