Timing and Temporality
in Islamic Philosophy
and Phenomenology of Life

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I. TIME AS PHILOSOPHICAL ENIGMA

That time plays a fundamental role in ontology is the intuition that supports the work, *Sein und Zeit* by M. Heidegger, whose ponderous inquiry, however, was not able to remove the enigmatic character that since antiquity has accompanied the relationship between being and time. Rather, he accentuates it, exhibiting the incapacity to investigate its conversion into *Zeit und Sein* presaged in the work’s outline.¹ Thus even after Heidegger, we lack an adequate philosophy for understanding time, and we still find ourselves in the condition described by Augustine of Hippo, who, even while he had awareness of time, no longer knew the answer to what time was, if asked about it.²

According to Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, the being-inside and being-outside of time in comparison with being of traditional ontology, is emblematic of the current dissatisfaction of philosophical aspiration, which since now has been incapable of drawing upon that context of totality and entirety³ that, “if this be at all possible”, reposing in itself and not calling for further justification or explanation, would allow philosophy to advance without delay in its own work of conferring meaning on all the entities that appear bit by bit on the stage of history. In addition, a context of totality and entirety would enable philosophy to avoid always having to delay in devising strategies for researching reasons-of-being, that the restricted and closed horizon of meaning, at the moment available, does not allow it to find.

It is true that speculative thought to produce systematic totalities of meaning is now viewed with diffidence: since from the end of the XIX century to our days, a critical attitude has prevailed against general theories and systems of philosophy seeking to project an all-encompassing context for every philosophical inquiry, because of the fact that illegitimate connections are made between and among various facets of questions. However, even using the hermeneutic methodology in vogue today, it lasts that to find the meaning of a single piece of the “text”, it is always necessary to draw upon “deeper” layers of meaning and to enact “a regression through the entire development

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of culture". Thus not even the methodological updates of the XX century provide philosophy with an adequate context for its progressive development in time: in both speculation and hermeneutics, it remains entangled in the recessive processes of justification or explanation and cannot succeed in unfolding as life would ask it to. The problem of time remains still crucial and unanswered for philosophy, which, not even in its phenomenological inflection with E. Husserl or P. Ricoeur, seems able to transform the inscrutability of the relationship between time and being from an objection to ontological inquiry, to the occasion for its in-depth analysis and expansion.

2. A NEW CRITIQUE OF REASON

And yet, it is intrinsic to philosophical intentionality, inaugurated by Talcott in the VII century BC, to constantly measure itself against time: the search for the principle of all things, in fact, continually re-establishes itself because experience constantly presents anew not-yet-known. Philosophy is born with a duplicity built into its structure, by which the stillness, connected with the contact with ontological apexes, lives alongside the dynamism implicated by the processuality of inquiry, which the interrogative pressure from the renewal of experience keeps active and striving to respond to the question: "How must the foundation and the first cause of the totality of the world be constituted so that such a thing, such an essential structure, may be possible?"?

In addition, as Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka observes, "the various modes of existence (e.g., reality, ideality, fictive existence, absolute existence) are fundamentally distinguished from each other on the basis of their relationship with time. In fact, their ontological structure either necessarily requires the reference to time, as in the case of real existence, which is subject to change and action, or they reject it as incompatible with their own nature, as it happens for ideal existence, which does not entail the possibility of change."

But, on the other side, in practical philosophy and religious philosophy, which reflect on cultural-social life and the specifically human vocation of searching for a personal transcendent destiny, what comes to sight first is not so much time, as life.

Along with Nietzsche and with Scheler, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka holds that it is the traditional philosophy of being which represents an inadequate context for understanding time, and that the moment has come to set out upon "a new critique of reason", given that

also in the sphere of the phenomenological exploration of the 1970s, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka issued calls to search for a new ontological-metaphysical horizon, able to meet the demands of the changed epistemological and social context after Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, Ingarden, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty; but, above all, for an inquiry that would penetrate further deeply than these thinkers had. It meant achieving the Husserlian aspiration of a phenomenology as philosophia prima and at the same time to victoriously accept the challenge issued in the 1950s by Alfred Tarski. The great mathematician and convinced neopositivist, in fact, doubted that phenomenology could overcome "the pragmatic test" and demonstrate its "universal validity", taking position as the discriminating and inescapable reference on the terrain of "the issue of theory and practice". In that period, the question of the human as well as technical value of philosophy for cognition and praxis, even though it is "one that strikes at the knot of all the great philosophical questions we have inherited from two and a half millennia of tradition", arose above all in terms of the relationship between the inspirational role phenomenology has played in the human sciences and in the empirical and hard sciences, and philosophy's ability to maintain, as philosophia prima, the status of universal reference. In particular, the question was: "Is philosophy, in its new familiarity with concrete knowledge, losing his status of universal reference – of 'first philosophy'?"?

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka responded to this demanding question, producing the "phenomenology of phenomenology" that Husserl had left incomplete, even though "other levels of rationality, towards the revelation of various perspectives of the logos" had come to light following his investigation, rooted in pure intellectual reason. However, they were underestimated, or even ignored by the first generations of phenomenologists who for this reason failed to attain the goal of endowing phenomenology with an "absolute cognitive ground". In this context many students and experts of phenomenology demanded it be improved, and thus arose the radical exigency, "to follow the progress of the method in order to inquire into its very logos and its yieldings". To do so, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka subjects phenomenology itself to a "reduction", but one that goes "in another way" and represents "a different track" than "that of a 'last' transcendental reduction of transcendentality, of transcendental constitution as such" proposed by E. Fink and approved by Husserl, in the Sixth Cartesian Meditation.

In fact, this entails, on the one hand, escaping the trap in which Husserl was caught, "by [his] identifying the intentionality of consciousness with cognition", and on the other, revealing "the ultimate nature of rationality
forces and their operational rules resulting in the inventive outburst that then upset the equilibrium of vital and existential forces”. In fact, “by taking the investigation of the creative/inventive virtualities of the human being as the starting point of philosophy, rather than the cognitive act, we enter into the heart of the ontopoiesis of life in which both nature and culture are situated”.

The identification of such a logos, at once living, human and ordering, and therefore pre-ontological and proto-ontological, inasmuch as ontopoetic, is also innovative from the point of view of the enigma of time: in fact, the new logical context finally enables examination of the ancient problem of *kronos* and *kairos*, breaking “the timeless pattern of surrender to nature” and rendering inadequate the millenary equilibrium of life between nature and human beings, and between the gifts of nature and their use by living beings. 

### 3. THE HUMAN CREATIVE CONDITION

The success of such an approach has received an absolutely essential contribution from A.-T. Tymieniecka’s research beginning in the 1970s, through which she reopened access to the life for the constituting transcendental consciousness and, on the basis of the “conscious-corporal” experience (*Leib-bewusst*), reflexively went beyond the essential “givenness” of the constitutive genesis of objectivity, in the direction of its “inner working as the locus whence eidos and fact simultaneously spring”, in the conviction that “not constitutive intentionality but the constructive advance of life, which carries it, may alone reveal to us the first principles of all things”. From this new theoretical position, Tymieniecka has been able to demonstrate that the function of individualizing constructivity, which oversees the evolution of life, determining its growing specialization and complexity, finds its culminating expression in the stage of development marked by the appearance of man, the living being endowed with Imagingio Creatrix.

The creative function, guided by its own telos, generates Imagingio Creatrix in man, as the means, par excellence, of specific human freedom: that is, freedom to go beyond the framework of the life-world, the freedom of man to surpass himself.

Thus, when life reaches the level of the human creative condition, it no longer limits itself to reproducing itself, but in the acts of life of man always engages in “self-interpretation-in-existence”, giving rise to new and previously unimaginable forms of life that are congruent with and adequate for the becoming being of life, of which only man possesses “the cipher”. For this reason, man is radically the bearer of the metaphysical
exigency: in fact, in order to orient the virtualities in his possession in the direction of positive realization, he needs to find the reasons of "beingness" and to draw upon the principle of being, through which he confers on creations the indispensable character of humanly adequate "objective" form, that makes them graspable and usable. Of crucial importance at this point is the fact that being, so spontaneously set into play, does not limit itself to maintaining the importance of the "indispensable essential factor of all beingness", in the sense of classical metaphysics, inasmuch as it "concerns beingness in its finished, formed, established or stabilized state".

Rather, to the degree in which it appears in the acts of the human living, being manifests itself as "the intrinsic factor of the constructive process of individual becoming". This means that, since "becoming is a process in its own advance, in qualification" and since the individual "remains always in the process of becoming", that is, continually proceeding toward "something that is not yet"\(^{27}\), being, involved in the human creative acts from which becoming proceeds, acts as intrinsic stabilizing anticipator of the acquiring and transforming of form characterizing the natural evolution of the individual life. In this sense, compared to all other givennesses, that of man within his world is not simply comparable to a "process-like nature", but expresses a specific temporal type of constructivism, which furthermore is not reduced to what is developed during life, nor does the human being operate only as "meaning-bestowing-agent", producing its life-world, as Husserl proposed. Man begins before to "create according to being" (= ontopoiesis), because:

... his [man's] very life in itself is the effect of his self-individualization-in-existence through inventive self-interpretation of his most intimate moves of life.\(^{38}\)

A.-T. Tymieniecka has thus overturned the classic phenomenological priorities, introducing what C. S. Peirce called the "primary reality of philosophizing, its firstness: the reflective agent, who is self-organized and self-regulating".\(^{39}\) He is independent of anything else because of his creative act with the fulgurating force of *Imaginatio creatrix*. This is presented as the Archimedean point of the human enterprise, instead of the intellectual intentionality of the objectifying constitution.\(^{40}\) The ensuing unveiling of the Logos of Life, as the intrinsic factor of life's origination and unfolding in innumerable rationalities, opens the pristine field of life to an ontopoietic investigation. The phenomenology/ontopoiesis of life is therefore opened as the ultimate level of reason: a primordial ontology, that brings innumerable novel insights, included the possibility of a new conception of time.

4. TIME AND ONTOPOIESIS

The re-integration of ontology into the original triple matrix of becoming, in which a) the human creative condition b) the self-individualization of life's being and c) the existential tentacles revealing the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive\(^{41}\) all interact, also requires that time and temporality be torn out of their undue inscrutability and, inasmuch as they are placed back into the orbit of the being-life, the logos of which is revealed, that they be re-accepted into a structure of meaning able to comprehend them wholly. Now, time appears as "the main artery through which life's pulsating propensities flow, articulating themselves, intergenerating".\(^{42}\) In fact, when consciousness takes on, as the Archimedean point for the beginning of research, not "the epistemic perspective", but the "creative/ontic perspective", the peculiar one to human creative condition, "the ordering of living beingness is unveiled at its core, qua the primogenital exfoliation of the logos of life". The phenomenology/ontopoiesis of life establishes itself "at the level of generation", where the becoming of living existence encounters "the constitutive epistemic-presentational manifestation".

In the arteries of becoming, these same beingnesses in their generative phases, as much of expansion as of deterioration and in the existential interchange with the vital enigmas of other beings, show themselves to be resident in the primogenital function of life: the self-individualization of beingness. This self-individualization of the living beings is sustained by the forces and dynamisms that now have become accessible, inasmuch as they are received, distributed and/or rejected by the operative nucleus of the "ontopoietic sequence", which comes on stage "with each life commencing" and acquires awareness with human life.\(^{43}\) The conscious reflection, that is able to listen to this ontopoietic logos of life, can thus enter safely into the labyrinth of the living being, following the weave of self-individualization that life itself produces and that reveals, if one follows its "existential tentacles", the "unity-of-everything-there-is-alive". In such a conscious unfolding of the logos of life as ontopoiesis, the consideration of time is enormously deepened: the subjective and objective aspects of time are no longer isolated and the infinite succession and the infinite duration are no longer so distinct; time and temporality, no longer absolutized, once again find themselves located in their original and primogenital position, in that genuine unitary perspective that was lost speculatively and that now has been regained.\(^{44}\)

"Life times itself"\(^{45}\), such is the discovery that the logos of life communicates to consciousness, when the latter gains awareness that it is a living being. The secret of the "ontopoietic unfolding of life", "the ultimate generation of
beingness-in-becoming” has by now been revealed: “ontopoietic becoming times its advance at each and every one of its steps”. In this way, also “the universalizing and objectifying of movement, change and becoming that humanity has for millennia assumed in various ways as a means by which to regulate the flow of human existence amid confluence and interaction, yields a universally valid order of life’s course, one accepted by all and one that assumes ‘time’ as ‘real’, whereas [...] it is just a hypothesis.”

“The grand, infinitely complex, flexible artery-in-progress of the constructive advance of life”, which is time, encompasses “its relevant cosmic links” and “its reach for a portal to the transcendental aspirations of the human being”. For this reason, we can now discover time amid all the infinitely changing modalities with which the simplifying human mind categorizes the innumerable ways in which processes, events, functional units, etc. advance life (chronos) toward its nodal points of accomplishment (kairos), as well as amid the specific circumstantial, as well as the essential, strivings (and the crowning significance of their accomplishment) at the very heart of the poiesis of life.

With striking intuitive and conjectural capability, A.-T. Tymieniecka attains, in her phenomenology of life and of the human condition, or in her theory of the ontopoiesis of life, just such a new and broadened perspective on philosophy and meaning, in which “kronos” and “kairos”, which elude ontological and scientific categorization, offer themselves in their originary modality.

A.-T. Tymieniecka acknowledges that Aristotle was the one who located the physical body and the notion of time “in the same time-motion and space-soul context”: he saw time immersed in the physical processes, and generating itself with them, but could not detach it from the soul. In fact, time consists of “now moments” that, involving a “before” and an “after”, while they number the movement, require that there be “someone” to measure or count the space of time, and the soul represents such an “indispensable synthesizing principle for the measurement of time”. So indispensable that later Leibniz, even though he was a good Aristotelian and forcefully proposed both the monad as the crucial factor of life in the world, and the vis viva as the motor of intra-mundane nature, did not see fit to name it in the spatial-temporal matrix of every-possible-world.

In the perspective of the phenomenology of life, the entire Aristotelian reflection on time is assumed and reinterpreted. In fact, on the one hand, the physical world here is inserted with full rights into that of life, while on the other hand, the ontopoietic horizon representing the most recent achievement of the logos of life, “reposes in itself, without turning to further points of reference”. In the revision of the meaning of time within the new vital context, A.-T. Tymieniecka draws from a neutral and universal concept of motion, which, however, already in Aristotle is seen very soon as oriented toward constructive movements in the cosmos and toward movements of life that are constructive and goal-oriented. Already in the consideration of physical movement, “time and motion remain in reciprocal relation to each other when it comes to measurement”, conforming to the Aristotelian indication in Physics, 220b 14-22: “we measure not only motion by time but also time by motion, because they determine each other mutually: because time determines motion of which is the number and movement determines time”. In the interpretation of time and movement, there emerges a reference to the measurer; if it is the soul that measures, then there emerges the question of the criterion with which it operates. Does the soul create the measure? Or does it simply bring to completion the operation of measuring and counting? Perhaps the soul itself is time that creates its numbering? The question is not resolved by the idea of the soul “as an intellectual observer”; rather, it requires interpreting the soul as the “integral factor of all that moves, that is, of living beings and the life-processes in which they are entangled” and explaining its role in the “processes and progress of life, of ‘coming to be and passing away’”.

At this point, A.-T. Tymieniecka’s conception of life as self-individualizing-in-existence plays a fundamental role: in fact, according to this perspective, “it is through a crucial specific existential/ontological device that differentiates all life from non-life, that is, through the inward/outward oriented central ‘agency’ of the individualizing beingness, that life’s ontopoietic processes are carried out”; therefore, it turns out phenomenologically that we are not dealing with a “universal or universalised” generic motion, but with the specific movement of the Bios, which numbers time. This confirms the Aristotelian vision that assigned to each living being a soul, like “a system of articulation with a glimmering of consciousness”. Leibniz also observed that even from the simplest forms of life, the soul shows that it possesses a capacity for synchronization.

However, in the ontopoietic context of life, it emerges that the soul does not only play “a counting role”: it does not merely observe the temporal succession; rather, exercising “a living function” of organizing, articulating and dynamically operating, the soul introduces distinct phases into the temporal process and acts as “an articulator of motions into their successive, concurrent and telic knots, a configurator of phases and culminating-points of accomplishment”. In the degree to which we can avail ourselves of the meaning horizon of the ontopoiesis of life, we can proceed beyond Aristotle and Leibniz and grasp the soul, that gathers all the life-processing
functions and through them articulates the constructive progress of life, as the concrete principle of life itself, as promoting through life’s functioning the movement through which time is numbered. The soul, which Tymieniecka has conceived of as

a stretching over the entire territory of the self-individualizing processes of life, comprises then all the being’s circuits of energy and forces, all stirrings, moves, operations, and processes, from the simplest vital ones, through those psychic and gregarious ones orchestrated by the entelechal principle of vital significance, up to the emergent Human Condition, which with its creative orchestration ushers in freedom and the specifically human significance of life.63

Correspondingly, in the degree to which the soul is identified as the concrete principal of life itself, it also turns out that

time, being originally and primordially coeval and congenital with the constructive deployment of life, and hence to be distinguished among the relevancies, both those cosmic and those abstractly rational, participates in two lines of a combinatory strategy of life, and hence has one twofold modality, that of kronos and kairos.65

5. KRONOS AND KAIROS

However, if time and movement are functions of a progress that constructs life and if time appears in the crystallization of the motility proper to the vital functioning, then we can no longer identify temporality principally with succession, as has happened till now. In the constructive phases in which life crystallizes itself, in fact, that is, in the phases of generation, of growth, of fruition, of decline, and of extinction, in measuring the interval of time it is not enough to identify “a direct cause-effect nexus in which the lapse of time is to be apprehended as a sequence in which each occurrence or event would have a clearly traceable cause and be in turn the cause of the next occurrence, change, transformation”, “The vital process of bios do not proceed through we can only abstractly distil from the entanglements of the functions which carry them on”! On the contrary

the ontopoietic course of life proceeds through the confluence of numerous operations, processes, moves, stimuli and it is this confluence to perform the transformative or sensorial-motor operations. This confluence itself crystallizes in a multiple motion. Hence it crystallizes in time, which lends it a “moment” of fulfillment, the measure of the step onward in the process of growth or decline.64

In order to measure the interval of time in the ontopoietic course of life, it is therefore necessary to use the modality of “confluence”. In fact,

each constructive advance of individualizing life (e.g., the opening of the petals of a flower, the rise of the sap of a tree in early spring, the cross pollination of flowering plum trees effected by insects . . . ) is a result of a bundle of results – of numerous operations and processes, each of them crystallizing segments of time that flow together to work a change, a transformation, a moment of constructive progress.

Consequently, whether or not consciousness registers it, “life-bios–is timing itself. It measures itself, and thus its temporal spread by its natural constructive advance in the cyclic cosmic order”65. It is not time that orders; time is not added to the construction factors from outside. The movements of the vital operations that begin in the latent organic forces, emerging from other apparently not organic forces, or movements of a virus that enters in a cell to reproduce itself, all these temporally regulate themselves from within and their advance marks and measures the temporal process itself. In this way, the measure of movement — of organic/sensorial/psychic movement and that of time that crystallizes in it—springs from the movements within the sentient and living soul of the living being.

On the other hand, this crystallization, universally constructive/destructive of time, takes place in virtue of the more radical self-constructive tendency of life, that expresses itself in a self-individualizing progress, supported by an “entelechal principle of life”, from which emanates an “entelechal framework” that, like a pre-existent model in the germinal state, presides over the constructive advancement of life toward self-realization. In this ontopoietic unfolding, every juncture of development and every step forward participates in a broader construction, in an interwoven and interconnected network that flows from different functional sectors but in which all the parts cooperate with each other. Each operative confluence, which constitutes a segment of the constructive advance, is constructive because, even while it is not taken for granted, it appears oriented by a final principle, toward a successive stage that has been prepared as a task to bring to completion with respect to the previous stages of the process.66 This positive and constructive deployment of the operative moments to the point of confluence is what determines in temporality the arrival of the “propitious moment”67 that is to be understood as “the confluent moment of the constructive mode”.

In conclusion, if we identify “the long winding operations and processes of timing” with the notion of “kronos”, we subject them to the simplifying effect of the impartial observation of human intelligence, which reduces time to succession or continuity of happenings and events. In order to grasp “stances of kairos”, we must focus on “the multifaceted timing of the constructive achievements that punctuate life’s progress”. Thus if kronos indicates the order and the sequence of life, moments of kairos are “life-constructive fulments marking ontopoietic progress, and their occurrence within the play of favourable and contrary conditions”. Starting from these
experiences of living temporalization, we also deal with the complicated problem of cosmic time and mechanical temporality. Since we have no evidence of “movement timing itself” in the cosmos, we approach these moves and processes as “stripped-down versions of the timing of life” and so posit for it an abstract line of succession, seeing only lifeless mechanical motion. In this way, we reach both cosmic time and the time of mechanical movement, and equally, the uniform abstraction “of all of time’s qualitative life-coordinates” in the measurement of time with the hourglass, the clock, and the metronome. “We empty the prototype of living time of all its genetic content, leaving a mere skeleton.”

6. HUMAN HISTORY

The reign of Bios is coextensive with temporalization itself, placed as it is between the two extremes of the need for the constructive entelechial principle and of the chance of the external conditions of the unfolding of the principle. Kronos and kairos are the arteries of life and take form in this oscillation.

A gradual change intervenes in this situation in the moment in which the animal species emerge, in the course of evolution, in the complexity of their forms and their growing “flexibility”, in adhering to the internal request and the external offerings to oppose adversities and seize opportunities. This flexibility reaches its culmination in the emergence of a new category of life, that of human freedom. In fact, it is between freedom and arbitrariness that human self-individualization oscillates. The timing of life’s self-unfolding, its self-interpretative course, here undergoes several transformations, with time as kairos coming into its own. Kairos here assumes original, uniquely significant roles with respect to the specifically human significance of life, its projecting of new avenues, history, and the personal quest for transcendence.

In effect, it is in the crystallization of the human creative condition that the entelechial decodification, up to this point relatively rigid, of the law of life in the progressive unfolding of the species in evolution, attains the flexible, inventive, incessantly transformable progress of the “free will” or of the imagination of the human being. In this way, kairos and kairos take on new modalities and new roles. Temporalization itself passes through the innumerable interrogatives concerning the entire sphere of human life in its universality: freedom, coercion, arbitrariness, order and disorder, monotony and revolt, peace and crisis in personal and social life. On the one hand, there are still the regular and daily activities and gestures, while on the other, there is the incessant flow of aware and personal psychic life, made up of stimuli, sensations, emotions, motivations, and conscious acts, all variably linked together. The process of human self-individualization defines itself by striving for accomplishment: tasks, goals, and ideals, projected inventively by the human creator emerge, in fact, as the fruit of the creative human re-orientation in the surrounding world and thus pose themselves in contrast to the organic and vital sensorial movements constructive of life that were previously given. Thus, even though due credit should be given to the progress of the evolution of the species from the entelechial flexibility to the exercise of freedom, at the point in which the creative orchestration of the specifically human emerging function establishes itself, the crystallization of the creative function in the human condition remains the principle example of the emergence of the unique temporalization that is the kairos. Within the new creative functional orchestration, in which human will seems to rise on the wings of the Imaginatio Creatrix above all natural urges, we see introduced “the primordial moves of the human spirit”, “the thrust toward the other”, “the will to undertake” and lastly “the deliberative inventive quest”. These functions activate themselves in the sphere of the evaluative framework, that installs the human creative condition in the esthetic, moral and intellectual perspective and open to the specifically human evaluation of life. In addition, these factors of the human dynamic operate in the limits that the world of life projects in structures and rules: thus the human being, while striving to always go beyond, because of the creative push, maintains his creative and inventive drive in the open but not absolutely unlimited confines of the human, following a direction that it fundamentally finds within the confines of the system of life itself.

With the advent of the human condition, we witness the emergence of an extraordinary sphere of expansion of the work of self-individualization and self-interpretation toward the interior and toward the exterior of the living being. However, interior life, the life of experience and consciousness, manifests a temporalization of its own, because kronos and kairos become more acutely defined in our sensations, feelings, thoughts, and judgements and in their concatenations. In particular, temporalization of the interior awareness self-interpretative course inserts itself in the model of kairos, inasmuch as the acts not only succeed each other, but in the proceeding, form new modalities of experience that can also be seen as monotonous. But, “when animated by hidden inner stirrings toward ventures, projects and aspirations that are to be actualized in the external realm of life, inward acts acquire the “exciting” rhythms of kairos striving for “accomplishment”.

It is thus that the experience of human life in its interiority and in its external activity are transported by two connected arteries: in fact, they are marked by kronos, “the everyday tact carrying on of repetitive assignments for life’s
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8 Tymieniecka, Life’s primordial timing, cit. p. 3.

9 Ibidem.


12 Tymieniecka, Logos and Life. The Passions of the Soul..., cit., p. 9.


15 Ibid., p. xiv.

16 Ibid., p. xv.

17 Ibid., p. xiv. Cfr.: E. Fink, Sixth Cartesian Meditation. The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of Method, tr. R. Brunaia, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995. R. Holmes observes that "the work was written as a continuation of Husserl’s five Cartesian Meditations: the Fifth Cartesian Meditation was drafted by Eugene Fink and then worked on and critiqued by Husserl. It is subtitled A Transcendental Theory of Method and was intended—as R. Brunaia, Introduction to Fink, Sixth Cartesian Meditation, cit., pp. xlviii–lix notes—to show that the methodological question in phenomenology, in the ‘radical self-reflection’ that phenomenology puts into practice, the question of the nature of the move back to the beginning beyond which questioning cannot go, is ultimately going to involve the central substantive difficulty of the nature of the difference and identity between human and transcendentality, between the subjectivity that lives and subsists with the world and the subjectivity that constitutes the world and all in it. This is a question of how a phenomenologist can explicate a subjectivity that both belongs in the world and yet constitutes objectivity and its world. Fink’s answer is to the effect that to explicate the sense of world and subjectivity within it (again from the translators introduction) requires a dimension of reflective analysis in phenomenology that works beyond the strict limits of the intentional giving of something in its very self [Selbstgebung]" (Ibid., p. lviii). That is, it seems to require we violate the fundamental principle of phenomenology to not accept “any judgment as scientific that I have not derived from evidence, from ‘experiences’ in which the affairs and affair-complexes in question are present to me as they themselves” (E. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, tr. D. Cairns, Dordrecht: Nijhoff Publishers, 1977, p. 13)? R. Holmes, The sixth Meditation, in: R. Freit and W. Sweet eds., Husserl and Stein, Washington D. C., RVP, 2004, Chapter 3. Cfr. G. van Kerkoven, Mundanisierung und Individualisierung bei Edmund Husserl und Eugen Fink: die sechste cartesianische Meditation und ihr Einsatz, Würzburg, Königshausen & Neumann, 2003.

18 Tymieniecka, The logos of phenomenology..., cit., p. xxxv.

19 Ibidem.

20 Ibid., p. xv.


22 Tymieniecka, Life’s primogenital timing, cit., p. 4.


24 Tymieniecka, Impetus and Equipose, cit., p. 98.

25 Ibid., p. xxxiv.


27 Tymieniecka, Impetus and Equipose, cit., p. 99.

28 Ibid., p. 100.

29 Ibid., p. xxxiv.

30 Ibid., p. 102.

31 Tymieniecka, Life’s primogenital timing, cit., p. 4.

32 Tymieniecka, Impetus and Equipose, cit., p. 99.


38 Ibid., pp. 4–5.


41 Tymieniecka, Life’s primogenital timing, cit., p. 5.

42 Ibid., p. 4.

43 Tymieniecka, The pragmatic test of the ontopoiesis of life, cit., xxiii.

44 Tymieniecka, Life’s primogenital timing, cit., p. 5.


46 Ibidem.


48 Tymieniecka, Life’s primogenital timing, cit., p. 4.


Tymieniecka, *Life's primogenital timing*, cit., p. 5.

Ibid., p. 6.


Tymieniecka, *Life's primogenital timing*, cit., p. 4.

Ibid., p. 6.

Ibid., pp. 6–7.

Ibid., p. 7.

Ibidem.

Ibid., p. 8.

Ibidem.

Ibid., p. 9.

Ibidem.

Ibid., p. 10.

Ibid., p. 11.


Ibid., p. 15.

Ibid., pp. 13–14.


Ibid., p. 16.

Ibid., p. 16.


Ibid., p. xvii